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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

WELCOME

3

MS. CALLISON:

This is the second day of the

4

Joint DOJ/FTC Workshop on Merger Enforcement.

5

contained a lot of interesting information and useful

6

panels.

7

well.

8

Yesterday

I'm sure today we will follow that up quite

I want to let you know that presentation

9

materials from our panelists' papers and slide shows that

10

they have sent in will be available on our respective web

11

sites.

12

be there shortly.

13

hearings of the workshop will be available on the web

14

sites at some future date.

15

I wouldn't look for them on Friday, but they will

Thank you.

16
17

Likewise, the transcripts of the

NON-PRICE COMPETITION/INNOVATION
MR. FRANKENA:

This morning we will be focusing

18

on the discussion of the effects of mergers on

19

innovation.

20

speak first, and then Ann Malester will go next, and then

21

Dick Rapp, and after that, we will have an open

22

discussion between the panelists and the audience, with

23

audience participation and so forth.

24
25

Our panel today is Steve Sunshine, who will

When I was asked to moderate this distinguished
attorney and economist panel on mergers and innovation,
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1

my first thought was to seek input from the investor

2

community which didn't seem to be represented.

3

So I asked my friend Tom, who after all has

4

about 1,000 patents, whether he could address the

5

relationship between competition and innovation this

6

morning.

7

that he had addressed this very matter back in 1889, when

8

someone proposed that his firm, Edison General Electric

9

and its competitor, Westinghouse Electric call a truce in

Well, Tom couldn't join us, but he reminded me

10

their war to sell electric systems to cities and towns

11

around the country.

12

Tom explained that he refused to go along with

13

the proposal because, and I now quote from a contemporary

14

letter from Edison:

15

usefulness as an inventor is gone.

16

be worth a penny.

17

incentive.

18

"If we make the coalition, my
My service wouldn't

I can only invent under thought of

No competition means no innovation."
But my real difficulty with this statement,

19

though I -- after I read it I noticed that it was written

20

on April Fool's Day in 1889, so I don't know how much

21

weight to put on it, but that's a statement from an

22

important inventor.

23
24
25

Okay.

With that, could I ask Steve to get us

started?
MR. SUNSHINE:

Thank you.

I'm happy to be here
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1

this morning.

2

speaker.

3

Professor Davis.

4

therefore, could not be with us.

5

extreme way to get out of doing this talk, but I did last

6

night consider that.

7

I was not supposed to be the lead-off

The lead-off speaker was the distinguished
He ate some bad fish yesterday and,
It seemed like a rather

I struggled for how to title this talk, and

8

like everything else, the inspiration came to me because

9

of something my 12-year-old son did.

I was listening to

10

this song by Smashmouth called "All Star," which I'm sure

11

you all have heard.

12

it for you.

13

Don't worry.

I'm not going to sing

There is a line in there that says, "I'm not

14

the sharpest tool in the shed."

15

between that and innovation analysis were just

16

immediately obvious, as I'm they are to everyone sitting

17

here in the room.

18

To me, the parallels

The point that I will make generally today is

19

that innovation analysis has its uses.

20

it the sharpest tool in the shed.

21

question, and hence the title, when should this tool come

22

out of the shed?

23

I wouldn't call

That leads to the

Just as an overview, I hope that these

24

propositions here are pretty non-controversial, at least

25

the first few ones are.
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1

Innovation is an important dimensional rivalry

2

and intervention of progress.

3

lot of dispute for this point.

4

have been done over time have said that innovation has

5

been responsible for the vast majority of economic

6

progress that has been made over the last century.

7

I don't think there's a
I think the studies that

Then when we try to actually apply it to merger

8

analysis, can we actually predict the effect of a merger

9

on innovation?

We will talk more about this later.

I

10

think it's fair to say that the effects are uncertain.

11

Of course, it's probably also fair to say that the

12

effects of market structure on goods and on the

13

relationship between market performance on goods is not

14

as clear as we would like it to be as well.

15

That leads me to this is, I think, where we get

16

a little bit more into my view, and others clearly have

17

different views, the legal and economic issues.

18

are legal issues here, too.

19

on the economics, but there are legal issues here, too,

20

that legal and economic issues require a showing -- I

21

called it "probable effect on output."

22

"output" here, I don't mean innovation output.

23

output in the goods market.

24
25

There

We have been focusing mainly

When I say
I mean

The Genzyme example, we will get to it, we all
have our views on it, but perhaps Genzyme is an example
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1

where the chairman and the rest of the Commission

2

basically followed the first three bullet points, thought

3

in theory there could be an effect on innovation, but

4

found a set of facts where the merger could not have a

5

demonstrative effect on output, and hence, no case. If

6

that's what they did, count me in.

7

we have to talk about.

8
9

Of course, the facts,

Lastly, just in terms of what does this mean
practically?

My general point on this is going to be

10

that the practical application of innovation markets is

11

infrequent.

12

market cases.

13

industries, pharmaceuticals being the obvious example,

14

and that for reasons that I think some of my co-panelists

15

will go into.

16

We are not going to see a lot of innovation
They are more likely in certain

One of the many big problems with innovation

17

markets is that they are really hard to define.

18

you know an innovation market?

19

standard more than just as spotters, you know, I'll know

20

it when I see it.

21

How do

We'd like to see a

We have to account for trying to identify all

22

the conceivable sources of innovation.

23

account for how do we know what the strengths and

24

significance of the population of innovators are.

25

We have to

Also, the type of innovation that's going on in
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1

the market may be relevant to our confidence in market

2

boundaries.

3

What do I mean?

Well, are there regulatory barriers that are

4

going to make innovation much more structured?

5

innovation tied to certain sets of production assets,

6

where we know that people without production assets

7

really are not effective innovators?

8
9

Is

For that, I would refer to the Department of
Justice's complaint in the General Motors/ZF

10

Friederichshafen case.

11

to an existing set of production assets, and no one could

12

innovate new truck and bus transmissions unless they had

13

those set of processes.

14

That case of innovation was tied

Then another way or type of innovation is

15

patents, but patents are really tricky.

16

patents, patents may mean there are a necessary set of

17

assets.

18

up so that the mergers are complimentary.

19

really careful.

20

When you get to

It may also mean that markets have been divided
You have to be

I won't go through the article that Professor

21

Gilbert and I wrote, but we identify certain sets of

22

factors that you need to find in order to have some

23

confidence that you have an innovation market.

24

don't have that kind of confidence, then frankly you

25

should go home at that point.

If you

If you can't define the
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1

market and you can't define a few players, there's no

2

point in going on.

3

work to do.

4

If you can, of course, there's more

Defining the boundaries of the market is hard.

5

This part is even harder.

How can you actually predict

6

the competitive effects?

How can you assess the merger's

7

effect on innovation and then translate that into an

8

output effect?

9

We start off with, I think, a very obvious

10

question, structures as a means of predicting

11

performance.

12

Who is right, Schumpeter or Arrow?

Schumpeter basically says you need monopoly

13

rents, and it's possible in some industries you may need

14

monopoly rents to actually provide incentives for

15

innovation. Arrow says, on the other hand, because of

16

cannibalization concerns, expected return, that perhaps

17

monopolists do not have the same incentive to innovate at

18

the same rate as others.

19

I don't think it's fair to say the economics

20

literature thinks this is completely an unaddressed

21

question.

22

by Spence, by Stidless, that allows you to make some

23

inferences.

24
25

There has been a lot of work done by Scherer,

It's certainly not proven.

I think, also, if you go with just basic
intuition, how many around this room believe that time
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1

after time, monopolists really have a high incentive to

2

innovate?

3

I think it is fair to say that just as a matter

4

of economics, we don't know for sure what the answer to

5

that question is.

6

have our own belief, but we don't know.

7

We might have an intuition.

We may

That leads us right into the second issue,

8

which is the problem of the necessity of case specific

9

evidence.

I think, given the uncertainty in the

10

economics, that all of these cases have to be driven by

11

the actual facts of what's in front of the Commission,

12

what's in front of the DOJ, what's in front of the

13

plaintiff.

14

innovation competition going on between the two, and that

15

each have high incentives to innovate.

16

You have to believe there is important

Again, the GM/ZF case, I guess I have a little

17

familiarity with, was a case where the evidentiary record

18

showed years and years of the two companies actively

19

targeting each other's innovation activities, actively

20

pursuing incremental process improvements, and then with

21

the signing of their merger agreement, saying we're not

22

going to do this so much any more, but then labeling it

23

efficiency.

24
25

That was a fact specific inquiry that led to
say, you know, I think we know enough.
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1

is right sometimes.

2

we are now in the Arrow camp with these facts.

3

Maybe Arrow is right sometimes, but

I touched on incremental versus revolutionary.

4

This is an idea of how big the innovation is.

In some

5

ways, incremental innovations may be the ones that are a

6

little bit easier to understand how to protect.

7

be easier to define where the sources of that innovation

8

are going to come from.

9

there's much more profit at stake, so there's more

It may

These revolutionary innovations,

10

incentive to pursue them, and sometimes they are harder

11

to tell where they are going to come from, what the

12

source of that innovation is going to be.

13

In the incentives, I don't think you could

14

understand the incentives to innovate until you

15

understand the nature of competition between the

16

innovations.

17

downstream level.

That's going to require looking back at the

18

Are two pharmaceutical companies going to be

19

manufacturing exactly the same chemical compound that,

20

you know, once they get to the market, they are going to

21

be in competition with one another, and there's no orphan

22

drug status.

23

will be in competition with one another.

24
25

You know, once they get to the market, they

That may lead you to one set of conclusions.
If on the other hand these products are so sufficiently
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1

different they are going to be attacking different

2

markets and there will be a high expected return, maybe

3

there will be an incentive for both products to be

4

developed.

5

going to open up so many new applications and increase

6

demand that there will still be a strong incentive to

7

invest.

8
9

I don't know.

Maybe the second invention is

Confidence that the reduction in innovation
will lead to an output effect.

That goes to all the

10

previous statements, too, but here, I think you have to

11

take into account downstream competition.

12

are downstream products that are competing against your

13

upstream products, and those are going to continue to

14

spur innovation.

15

What if there

I think that what all this is saying is that

16

there are a lot of steps to go through in order to get to

17

this level of confidence.

18

the effect outweighed by innovation efficiencies?

19

Lastly, I put down here, is

Let me just throw in a point just as a matter

20

of personal opinion.

I know this is not necessarily

21

accepted by everybody.

22

whole idea of merger specific efficiencies.

23

after the fact, sitting around and saying gosh, I think

24

these guys probably could have done a contract research

25

and development joint venture.

One of my pet peeves is this
People,

To me, that is a naive
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1

view.

2

I think the analysis should be here's the deal,

3

here's what life would be like absent the deal, and is

4

the world a better place or not, but to try to social

5

engineer efficiencies seems to me to be a misguided

6

approach.

7

What I've done by putting efficiencies as part

8

of the competitive effects, I haven't shifted the burden

9

of the efficiencies to the defendants.

I think it is

10

still part of showing -- to show an output effect.

11

Eventually, this really belongs in the camp of the

12

plaintiff, because you can't show the effects unless the

13

efficiencies don't outweigh the other benefits.

14
15
16

Enough about economics.

What about the law?

I'm running behind.
There have been a lot of consent decrees.

17

There has been a complaint that the Department of Justice

18

filed that did not go to trial.

19

other cases where innovation is sort of talked about but

20

not a true innovation market.

21

There have been some

Does Section 7 really allow us to have an

22

innovation market?

The few cases that exist on this, I

23

think, say that without actual sales and a line of

24

commerce, that perhaps you don't have a market, which if

25

that was true, that would doom Section 7 analysis.
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That's my view, and what Gilbert and I wrote in

2

our articles is that it would be misplaced for Section 7

3

to not recognize an innovation market theory.

4

why I say that, we would start from, I think, a pretty

5

easy proposition that says that merger analysis should be

6

designed to identify those mergers that lead to reduction

7

in welfare, to lower output.

The reason

8

The analysis that I just went through, if you

9

can go through that analysis and come to the conclusion

10

that output is reduced, you have satisfied what is the

11

basic condition.

12

market, I think, is the innovation market essentially

13

identifies the place of competitive interaction where the

14

problem arises, and then the output market actually

15

defines where the effect is felt, and it defines the line

16

of commerce and the section of the country that the law

17

is trying to protect.

18

Then the question on an innovation

In that way, I would draw a loose analogy, and

19

it's not a perfect analogy, to a vertical merger.

20

actual output market, there's no direct effect.

21

could look at input, you could look at innovation as an

22

input or an upstream product in a vertical merger, but I

23

would say if you look at the Medicorp vs. Humanas case

24

and some of the other cases cited in the stuff that we

25

wrote, there are some courts that have gone other ways,
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1

because they are thinking cookie cutter, define a market,

2

measure the market shares, prima facie case, blah, blah,

3

blah.

That's one way of doing it.

4

The second point, can plaintiff prove a

5

non-speculative effect in a reasonable amount of time? I

6

think that proposition stands for itself.

7

a defense that I would want if I was defending against an

8

individual market case.

9

importance of being able to actually have the documents,

This would be

This just goes back to the

10

the market evidence, and everything else to show that

11

this is a real problem.

12

I know I'm running short and I want to leave

13

time for some conversation.

14

this.

15

I won't spend much time on

Ron Davis, who was going to lead off, was going

16

to say burdens, where's the beef?

17

why all the fuss?

18

plaintiff.

19

Hughes say that upon the establishment of a prima facie

20

case, that the burden of production shifts over to the

21

defendant, but the burden of persuasion always remains

22

with the plaintiff.

23

I was going to say,

The burden of proof is always on the

We all know that.

We know that PNB and Baker

I think in the Genzyme case, while it was just

24

an investigation, it wasn't a case, I have to imagine

25

that the defendants satisfied a burden of coming forward
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1

with evidence.

2

It seems to me that any proper application of

3

this kind of analysis would lead to the burden going back

4

to the plaintiff to persuade they were actually right.

5

If Commissioner Thompson's dissenting opinion

6

means something else, with a presumption, then he means

7

something else, which I think is not in step with the

8

case law, perhaps even for output markets, but certainly

9

not for innovation markets for the reasons that we have

10

talked about.

11

Problems of the investigator.

The first point,

12

I think, is obvious to everybody sitting in this room.

13

The investigator has a duty to evaluate the transaction

14

before it.

15

serious competition in innovation, what are you going to

16

do?

17

just let the transaction go if you think there is going

18

to be a problem.

19

In the transaction before you, if you see

You have a duty to look at it.

You don't want to

You have to dig in.

The law with the state of the economics, there

20

is no easy path here, is there?

We have just been

21

through it.

22

could be some adjustments, depending on who is involved,

23

the burden of proof is clearly going to be on the

24

plaintiff, and the plaintiff and the investigator will

25

have to show a number of difficult issues.

I think the burden of proof, while there
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space which will occur, the merger's likely effect on

2

innovation, the manner in which output will be reduced,

3

and again, output is output in a goods market, and when

4

the output effect will be felt.

5
6

Not easy stuff, right?

We are talking about doing this in at least two
different markets, two different spaces.

7

Again, as sort of the last resort of the

8

investigator, the importance of empirical evidence from

9

the merging parties in the markets cannot be overstated.

10

Without the evidence, the economics isn't going to get

11

you all the way there.

12

evidence.

13

You are going to need the

I won't go through this in any kind of detail.

14

I just thought through questions on how I might think

15

about doing an innovation analysis.

16

Is innovation an important dimension of

17

rivalry?

18

for price effects.

19

beer.

20

The answer is no, forget it.

Why bother?

Look

Go out with your colleagues for a

Second question, will innovation effect

21

existing product markets in a reasonable amount of time?

22

The answer to that is yes, let's not worry about

23

innovation markets.

24

Let's do a competitive effects on the goods market.

25

Gil will remember, this was the Microsoft/Intuit case.

It sounds like a goods market to me.
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We toyed with bringing a case in an innovation market.

2

We said we have a real market here, why are we bothering?

3

Innovation is an important dimension of competition.

4

one of the two players is in the market, then we have a

5

potential competition case.

If

6

I had to sit back for a second and say, I think

7

a potential competition case is easier than an innovation

8

market case?

9

Well, there you have it.

Can the boundaries of the innovation market be

10

determined?

11

play.

12

Again, I put the efficiencies in with the obligations of

13

the plaintiff.

14

show there is an effect, then the plaintiff should also

15

be comfortable showing the efficiencies don't outweigh

16

the other effects.

17

We went through that.

It's not child's

Does the merger provide incentives us to innovate?

Again, if it's the plaintiff's job to

And then last, the harm to the output market,

18

without this last piece, not only do we have an economic

19

problem, but we clearly have a legal problem as well.

20
21

With that, I know it's all painstakingly clear.
Thank you very much.

22

MR. FRANKENA:

Thank you.

Ann?

23

MS. MALESTER:

Well, I must say that I'm really

24

surprised that this many people showed up this early in

25

the morning to hear us talk about innovation markets, but
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1

this must mean all of you are certainly aware that we

2

have been having a debate in the antitrust world for well

3

over a decade about what the antitrust agencies should do

4

about the concept of innovation markets, and essentially,

5

should there be any enforcement actions in this area?

6

As you know, there are those who believe that

7

because the empirical economic data has not been

8

conclusive in showing a correlation between increased

9

concentration and reduced innovation, that really the

10

antitrust agencies should just throw up their hands and

11

walk away and not think about bringing enforcement

12

actions in this area.

13

There are others, and I count myself in this

14

group, who believe that preserving competition at the

15

research and development stages is really important, but

16

recognize, as Steve has pointed out, that there are some

17

real problems and a lot of difficulties in really

18

assessing how innovation markets should be defined and

19

what the antitrust agencies' role really should be there.

20

First, let me just give you two reasons why I

21

think that it's vital for the agencies to preserve

22

competition and be vigilant in protecting competition at

23

the R&D stages.

24
25

First of all, because in the long run, a merger
that reduces the pace of innovation can be far more
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1

harmful to consumers than a merger that results in a

2

price increase of quality decrease.

3

Second, because in the real world, where

4

companies compete every day, it's very clear that

5

competition is the primary incentive that spurs increased

6

level of innovation.

7

In preparing for this workshop, I re-read the

8

testimony that the FTC received during the 1995 hearings

9

on global competition.

What struck me is that although

10

the economists could only agree that it was really

11

inconclusive and they weren't sure what the evidence

12

showed, the business officials who testified during those

13

hearings were, and I'm quoting the words of the staff's

14

report, "Unanimous and emphatic in their view that

15

competition is the primary incentive for innovation."

16

I spent well over a decade at the FTC as an

17

assistant director in the merger division.

18

hundreds of documents, and talked to dozens of business

19

officials, who told us that they supported that

20

conclusion.

21

I have seen

When you look at the reality of the way

22

businesses make their decisions, I think it's clear that

23

typically businesses invest more resources, work harder

24

and work more quickly in their research and development

25

efforts when they are faced with the possibility that
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they will be beaten to the market by another firm that's

2

working to develop a competing product.

3

We saw evidence in our investigations that

4

companies often spend a great deal of time tracking the

5

research and development projects of other companies that

6

are working in their general area.

7

information about the schedule and progress of competing

8

R&D programs, and they make investment and priority

9

decisions based on the level of competition they believe

10

Companies seek

they face.

11

They also confirmed that being the first to

12

introduce a new or improved product can be critically

13

important to many industries.

14

that gives you increased market acceptance, lock in of

15

customers, there are many reasons why in some industries

16

reaching the market first is very important for future

17

success.

A first mover advantage

18

Having said all that, I really do agree with

19

Steve when he explained that it is much more difficult

20

for the plaintiffs to predict under what circumstances a

21

merger is likely to reduce the pace of innovation, and we

22

know that it's not that easy to even predict when a

23

merger will result in a price increase.

24
25

In many cases, it is difficult to identify all
the potential sources of innovation, or to identify
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whether the merged firm will have both the ability and

2

incentive to reduce the pace of innovation after the

3

merger, and finally, even harder to decide what type of

4

efficiencies, if any, the merged company will be able to

5

achieve in combining their R&D programs.

6

I think it's for that reason when you look at

7

the past 10 years in enforcement at both the Justice

8

Department and the FTC, you will see first a relatively

9

small number of cases where the agencies alleged only a

10

reduction in innovation, not tied to an existing current

11

goods market, and second of all, you see those actions

12

that there are generally in the pharmaceutical and

13

defense industries, where first of all, it is quite easy

14

to identify generally the companies that are

15

participating in research and development, and where the

16

barriers to new companies beginning development are

17

extremely high.

18

Let me turn for a moment to the Genzyme

19

investigation, which is the most recent pronouncement by

20

the Commission, and which brought forth three separate

21

statements by the Chairman and Commissioners Thompson and

22

Harbour.

23

That decision could be the subject of an entire

24

panel, so I'm just going to talk about two points.

25

First, really the question about whether in innovation
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markets, there should ever be a presumption of

2

anti-competitive effects at any level of competition, and

3

second, my own views of what Genzyme might tell us for

4

future Commission enforcement decisions.

5

On the first point, I was frankly puzzled by

6

the seeming importance that all the statements placed on

7

whether or not there should be a presumption of

8

anti-competitive effects.

9

feeling that in existing goods markets, where

Somehow, that left me with the

10

presumptions are raised at much lower concentration

11

levels than was the case in Genzyme, but the antitrust

12

agencies bring an enforcement action every time a

13

presumption of legality is raised.

14

nothing could be further from reality.

We all know that

15

I think that the data that the Justice

16

Department and the FTC released two weeks ago on

17

horizontal mergers and the concentration levels and which

18

ones resulted in enforcement versus closing, make it very

19

clear that even in existing goods markets, there are

20

highly concentrated markets where merger may reduce the

21

number of competitors from three to two and even two to

22

one, where in some cases, the Commission did not bring an

23

action or the Justice Department did not bring an action.

24
25

What does the presumption mean?

It only means

that the merger deserves a really close scrutiny, and
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that the agency in question will spend as much time as it

2

has to develop an intensive fact based analysis.

3

I don't think there is anyone at the Commission

4

who believes that Genzyme did not deserve that kind of

5

close scrutiny.

6

Commissioners spend a great deal of time and effort in

7

analyzing the large investigatory record, and in

8

assessing what the facts were and what the analysis

9

should be, and that is really what I think the

Both the agency staff and all of the

10

presumption means, that it's a case that warrants that

11

kind of scrutiny.

12

Finally, let me just talk for a minute about

13

what the impact of Genzyme is and what it tells us about

14

the Commission and its likely enforcement in the

15

innovation markets.

16

First, I think clearly the Commission's

17

decision indicates that the current Commission is likely

18

to approach any innovation market analysis with a lot of

19

caution, but there are four reasons why I think you

20

shouldn't read too much into what the Commission may do

21

in other cases based on the Genzyme decision.

22

First of all, I think it's important to note

23

that not one of the three statements that were issued was

24

signed onto by anyone other than the author of that

25

statement.

Two of the Commissioners, Commissioners
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Swindle and Leary, although they voted to close the

2

investigation, did not join in any of the statements that

3

were the public statements that were issued.

4

Second, in the Genzyme case, both companies,

5

Genzyme and Novazyme, were actually in the late clinical

6

stages of drug development, which is earlier than the

7

other innovation market cases where the Commission has

8

investigated and taken action before, and that means that

9

the likelihood of both products making it to market is

10

less than in the other cases the Commission has looked at

11

in the pharmaceutical area.

12

Third, the drugs in question were covered by

13

the Orphan Drug Act, which grants a seven year market

14

exclusivity to the first drug that makes it to market.

15

think that fact also makes it less likely than in a

16

traditional pharmaceutical market that both drugs would

17

in fact compete in a future goods market, and finally,

18

the Genzyme acquisition was not reportable under the

19

Hart-Scott-Rodino Reporting Act, and the transaction had

20

closed well before the Commission was in a position to

21

assess its legality.

22

Trying to design a remedy in an innovation

I

23

market in a consummated merger where the core assets are

24

scientific personnel, know how, access to academic

25

researchers, and many other human factors, really
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presents quite a daunting task, and the vast majority of

2

cases that the agencies face, which isn't the typical

3

Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-merger review, I don't think raise

4

the same level of difficulty in designing and

5

implementing a remedy.

6

In sum, I think Genzyme was a very important

7

case because it gave the Commission an opportunity to

8

look at a really complete investigatory record, and to

9

take the time, which often doesn't happen with Hart-

10

Scott, to really debate the issues.

11

Obviously, different people at the agency came

12

to different conclusions on what the facts were and what

13

the conclusions should be.

14

exercise at the Commission.

15

I think it was an important

I also think the specifics of that case and of

16

the market in question and the fact that there wasn't a

17

majority opinion on what the appropriate analysis should

18

be, at least should leave everyone with some caution in

19

predicting what the Commission will do in future cases.

20

MR. FRANKENA:

Thank you, Ann.

Dick?

21

MR. RAPP: I'm in the situation that many FTC

22

speakers are in.

I have to issue a disclaimer before I

23

begin, because there are many of my colleagues at NERA

24

that disagree with my extremist positions.

25

over there, the man with his fingers in his ears, has the
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look of participatory mortification on his face, is one

2

of those.

3

not shared by everybody at my firm.

4

I want you to know that my point of view is

I do find myself once again as the extremist in

5

the group, wishing to repeal entirely the use of

6

innovation market analysis.

7

For those of you who do not know me, I want to

8

assure you that it is not that my position is what it is,

9

not because I'm an anti-interventionist generally, that

10

the good government shouldn't put its aura in, et cetera,

11

that is a poor characterization of my views about almost

12

everything else.

13

I am an opponent of the use of innovation

14

market analysis frankly for an arcane epistemological

15

reason, and that is there is an absence of underlying

16

theory, and in a nutshell, what I mean is that antitrust

17

works well when it is based upon economics.

18

a science.

19

explanation, a hierarchy of general laws and law like

20

statements.

Economics is

What that means is that it uses scientific

21

The horizontal merger guidelines are a

22

wonderful example of economic science for policy

23

purposes.

24

demand elasticity, which is right in the mainstream of

25

the laws of economic science, going all the way up to the

The SSNIP test and other devices invoke the
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law of demand.

2

Cournot's welfare triangle, Stigler's theory of

3

oligopoly, all underpinnings of the merger guidelines are

4

inherent, and the guidelines have a strong theoretical

5

basis.

6

facts as well.

7

concerned.

8

market analysis is basically reasoning by analogy.

9

policy premise, as I see it, is the proposition whether

10

the social gain from stopping an R&D merger exceeds the

11

social gain from letting it go through is predictable,

12

that you can tell which way that inequality will run.

13

By the way, we observe consistency with empirical
That is secondary as far as I'm

I care most about the fact that innovation
The

I think the only basis for that that I can

14

perceive is an analogy to the relationship between

15

competition, quantity and prices in goods markets, and

16

the analogy is false.

17

article, as many of you know, in 1995, that captures my

18

views about that subject.

19

I won't dwell on that.

I wrote an

Looking now in the five minutes I have, because

20

I will not impinge on the discussion period, where you

21

get to drag out of me in conversation, let me make just

22

three quick points, two of them relating to Genzyme and

23

then an attempt to be a little constructive instead of

24

being a naysayer.

25

accuse me of bothering an ugly baby.

Steven here is sick of having to
Let me see if I
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can't do something better than that.

2

Whose baby is that?

I want to point out -- I'm going to go through

3

this whole slide -- it's really the first point that I

4

wish to remark to you about, and that is that I am an

5

admirer of Chairman Muris' statement in Genzyme.

6

remarkable to me for the fact that it changes the basic

7

policy rule.

8

with peculiar circumstances of the case, but one should

9

not lose sight of the pun on the word "competition."

10

What we are talking about now is a race to

It is

It has to do, as Ann described very well,

11

monopoly.

It has nothing to do with the kind of

12

competition that is output expanding, price reducing

13

competition, the likes of which we talk about when we

14

talk about horizontal mergers.

15

to do with this.

Market power has nothing

16

The underlying characteristic of -- let me say

17

the most basic finding in the majority statement is even

18

though they are nowhere near the end of the race, that

19

the pace of the two parties is predictable, the issue is

20

not who is going to come in first.

21

the second will come in at all or come in sooner rather

22

than later.

23

It's whether or not

The fact that there is no possibility for delay

24

of the first one getting to the deadline as a result of

25

the merger means the merger has no negative impact.
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That's my quick two second reading of the majority

2

viewpoint without all of the reasoning that follows.

3

All I wish to say is that as an analysis of

4

incentives, it makes a great deal of sense to me.

5

quite novel.

6

The lawyers in the group can consider how it would play

7

at Section 7 or FTC Section 5 enforcement, but I think

8

it's unusual.

9

It's

That doesn't bother me as an economist.

My real focus is on Commissioner Thompson's

10

dissent, because I have to say in the debate between the

11

extremists and those who favor the innovation market

12

approach, as far as I'm concerned, I can't be both a

13

player and a referee, but I have to say as far as I'm

14

concerned, my reading of Commission Thompson's dissent

15

led me to say game over, I win.

16

This is a litany of what can go wrong if merger

17

analysis is applied using its very premise, that is to

18

say reason by analogy to the goods market.

19

You talk about a merger, a monopoly, and speak

20

about market power, even though there are no goods around

21

and market power is not the issue.

22

I know about presumption of anti-competitive

23

effect without either theoretical or empirical basis.

24

There is this -- now we are getting back to the lesser

25

things that I won't dwell on so we can get to the
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conversation part -- this struck me as extraordinary.

2

There is a difference to be expected in the

3

resource allocation of Genzyme, arising from the

4

difference between trying to get the first approval with

5

orphan drug exclusivity, to save a lot of children's

6

lives and make a ton of money, and trying to get first

7

approval with orphan drug exclusivity for a longer period

8

of time for the sake of first mover advantage.

9

I can go along with all of those who say

10

competition spurs innovation.

It makes a certain amount

11

of sense.

You see how the notion can be, I would say,

12

misused.

It represents to me a believer in competition,

13

certainly an oddly crabbed view of human nature.

14

There is a further litany of errors, errors in

15

economics and logic, but I believe here, in Commissioner

16

Thompson's dissent, we can talk about them if you like,

17

my worry is that some day President Kerry might appoint a

18

Commission with this frame of mind, and that is the

19

reason why a line of by and large sensible -- I won't say

20

unobjectionable -- to me, understandable decisions both

21

by the Pitofsky Commission and the Muris Commission, are

22

not good evidence that we are okay with the innovation

23

market concept.

24
25

Let me see if I can do what Chairman Pitofsky
did to me at the 1996 hearings, to try and find some
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2

compromise in my extremist position.
At the very end of that panel, he put the

3

following question to me.

He said, look, just imagine

4

that Boeing is building the next airframe.

5

jet engine makers.

6

cam systems and start designing the new jet engine that

7

would go along with that.

There are two

They are about to sit down with their

8

Do you propose that the Federal Trade

9

Commission, if they came to us and said we want to merge,

10

we want to do a joint venture, we want to turn those two

11

research efforts into one, that we ought to just go away?

12

My answer to him was no, sir.

What I wish I

13

had said is no, sir, and here is why.

No, sir, because

14

you can do a goods market analysis, even though the first

15

good, the design and character of either good has not

16

been invented.

17

research effort and whether or not they will pour it on

18

to a greater degree on R&D spending or effort, if they

19

merge, because you can't predict that.

You have the means to analyze not

20

What you can do is you can say, look, this is a

21

case where there are going to be two goods competing with

22

one another versus one, if the merger or the joint

23

venture takes place.

24

guidelines reasoning to deal with that, and that makes it

25

okay with me.

We can use horizontal merger
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My attempt at a constructive end to my

2

extremist talk here is to say that to the extent that we

3

are -- let me put it in terms that Mark used when he

4

wrote us a series of possible questions to discuss.

5

I think the distinction between innovation

6

markets that pay attention to R&D effort, about which we

7

know very little and predict very little, the distinction

8

between that and future goods markets, which to me means

9

taking only those cases where we can actually foresee

10

what the goods are and what the number of players, the

11

number of pricing voices will be, and make some attempt

12

at doing horizontal merger guidelines analysis.

13

That distinction between innovation markets on

14

the one hand and future goods markets is very great, and

15

as far as I'm concerned, one that should strive and be

16

well, and the other should quietly go away.

17

Thank you.

18

MR. FRANKENA:

Thank you.

Just following up on

19

that, I'd like to ask Ann a question.

20

in 1995, the antitrust agencies had completely listened

21

to what Dick said, and had said that henceforth, in going

22

forward, we won't be defining innovation markets.

23

think innovation is important and we think competition

24

may affect the rate of innovation, but we're not going to

25

delineate innovation markets, so we don't want our staff
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to be doing that.

2

My question for Ann is what difference would

3

that have made in the types of investigations, things

4

like that?

5

MS. MALESTER:

I think there are maybe two

6

examples that I can use to show you why I think Dick's

7

approach presents enormous dangers to competition, that

8

would allow mergers to proceed, that I think would have

9

really, really serious anti-competitive impact.

10

The first might be similar to the case that the

11

Justice Department brought, and I think it was during the

12

time Steve was there, Lockheed/Northrop Grumman.

13

It was really a step further back from the

14

Boeing example that Dick and Chairman Pitofsky talked

15

about, where the Justice Department raised the concern

16

that there were only three companies left in this country

17

that really had the capabilities of designing military

18

aircraft, and if Lockheed were permitted to buy Northrop

19

Grumman, that would be reduced to two.

20

There were no specific plans for a fighter

21

aircraft, but as we all know, in military procurements,

22

there are eventualities that arise that very quickly turn

23

the Defense Department into needing something new to meet

24

a new military challenge.

25

Even though there wasn't a future goods, a
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specific program or product on the drawing board, both

2

the Justice Department and the Defense Department felt

3

very strongly that one of the reasons to block that

4

merger was to preserve the capabilities of designing and

5

producing a particular weapons platform.

6

I think that is a step sort of removed from

7

Dick's position of we have to have a specific good that

8

we are looking at, even if the first one hasn't been

9

produced yet.

I think it's a case that if allowed to

10

proceed would have very serious anti-competitive effects

11

for our economy, and in that case, for our national

12

security.

13

The second point I want to make is moving even

14

further back away from the future goods markets, and this

15

may be something that is specific to the pharmaceutical

16

industry, and that's an industry that I did a lot of work

17

in, but may be applicable to others.

18

I'm not sure.

That is apart from looking at what the impact

19

of eliminating the merger is on the future goods market,

20

is it going to mean that there will only be one company

21

selling a product at some point.

22

There is actual competition going on during the

23

research and development phase when two companies know

24

that they are both trying to develop the drug, and want

25

to get approval first.

Those companies will, for
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example, do clinical trials that involve many more

2

patients, to make sure they get a broader range of

3

patients with different kinds of seriousness of disease.

4

The kinds of clinical trials they do, the

5

amount of effort and outreach to patients they do, there

6

are benefits right now in the present of having two

7

companies competing to develop a drug, completely

8

separate from the actual benefits, potential benefits,

9

that we are not sure will be realized because we don't

10

know yet if both companies will successfully develop the

11

drug.

12

I think that may not be completely responsive

13

to your question, Mark, but I think that gives an idea of

14

the different kind of scenarios that gives me concern, if

15

we take Dick's position to say absent a very identifiable

16

good that companies are actually producing or are about

17

to produce, the agency should simply step away.

18

MR. SUNSHINE:

Let me just jump in here, too.

19

I was actually tremendously comforted by Dick's last

20

example, but if we go back to the engine example, and

21

engines take years and years to develop, but if it's that

22

situation where Dick sees a potential enforcement action,

23

what we are talking about is the area of competitive

24

interaction between the two companies is in research and

25

development.
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Yes.

There will be a goods market, but that

2

goods market is a long way off.

3

we normally consider to be within the reach of Section 7

4

of the Clayton Act.

5

Usually outside of what

Innovation market is an immediate step to

6

identify where the activity of the two companies come

7

together and where there might be an actual reduction.

8
9

In the case that Dick put forward, there will
be less innovation competition in developing this new

10

engine some years off, which will translate itself into

11

output.

12

If you want to say, no, no, that's not an

13

innovation market, that's a future goods market, fine.

14

Now we are talking semantics.

15

MR. RAPP:

Are we talking semantics then if we

16

rule out the application of the innovation market concept

17

to the Genzyme case?

18

we could make about how many goods would otherwise go to

19

market, what the future market would look like.

20

are no such goods.

21

There, there is no prediction that

I see that as a sharp distinction.

There

In other

22

words, my primary criteria is that the analysis not deal

23

with issues like the degree to which R&D spending will be

24

cut back or reduced.

25

some future, some prediction about a future goods market.

It has to do with an analysis of
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That's the distinction I want to draw.

2

MR. SUNSHINE:

How do you get there?

How do

3

you get to the output effect on the goods market without

4

understanding what's going on at the research level?

5

MR. RAPP:

It maybe that what I'm talking about

6

comes very, very close to the concept of potential

7

competition, where we are already very close to home.

8
9
10

You can do that even if the design of the goods
hasn't occurred, if you can predict the future.

This is

a closed conversation.

11

MR. SUNSHINE:

But just on the potential

12

competition, you would then relax the two year time

13

frame.

14

MR. RAPP:

15

MR. SUNSHINE:

16
17
18
19
20
21

Sure.

It means nothing to me.

Now, I think we are just in

different legal labels for looking for the same effect.
MR. FRANKENA:

All right.

You will need to get

a microphone.
MR. DANIEL:

I'm Tim Daniel, the aforementioned

NERA colleague of Dick.
I would be curious -- I liked the jet engine

22

example a lot.

Suppose one flows into that going into

23

the production process that Boeing and everyone else

24

knows that there is some probability that this engine

25

simply will not be a success, that the project they have
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on the table is for an airplane that requires advances in

2

science and advances in material science or something

3

where there is some probability that engine won't work.

4

So, you don't know with certainty there will be such an

5

airplane in need of such an engine.

6

I would be curious if the panelists generally

7

could just speak to how that analysis might change if

8

that were thrown in.

9

MR. SUNSHINE:

I think it's an essential part

10

of the analysis.

11

on what exactly are the incentives of the parties, and

12

what effect is the combination going to have, factors in

13

terms of are there efficiencies that come from it, the

14

necessary investments, because of the size of the project

15

and the risk of the project, whether it requires one firm

16

instead of two.

17

Again, the idea has got to be a focus

All those considerations go into the question

18

of whether this makes sense or not.

19

we have talked about before, applying straight horizontal

20

merger guideline standards to this innovation question is

21

misplaced.

22

For all the reasons

If this project is so risky that two firms need

23

to do it together or it won't get done, I think that

24

answers the question.

25

Let me stop there.

I'm sure Dick doesn't feel
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differently about it.

2

different view.

3

I don't know, Ann, if you have a

MS. MALESTER:

It seems to me it is not only

4

the question of is the standard that Dick puts forward

5

requiring that we know that a particular product be

6

successful, that they will in fact design an engine,

7

which I think really is a pretty extreme position, but I

8

would take the added step of saying if there are only a

9

very small number, in this case, two companies, that have

10

the technology and know how and expertise to design

11

aircraft engines, then we should be concerned about

12

allowing that merger for future aircraft engine

13

developments that aren't even yet on the drawing board,

14

and that was really why I brought up Lockheed/Northrop.

15

Stealth technology.

That was another reason

16

why the Defense Department and Justice Department felt it

17

was critical to keep a number of companies that knew how

18

to --

19

MR. RAPP:

The quick mental analysis that you

20

did to reach that conclusion doesn't really have much to

21

do with an analysis of what is going to happen to R&D

22

efforts.

23

if it is decades down the road, how many goods are going

24

to be available at the end.

25

it's processible in economics, as opposed to assertions

It has to do with being able to forecast, even

I'm okay with that because
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about whether more R&D or less R&D effort will arise and

2

whether that's a better or a weaker thing.

3

somewhere in there, but I won't bother illustrating it.

4

A decade or so ago, we had 27 drug companies,

This slides

5

big drug companies.

6

Is anybody prepared to say that major losses to R&D

7

effort have arisen because of the combination of those?

8

I don't think we are in a position to say that the

9

connection between concentration and innovation --

10

These days, we have seven of them.

MS. MALESTER:

I think that's a very, very

11

different proposition than what we have really been

12

talking about, which is competition or the lack of

13

competition, not whether or not there are 27 or 10, I

14

don't think in any current goods market that would

15

concern us.

16

I do think -- I don't think anyone on this

17

panel has said that we can look at the dollars spent on

18

R&D and say it's more or it's less and that means we are

19

going to get a better product, we are not.

20

Those are really not the issues on the table.

21

The question is whether having competition in designing a

22

new weapons system, for example, is going to provide the

23

purchaser with a better product in the end, a more

24

innovative, a more radical breakthrough.

25

I think there are quite a number of historical
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assessments you can look at that say yes, they do.

2

MR. HOVEN:

I'm John Hoven, Justice Department.

3

I'd like to make the point that each of you

4

were just talking about tools in the shed, and there are

5

many others, and yours are relevant for some purposes and

6

not for others.

7

a good illustration of that.

8
9

I think the Lockheed/Northrop merger is

The presumption of the innovation markets
analysis is that innovation is a very predictable

10

process, just like building bricks.

11

and you get a product.

12

You spend the R&D

A good example is the expectation that the kind

13

of innovation we are looking at is innovation that has a

14

known identifiable product at the end.

15

extent, that was true, and to some extent, that was not

16

at all true in Lockheed/Northrop, that innovation in many

17

industries is a process of ideas coming together in

18

unexpected ways and you want to preserve an industry

19

structure that allows that to continue to happen, and in

20

particular, in some cases, an innovation structure that

21

generates ideas, products that nobody can think of yet.

22

I think to some

I think the general process of innovation

23

analysis ought to be one in which one inquires how does

24

innovation take place in this particular industry, and

25

maybe it's the kind of approaches you are discussing, but
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

44
1

there are a lot of others that should be examined as

2

well.

3

MR. SUNSHINE:

I think certainly in the

4

framework that I put forth, and I think in the framework

5

that actually Muris puts forward in the statements, is

6

the recognition of what you said is exactly right.

7

The question is should we examine the

8

innovation market and under what circumstances can we

9

actually accomplish innovation effects.

10

minority of cases.

11

predict it, then you should go home.

12

It's a small

If you can't have the confidence to

Once you say that, then if you're talking about

13

innovative activity, there are three categories of what

14

can happen.

15

the future product.

16

in existing product, or it can be innovations that won't

17

be used at all.

18

It can be innovations that will be used in
It can be innovations that are used

That last category I don't think antitrust

19

enforcement should care about.

For the first two

20

categories, now we are talking about legal theories, is

21

it a competitive effect of a goods market, is it a

22

potential competition case.

23

to that is.

24

have to have developed your legal theory and put it

25

forward.

I don't care what the answer

When you get into a court, you are going to
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To me, that's the connection.

Find the

2

innovative effect, put it with confidence under the given

3

set of facts, if you can.

4

in the business.

5

there's a case.

6

If you can't, you shouldn't be

Identify an output effect, and then

MR. RAPP:

May I just add a sentence with that

7

in mind?

It is perfectly consistent with the majority

8

statement in Genzyme, but I think, and this is the

9

troubling part from my standpoint, that it is also

10

consistent with the dissent, in that Commission Thompson

11

may have used the same reasoning and had sufficient

12

confidence in his ability and that of his advisors and

13

staff to see through these issues.

14

example of what can happen when innovation market

15

analysis goes wrong.

16

MR. SUNSHINE:

I think it's an

I agree with your criticism of

17

Commission Thompson's dissent, and I think it is wrong.

18

I think in that dissent, he does make a straight analogy

19

to a goods market, for the reasons we have talked about,

20

that is improper.

21

Commission, I think it would be misguided.

22

what Chairman Muris says.

23

If that were the policy of the

MR. FRANKENA:

That's not

I have a question for Dick.

24

Based on Chairman Muris' statement, and if you just

25

accept the facts, are you comfortable with that word of
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"analysis," of trying to reason out the effects on

2

incentives and so forth?

3

MR. RAPP:

Yes.

I'm comfortable with

4

"analysis" as long as it reaches the conclusion that is

5

functionally the equivalent of not making innovation

6

market policy.

7

One of the reasons that I admire what the

8

Chairman's statement does is that it reasons sensibly by

9

analyzing the incentives to an outcome that says let's

10

leave this alone, and what I find hard to imagine, and

11

maybe it's the shortage of imagination on my part, I have

12

a great deal of respect for our former chairman who would

13

advocate this policy, of Steven and Rich Gilbert, who are

14

the parents, but I cannot imagine a well reasoned

15

economic statement -- a statement that is well reasoned

16

in economics that says and now let's intervene.

17

MR. FRANKENA:

Taking a broader view here, one

18

of our panelists wrote in the mid-1990s antitrust laws

19

and merger enforcement in particular have not focused

20

sufficiently on the consequences of market power for the

21

pace of industrial innovation.

22

I'm just wondering broadly whether you think

23

the agencies are doing sort of the right amount, too

24

much, and so forth.

25

MR. SUNSHINE:

Those words sound strikingly
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familiar.

2

I don't know where they came from.
Again, those words were written in 1994 and

3

1995.

I think that during the time period after that,

4

there has been a whole set of investigations by both

5

agencies where there has been real focus on innovation.

6

There are cases where I would certainly agree

7

with Dick that innovation analysis may have been carried

8

to the extreme or inappropriately applied or applied

9

without basis.

I would not take the position today that

10

innovation is under enforced, but as I said today and I'm

11

glad we stuck with the analogy of tools in the shed, it

12

is a tool in the shed.

13

the shed.

14

circumstances.

15

sure.

16

It is not the sharpest tool in

It's one that should be used only in the right
I don't feel it's under used today for

MR. RAPP:

I'm going to not answer the question

17

directly but raise an issue that arose out of the global

18

marketplace report, the 1996 report, and it was

19

specifically quoted in Chairman Muris' statement, which

20

puzzles me enormously, and I wonder whether I am the only

21

one.

22

That is this business of saying we recognize

23

the potential infirmities with this approach, so we are

24

going to be very cautious and conservative and apply it

25

in circumstances where only small number mergers are
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involved.

2

Is that a fair statement, Ann?

3

MS. MALESTER:

4

Do you mean small number of

competitors?

5

MR. RAPP:

Small number of competitors.

6

that is not conservative.

7

one that thinks that?

8

avoiding waste, in that if you don't carry innovation

9

market analysis into every seven into six merger, you are

10

receiving resources in some sense, but in those settings,

11

in the large number settings, you are going to have --

12

the likelihood is that the merger is going to be allowed

13

because somebody else is going to win, and if there's a

14

false positive that arises in your innovation market

15

analysis, in your merged number setting, it's not going

16

to be that consequential because somebody else is going

17

to get to the finish line.

18

That's radical.

To me,

Am I the only

It's conservative in the sense of

My definition of non-conservative radical

19

enforcement is to take this controversial concept to look

20

only to those mergers where it will be consequential

21

because you are intervening in a merger that is going to

22

determine the output of innovation, if you will, and

23

where if you get it wrong, there has to be harm as a

24

result.

25

do mean by "conservative," but we shouldn't lose sight of

It's a semantics issue on the one hand, what you
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the fact that we are only doing it into two to one

2

mergers, so it must be benign.

3

opposite is true.

4

MS. MALESTER:

At least in my view, the

I think really the reading of

5

what that global report meant and what the Chairman, I

6

think, alluded to, is simply the consensus that an

7

unilateral theory is by far the most likely if we are

8

going to apply an innovation market at all, and generally

9

speaking, you are looking at a very small number of

10

companies that have the specialized assets, so to speak,

11

to be innovating in the market before you are even

12

starting to think about unilateral theories.

13

was the impact of that.

14

MR. RAPP:

15

MS. MALESTER:

That really

I don't disagree.
In terms of your point of yes,

16

it's radical because where it makes a difference, we will

17

just turn it around and say it makes a difference, and

18

from my point of view, because I think protecting

19

competition where it makes a difference is important, I

20

think it is the right place to put our efforts.

21

MR. RAPP:

If that statement were always

22

prefaced by the prior statement, that the reason to be

23

conservative is that we are dealing in a realm of

24

uncertainty when we can't be all that confident that the

25

decisions that we make will be the correct ones, if it
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weren't for that, I could go along easily.

2

combination of those two things together strikes me as

3

problematic, my only point.

4

MR. SUNSHINE:

The

Let me ask you one question tied

5

to Genzyme.

Suppose that the drug in question did not

6

qualify for orphan drug status.

7

outcome of the case?

8

you who are not pharmaceutical, it's not a winner take

9

all situation.

Does that change the

Orphan drug status, for those of

10

MS. MALESTER:

11

that go into coming to a decision.

12

orphan drug situation adds a complication, but in and of

13

itself, shouldn't bar there being a case altogether, and

14

it's one factor you look at in a very large number of

15

factors in assessing whether or not the Commission should

16

take action.

17

MR. FRANKENA:

I think there are a lot of facts
In my own view, the

Just one final question.

Is

18

there anything that you think the antitrust agencies

19

could or should try to clarify about their approach to

20

analyzing the effect of mergers on innovation?

21

anything left they could actually do?

22

MR. RAPP:

Is there

I think conversations like this are

23

illuminating.

I can't think of anything other than that.

24

You know, seeing Greg Werden and Luke over there sitting

25

side by side leads me to ask a question.
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fair, forgive me.

2

Are there or have there been interactions

3

between the agencies about the differences in the

4

application of it?

5

the comparison.

6

drugs gets a lot more cases where entry barriers are high

7

and things like that.

8

or not there is interaction between the agencies on

9

enforcement of innovation markets.

10
11

I won't ask for specifics.

Obviously, the FTC, with its focus on

MR. FROEB:

I'm curious to know about whether

Not on specific cases, but

certainly on general policy matters, I'd say yes.

12

MR. WERDEN:

13

MR. SUNSHINE:

14

None that I participated in.
I thought Greg and Luke were

working on the 2004 innovation market merger guidelines.

15
16

That's

MR. FRANKENA:

Thank you very much.

I'd like

to thank both our panelists and the audience.

17

(Applause.)

18

UNILATERAL EFFECTS

19

MR. FROEB:

Welcome to the session on

20

unilateral effects analysis.

21

today.

22

We have five speakers

We have Greg Leonard.

He's here.

I know he's

23

here.

We will start with Valerie Rabassa from the

24

European Commission, followed by Joe Kattan, Greg Werden,

25

and Tad Lipsky, and then Greg Leonard, if he gets here in
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2

time.

He will bring up the rear.

There he is.

I want to thank the panelists for agreeing to

3

come on relatively short notice.

4

the staff who has put together this conference, and also

5

worked on the enforcement data, getting the enforcement

6

data together, and releasing that as part of our desire

7

to be more transparent to the external bar and the

8

external community.

9

I also want to thank

I also want to acknowledge the efforts of my

10

predecessor, Dave Scheffman, who began much of the work

11

that is now just coming to fruition.

12

By 1999, they had displaced the structure

13

conduct/performance paradigm in industrial organization

14

economics, thinking on pricing and output coordination in

15

oligopolies had evolved considerably from the view that

16

it made coordination almost inevitable.

17

While economists never entirely rejected

18

coordinated effects theories for mergers, they did reject

19

exclusive reliance on them, and they had more plausible

20

theories for many cases.

21

that unilateral effects analysis appeared prominently in

22

the 1992 horizontal merger guidelines, which were jointly

23

promulgated by the FTC and the Department of Justice.

24
25

Thus, it was not surprising

The unilateral effects analysis satisfied the
attorneys' demand for simple intuition that they could
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

53
1

understand and explain to a judge, and at the same time,

2

it satisfied the economists' demand for more rigorous

3

analysis.

4

structural theoretic models to make quantitative

5

predictions of unilateral competitive effects.

6

It wasn't long before economists began using

In a price setting model, price goes up.

In an

7

option model, firms don't have to bid as aggressively to

8

win.

9

bargaining power.

In a bargaining model, the merged firm gains
In the equality setting model, well,

10

we learned that mergers aren't usually profitable with

11

equality setting models.

12

The controversy surrounding unilateral effects

13

analysis has focused on the application of structural

14

models to individuals cases, their main virtue is they

15

force assumptions to be made explicit and they provide a

16

clear mapping for the facts of the case to the effects of

17

the merger.

18

The shortcoming is that the models are

19

necessarily unrealistic and abstract away from the

20

important features of the industry. As such, the results

21

may be quite misleading.

22

Unfortunately, we have little evidence on

23

whether these models can accurately predict the effects

24

of real mergers.

25

about what is the best way to analyze unilateral effects

Instead, we are left with controversy
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theories.

2

What follows is we will hear from Valerie

3

Rabassa, Joseph Kattan, Greg Werden, Tad Lipsky, and Greg

4

Leonard on this and more general topics.

5

with Valerie.

Let's start off

6

MS. RABASSA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7

Let me talk about the Lagardere case.

It's a

8

European case which took place last year in France.

9

was analyzed by the European Commission.

10

It

It is one of

the leading 2003 cases of the media industry.

11

Let me talk about the transaction.

It was very

12

simple.

13

the first and second player of the book industry.

14

book industry in Europe is characterized by a very high

15

level of vertical integration.

16

industry.

17

publishing right, and who sell the rights to the

18

publisher, and distribute the books to the retailers who

19

distribute or sell the books to the final consumer.

20

given the particularity of these cases was an econometric

21

study carried out for the Commission by Professor Marc

22

Ivaldi, and it studied basically the effects of trash and

23

trees in the downstream segment.

24
25

The transaction concerned a transaction between
The

Different animals in this

In the upstream market, you have the

And

It was very interesting because it was the
first time that we incorporated an econometric study into
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a final decision.

2

measure, as you know, the entire concentration, the fix

3

in price, and then we have the impact to the final

4

consumers who produce and choose a profit of the firm.

5

In this study, they will in effect

So this was the launch with VUP, if Lagardere

6

had decided to increase price obviously unilaterally,

7

some of the final consumers would turn to the other

8

competing publisher, who may reach VUP.

9

thought of the concentration with VUP has shared a

So I've always

10

subsidiary of Lagardere to accept part of this

11

competitive pressure, and so can recover part of these

12

customer.

13

In this case, we use a very strong model, the

14

nested logic model, which is quite adapted to the book

15

industry, which is characterized by differentiated

16

products.

17

family of the discrete choice model, which was very

18

interesting in this case because obviously you cannot buy

19

too seminal a book.

20

The logic model, as you know, is from the

The consumer in this case made a discrete

21

choice, a model, a different set of economists and then

22

choose a book on the concerned list.

23

consistent with the Bertrand Model of competition and the

24

estimation was three stage least-squared.

25

Simulation is

So the reasons why it's quite interesting is
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because we find that the end price of the books were

2

significantly increased in the downstream segment.

3

Obviously, we were looking at the consumer surplus and we

4

find that consumer surplus will also fall significantly,

5

which was equivalent to a very negligible part of the

6

turn-over of industry in the field I'm generally tied to.

7

What was wrong obviously there is that the

8

price increase was linked with the market size, and we

9

were able to reconstitute the market size in this case.

10

Again, we decided to receive -- the results

11

were quite robust to incorporate it into the final

12

decision, and we have used a boot strap method to

13

construct confidence intervals that are quite often used

14

in the econometrics field and we find that there is only

15

five percent variability that the price rise to the

16

concentration that could be including significant a

17

significant interval of plus or minus one percent, with

18

the mean value of the price change.

19

Results were quite robust because of the very

20

high number of observation to at least 10,000.

21

different statistical traits were quite significant, and

22

the main parameters, I mean the marginal ATAF of a given

23

book and the intra-brand correlation were quite stable.

24

Altogether I feel that's reasonable to quite robust as

25

for when we decide to incorporate this econometric study
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into the final decision.

2

Thank you very much.

3

MR. FROEB:

4

MR. KATTAN:

Joe, you're next.
I want to talk about, I think,

5

differences between the ways that lawyers tend to look at

6

unilateral effects and the way economists do, and

7

particularly with reference to the new models, the merger

8

simulations that are being done increasingly in

9

unilateral effects cases.

10

I want to begin by just talking a little bit

11

about the 1992 guidelines and what they say, and to

12

contrast that a little bit with the new simulation models

13

and pose the question whether we are asking the same

14

questions, that is do the guidelines give guidance or do

15

these simulation models answer the same questions that

16

the guidelines are asking.

17

I think it's pretty clear that the 1992

18

guidelines really changed the way that people look at

19

unilateral effects before 1992.

20

basically thought of in terms of monopoly or dominance,

21

and the insight of the guidelines was that unilateral

22

effects can arise outside the monopoly context.

23

Unilateral effects were

The merger of Daimler and Chrysler does not

24

exactly have the same effect as the merger of Daimler and

25

BMW, and if you were just looking at HHIs and market
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shares, you may get a misleading answer.
Some people thought we were returning to

3

submarkets, which was a term that had been discredited at

4

least within the Beltway.

5

litigating a case on behalf of the agencies, I would rely

6

on the submarket nomenclature simply because it is

7

something that the courts are familiar with and are

8

comfortable with, regardless of whether that nomenclature

9

really makes a lot of sense in terms of the way we do the

10
11

Certainly, if I were

unilateral effects analysis.
I think it is certainly the case that inclusion

12

of unilateral effects was the most important change in

13

merger law since the 1982 guidelines, and had a very

14

profound effect on merger enforcement, and it wasn't that

15

very long ago that one could hear people talking about

16

whether unilateral effects was in fact the only valid

17

theory for looking at mergers.

18

swung back a little bit.

I think the pendulum has

19

I think it's fair to say that what we saw in

20

the guidelines is a synthesis of good economic theory,

21

but also practical judgment about the qualities of the

22

tools we have available to us in merger investigations,

23

and how refined a judgment we can make about the effects.

24

To repeat very briefly what the guidelines say,

25

not to state the obvious, but to give a benchmark for
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what we are looking at, the guidelines focus on spacial

2

separation between products and product space.

3

is on localized competition where certain sellers compete

4

more closely with one another than with other sellers who

5

are in the same product market.

6

The focus

According to the guidelines, that requires that

7

there be a significant set of shares of consumers who

8

regard the product of the merging parties as their first

9

and second choices, and certainly the way that lawyers go

10

about applying the guidelines is by asking very often

11

about whether we are dealing with first and second

12

choices.

13

when trying to look at a case for the first time.

14

That's one of the first screens one applies

We have a 35 percent screen for the merged

15

entities' market share, the debate whether that is a safe

16

harbor or something else, but in fact, we have seen cases

17

where the market shares were lower than that that have

18

been brought.

19

I think these reflect a pragmatic tradeoff

20

between quality of the analytical tools that are

21

available in merger investigations and the theory.

22

certainly possible to argue, in fact, it has been argued

23

by Greg Werden and others, that you can have an

24

anti-competitive effect in a merger where the merging

25

parties are not the first and second choices of
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1

customers, and you can certainly draw the theoretical

2

picture that would be supported and have numbers to

3

support it.

4

The question certainly in 1992, and not

5

accounting for all developments and the analytical tools

6

that have taken place since then, was what are the tools

7

that we have and how refined a judgment can we make, and

8

the judgment was, at least at that point, we are going to

9

look at next best substitutes.

10

Now, the way that the lawyers tend to approach

11

the issue of unilateral effects is, I think, familiar to

12

most people here.

13

You define a market, and you do that because not only the

14

guidelines say that, but Section 7 case law says that.

15

You look at markets, first of all.

More broadly, I think doing an antitrust case

16

without defining what the market is is a recipe for

17

disaster.

18

There was a recent case involving Rambus

19

Company that is in the news, where Infinion brought both

20

antitrust and fraud claims against Rambus.

21

claims were thrown out because Infinion forgot to define

22

a geographic market for memory chip technology, something

23

that probably would have taken two paragraphs in the

24

expert reports.

25

The antitrust

I think economists often take the position that
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1

defining markets is superfluous if they can get to the

2

answer more directly, and that may or may not be right,

3

but certainly from the viewpoint of the courts, if you

4

don't define the market, you may find yourself out in the

5

street, given a case like Infinion vs. Rambus, where the

6

definition of the geographic market was clearly a red

7

herring.

8
9

Once you define the market, I think the lawyers
focus on the issue of next best substitutes.

Why?

10

Because that's what the guidelines say, and the analysis

11

is driven by interviews and documents.

12

is to ask for way too many documents so that you can have

13

boxes and boxes of documents stacked up in the hallways.

14

A lawyer's fetish

I think there is a critique that one hears from

15

the economists that lawyers use models but don't

16

articulate them with sufficient particularity.

17

Certainly, the legal method does not require articulation

18

of the model the way the economic method does, and when

19

you look at the economic model, it tells you what the

20

assumptions are and if

21

the limitations are.

22

the models are.

23

assumptions are not made, what
Lawyers don't tell you exactly what

The model effectively if we look for

24

significant market share.

We look for next best

25

substitutes, and that embodies certain assumptions on the
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effects of the internalization of loss sales.

2

sales that would have been lost to the merger partner

3

that now is internalized as a result of the merger, the

4

effects of that on the merged firm's incentives.

5

That is

It's certainly true that the economic models

6

spell out their assumptions with greater particularity.

7

Lawyers have an advantage.

8

courts are lawyers.

9

thrown out on Daubert grounds, you know, the economic

The decision makers and the

You cannot have a legal argument

10

models, which may be equally valid, are subjected to a

11

different kind of scrutiny, at least once you get it to

12

the court.

13

It's a different issue at the agency.
The economists, I think it is fair to say, are

14

less bound by the guidelines because the methodology of

15

looking at what the rules are and applying them, that is

16

a legal methodology, and in fact, I've heard countless

17

times from various economists in various contexts,

18

mergers and otherwise, that the whole process of defining

19

markets and driving the analysis that way is an

20

artificiality, and if we have the tools that allows us to

21

get to the answer more directly, you know, why bother.

22

There is certainly an institutional bias

23

against the approach that the lawyers use.

I think the

24

economists have a desire to try to get closer to "the

25

real answer."

The tools that the lawyers use are fairly
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1

crude in many cases, making predictions about the future,

2

relying on assumptions, some of which are stated, some of

3

which are unstated, and have various degrees of support,

4

and obviously, if through the application of the data

5

methods, data analysis, you can get closer to the real

6

answer, why not try to do that.

7

It is certainly the case that the economic

8

approach has the advantage that the models have well

9

articulated specifications, which the legal approach does

10
11

not.
One of the things that we see now is that

12

economists have an insatiable appetite for data.

13

lawyers want documents.

14

a belief that virtually everything can be solved through

15

data exercises.

Economists want data.

The
There is

16

We have these models, and we can talk about --

17

Tim made the comment to the effect that the analysis not

18

helped by relying on the jargon, but I think there are

19

questions about whether the constraints of Bertrand

20

models are realistic in the context of differentiated

21

markets because they allow one point for differentiation,

22

which is price, and in fact, at least the way the issue

23

is posed in the guidelines, we are looking at a host of

24

variables that affect the positioning of different

25

competitors in product space.
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The insinuations are with us, and I think they

2

are going to be with us for a long time, whether or not

3

the lawyers like it, we are going to have to deal with

4

it.

5

Modeling simulations can be mutual if we are

6

all comfortable that they are attuned to the market

7

realities, that they are based on defensible assumptions,

8

and that's obviously where the debate has been.

9

One criticism has been that a small difference

10

in the assumptions can make very big differences in the

11

results.

12

economists is well, we have different ways of doing

13

things, we should probably do it more than one way and

14

impose some kind of reality check on your analysis and

15

also try to use the method that's the most conservative

16

from the standpoint of the party that you are.

17

The answer that I think you will hear from the

I'll pose the question whether there is a

18

conservative assumption from the standpoint of the

19

plaintiff, as all these models seem to be designed to

20

show a price increase.

21

Part of the issue that I have is price

22

increases are assumed in these models based on structural

23

assumptions, even though we are trying to run away from

24

structural analysis.

25

The question is what are we trying to show
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here?

2

price increase is.

3

that's not what we are trying to show, but I think that's

4

where it comes out.

5

Are we trying to show what the magnitude of the
I think everybody will tell you no,

When you get somebody telling you that I can

6

predict with 95 percent degree of confidence that you

7

have a price increase of 7.4 percent, you know, some if

8

it even has a decimal point, it sounds so precise that

9

you can debate that.

Of course, there's a footnote that

10

says, well, if you accept all my assumptions and that's

11

also before I take into account issues like repositioning

12

of product entry and efficiencies.

13

There is a risk, I think, of false empiricism

14

where you have these results which are so precisely given

15

with high degrees of confidence and decimal points, you

16

know, somebody is telling you this is the price increase

17

they are going to get.

18

I think this is fairly paradoxical, but the

19

economists' approach is more likely to identify problems

20

with a merger than the more traditional way the lawyers

21

do, simply because the models are designed to predict a

22

price increase, and because these models will predict a

23

price increase, even in relatively unconcentrated

24

markets, I think they tell us something, which is either

25

the models have a problem or the guidelines are wrong
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

66
1

because the models will predict a price increase in

2

situations where the merger would not even get a second

3

look under the guidelines, things that are below 1500.

4

The economists' answer is well, we are not

5

really trying to predict the price increase, we have to

6

take into effect entry repositioning and efficiencies,

7

but in fact, if you accept this methodology, then what

8

you have done is really shifted the burden of proof to

9

the merging parties, because you have said on the basis

10

of some data analysis that you have a price increase

11

unless these other factors come into play, so now please

12

prove to me that this price increase will not happen.

13

In fact, to really say to the parties in most

14

cases prove repositioning, because anybody that has done

15

a lot of mergers will know that most mergers, the

16

efficiencies that we see are not efficiencies that affect

17

the incremental costs in a meaningful way.

18

efficiencies that I've seen tend to be overhead

19

synergies.

20

real.

21

the end of the day, they are not the type of efficiencies

22

you can expect to translate into a beneficial price

23

effect.

24

very hard to show entry, particularly when you are

25

talking about differentiated product markets, where you

Most of the

They are very important and they are very

They drive merger economic efficiencies, but at

Entry is kind of a defense of last resort.
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1

have large investments integrated with differentiation,

2

that is promotion, advertising, and also distribution

3

arrangement.

4

The parties are now in a position of being told

5

your merger is anti-competitive, you have to prove it's

6

not going to have a price effect, and really your resort

7

is repositioning.

8

common.

9

implicitly the burden of proof to the merging parties by

Repositioning is pervasive.

It's

At the same time, we are in effect shifting

10

effectively assuming a price increase and really saying

11

the only issue is how big a price increase.

12

Another question to ask is what happens to the

13

next best substitutes analysis.

We talked at the

14

beginning about what the guidelines say.

15

say, well, we look at whether the products of the merging

16

parties are first or second choice of the large share of

17

the customers, and what we wind up with are legit models,

18

and really instead of being differentiated by product

19

attributes or by promotional issues, products are

20

differentiated by their sales level.

21

differentiation that the analysis assumes because that is

22

really what we are looking at.

The guidelines

That is the form of

23

Of course, we are assuming identical cross

24

elasticities of all products with respect to a given

25

product, which given the assumption that some products
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are closer substitutes to each other than others, it

2

seems to at least raise some issues.

3

The more complex models, they impose great

4

cost.

5

are issues with using retail level data as a proxy for

6

wholesale competition.

7

They have an insatiable appetite for data.

There

Dave Scheffman and others have put together a

8

very detailed analysis of that, and it deals both with

9

implementation issues, what do you do when a price

10

increase takes place in mid-week, but the data you have

11

collects prices on a weekly basis, as well as conceptual

12

issues, that most wholesale prices now really are two

13

part tiered and relatively fixed and a variable element,

14

and obviously consumer prices are an one part tier.

15

The issue that I guess I will end with is

16

whether these models follow the guidelines.

17

source of anti-competitive unilateral effects that the

18

guidelines are talking about has to do with the spacial

19

separation of product, are we really obscuring that issue

20

by looking at models that are defining differentiation

21

effectively based on the levels of sales, are we also

22

shifting the burden of proof to the merging parties

23

implicitly by doing that.

24
25

If the

I was actually heartened to see that one of the
recent presentations Luke did showed sensitivity to the
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1

cost of doing these types of analyses.

2

anybody who is doing a merger now is kind of forced to do

3

that as a defensive measure because the economists are

4

going to come to you and say, well, this is what DOJ is

5

going to be doing, and we need to do this because

6

otherwise, we are going to be unprepared for their case.

7

It's another burden of merger enforcement on top of the

8

endless boxes of documents.

9

The fact is

My feeling is that the current models are going

10

to have problems in court, but at the same time, most

11

cases are decided in front of the agencies, and parties

12

will be foolhardy to ignore these models because they

13

have become part of that decision making process, and

14

what needs to be done, which is very difficult because we

15

don't have the investigative tools to look at consummated

16

mergers and see what happens and calibrate the

17

assumptions in these models to actual market results, is

18

to try to refine them and make them better.

19

MR. FROEB:

Thank you, Joe.

Valerie, just

20

because Joe raised this question, did you look at the

21

retail sector to see what kind of contracts they had with

22

publishers?

23

tiers?

24
25

Did they use mark up pricing or two part

MS. RABASSA:

In the Lagardere case, we had a

big problem to gauge that, because frankly, the sale of
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1

books to retailers and wholesale was the sale of books to

2

the final consumer.

3

right data.

4

problem of getting data.

We had many problems getting the

We can talk about this problem later, the

5

MR. FROEB:

6

MR. WERDEN:

Thank you.

Greg?

Before I get to my prepared

7

remarks, I want to respond to a couple of things Joe

8

said.

The first one was a serious misquotation of my

9

views.

He paraphrased the guidelines, which I will

10

actually quote to you, and then said I disagreed.

11

don't.

12

I

The sentence I will quote says "Substantial

13

unilateral price elevation in a market for differentiated

14

products requires it to be a significant share of sales

15

in the market accounted for by consumers who regard the

16

products of the merging firms as their first and second

17

choices."

18

I totally agree that is a very nice way of

19

putting the point, notice it said significant share, not

20

a large share,

21

share, and you don't need a large share.

22

wants to then translate this into saying there is some

23

global ranking of the products, one, two, three, four,

24

and the merging products have to be closest in this

25

global ranking.

I think Joe wants to switch it to large

That is wrong.
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1

The crucial thing to know is that typically in

2

differentiated products, different consumers rank the

3

product differently.

4

product and some people will buy another one.

5

That's why some people buy one

What the guidelines say, which I totally agree

6

with, is are you using a significant number that is

7

viewed as the first and second choices.

8
9

Secondly, he suggested that modeling, the kind
that economists do, merger simulation and other things,

10

is more likely to find mergers problematic than whatever

11

it is that lawyers do instead.

12

statement because that's just totally contrary to my

13

experience.

14

I find this a remarkable

One of the reasons Luke and I got into this 12

15

years ago was the lawyers had tremendously exaggerated

16

notions of likely anti-competitive effects of mergers,

17

and the only way we could think of to bring them down to

18

earth is with economic models, and it has worked.

19

In a lot of cases in which the models have

20

shown that it was implausible there would be significant

21

price effect.

22

enough, even with very small efficiencies, that the net

23

price effect would be positive.

24

didn't bring because of the modeling.

25

It was implausible they would be large

These are cases we

It's hard to say, because we did do the
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modeling, but when most of the modeling said there was no

2

significant effect, we didn't bring the case, in every

3

single one of those cases that I know of.

4

I think modeling has probably kept the agencies

5

from bringing some cases, although it might have caused

6

them to bring some other ones they should have brought,

7

and in both cases, that was for the better.

8
9

Starting with my prepared remarks, the concept
of merger simulation.

If the same well specified

10

oligopoly model reasonably describes the outcome of the

11

competitive process, both before and after the merger, a

12

lot of conditions, then that model can be used to

13

generate a quantitative prediction of the merger's

14

unilateral competitive effects after it is first

15

calibrated to match the prices, shares, et cetera, that

16

would prevail but for the merger.

17

All it says is if we run a model in our

18

standard tool kit that fits the industry, and we think it

19

is also going to fit the industry, except for the merger,

20

second assumption, and if it predicts what we care about,

21

like prices and maybe more, then we know how to use that

22

model.

23

and shares and elasticities or whatever we observe for

24

the industry, and to generate what the post-merger

25

equilibrium looks like, taking into account the

We know how to calibrate it to match the prices
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1

internalization of the competition between the merging

2

firms.

3
4

We can put numbers on what the guidelines talk
about in some cases.

5

From a plaintiff's perspective, and since I've

6

worked for the Department of Justice, that's the

7

perspective I usually take, I think that's very helpful

8

in several respects.

9

to tell the judge that there is a significant number of

In the first place, it's one thing

10

customers who view the merging products as first and

11

second best alternatives, and it's quite another thing to

12

say the likely implication is they will raise price 10

13

percent.

14

I think you are much more likely to win the

15

case if you can make the latter statement than if you

16

can't, and if you have something to back it up, of

17

course.

18

Plus, there is a way to put things in

19

perspective, like cost reductions.

20

off if you do a quantitative analysis.

21

otherwise.

22

You can trade them
You can't

That's really my second point here in the

23

slide.

There are certainly cases in which mergers may

24

have significant efficiencies or in which we think even

25

if we don't have specific evidence of efficiencies, it's
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very plausible the merger will have some efficiencies.

2

It's very easy to take those into account in merge

3

simulation and very easy in some cases to show that

4

plausibly the net effect is a price decrease, not a price

5

increase.

6

We don't bring those cases.
Merger simulation can be an useful way to focus

7

an investigation or try by identifying which factors or

8

assumptions really matter.

9

modeling exercise that one assumption gives you one

If you can show in the

10

result, another assumption gives you a very different

11

result, then it becomes a very crucial fact which is

12

which of those assumptions is the right one or the better

13

one.

14

That can be a very useful process.
You can also find some things really don't

15

matter much, so you shouldn't put your resources on

16

figuring those things out.

17

Limitations.

The fundamental limitation is no

18

economic model is going to capture every nuance of

19

competition in the real world, but you don't have to.

20

All you have to do is capture enough to be able to

21

usefully predict.

22

Second.

Price increase predictions can't be

23

any better than rough estimates.

There is a whole lot

24

going on that isn't in the model.

All kinds of things

25

are going to happen in the world that you can't possibly
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1

anticipate.

2

effect of the merger, but that's a whole lot better than

3

no idea of the likely effect of the merger.

4

You are only given some idea of the likely

Third.

Merger simulation is basically designed

5

to predict price effects, possibly other short term

6

effects of the merger.

7

long run evolution of the industry, but the good news is

8

Section 7 doesn't care that much about the long run

9

evolution of the industry, which in any event, we have no

It's never going to predict the

10

tools in law or economics to really predict very well in

11

most cases, so what merger simulation gives us is

12

something that the law is looking for, or what it can

13

give us.

14

The basic theme of my talk is that before you

15

use a merger simulation at trial, and for that matter,

16

before you use it for any other purpose for which you

17

give significant weight to the actual predictions, it

18

should have to pass an admissibility screen from the

19

rules of evidence.

20

Daubert, Joiner, Kumer Tire, and many antitrust cases of

21

less prominence.

22

Rule 702 interpreted by cases like

What I take away from Rule 702 and the case law

23

applying it as it applies to economic testimony in

24

antitrust cases is that testimony is admissible if the

25

witness is an expert in the relevant field of economics,
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if the testimony employs said methods from the relevant

2

field of economics, and if the testimony reliably applies

3

those methods to the facts of the case.

4

I'll elaborate these a little, mostly the

5

third.

I think the required expert knowledge is a fairly

6

low hurdle.

7

Heisenberg, a famous physicist, who defines an expert who

8

is someone who knows the worse mistakes that can be made

9

in his subject and who manages to avoid them.

I like to quote a lot from Werner

That's the

10

kind of expertise we need in any area, including merger

11

simulation.

12

make, and you have to know better than to make those.

13

There are some really bad mistakes you can

What merger simulation does is use absolutely

14

standard, well accepted tools from economics, so in that

15

sense, theoretical sense, merger simulation is the

16

application of sound methods necessarily.

17

There is also the empirical sense of soundness,

18

which can be very important, and as Luke mentioned in his

19

opening, we don't know very much about the predicted

20

accuracy of merger simulation.

21

very much about the predicted accuracy of anything else,

22

so in a relative evaluation, merger simulation certainly

23

doesn't do worse in predicting than anything else anybody

24

has ever come up with.

25

However, we don't know

I won't offer some of my favorite pieces of
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dicta from Supreme Court decisions here.

2

Daubert itself, which held that expert testimony is

3

admissible only if it is sufficiently tied to the facts

4

of the case and will aid the jury in resolving a factual

5

dispute, i.e., only if there is a good fit between the

6

testimony and the inquiry.

7

First, from

Daubert didn't come up with this fit concept.

8

It was borrowed from a Third Circuit decision.

I think

9

it's a very good and precise way of describing what we

10

are looking for, and it's something that certainly

11

antitrust cases are looking for.

12

The same theme expressed in a different and

13

also useful way in the Joiner case.

14

admit opinion evidence that is connected to the existing

15

data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.

16

conclude there is simply too great an analytic gap

17

between the data and the opinion proffered.

18

The court should not

A court may

In my view, it is not uncommon to have expert

19

economic testimony that is merely ipse dixit.

20

economist doesn't closely tie his theories to the facts

21

of the case, and I think Joiner is right on track saying

22

this is the kind of thing that courts should not allow.

23

The

As an example, a very well known one from an

24

antitrust case, the testimony of Robert Hall was excluded

25

in Concord Boat because his oligopoly model, the kind
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that you might use for simulation, although hardly

2

anybody does, was not grounded in the economic reality of

3

the industry.

4

perhaps, although I happen to read the case as saying

5

there were like six different ways in which it wasn't

6

grounded in the economic reality of the industry, so I

7

think all of the critiques were fit critiques.

8
9

This wasn't the only knock on the model

The court said there was nothing wrong with the
model as a matter of theory, it was a sound method, but

10

it wasn't the right method for that case.

11

exactly the kind of inquiry a court should do, and I

12

think in the case of Concord Boat, the court was exactly

13

right, it wasn't the right model for that case, and in

14

particular, at least the way the model was calibrated by

15

Hall, it predicted that the defendant would not have more

16

than a 50 percent share without engaging in the

17

challenged practices.

18

I think that's

The fact was the defendant had a 75 percent

19

share before engaging in the challenged practices, and I

20

would say that's got to be improper calibration.

21

only problem with the model the court pointed out, and

22

some of the other ones I think were important as well.

23

Not the

A less well known case but perhaps a more well

24

known economist, Frank Fisher's testimony was excluded in

25

the Booksellers case for purposes of at least determining
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1

damages, which was pretty important in that case, because

2

it contained too many assumptions and simplifications

3

that were not supported by real world evidence.

4

I will not comment on the merits of Fisher's

5

testimony or the court's analysis of it, because I don't

6

know enough about either one, but I will comment on the

7

language used by the court here in excluding the

8

testimony.

9

think about some economic evidence and if it is the right

I think this is exactly the right way to

10

way to think about that evidence, and the right

11

conclusion is that it should be excluded.

12

on too many assumptions and simplifications that are not

13

supported by real world evidence, then it doesn't fit the

14

facts and it isn't admissible evidence.

15

If it depends

What are the key elements of fitting the facts,

16

and I will emphasize these are key elements because this

17

has to be a case by case determination, depending on what

18

the facts are, what the model is, and what you are trying

19

to do with the model.

20

An oligopoly model used in simulation has to

21

reflect critical aspects of competition in the short term

22

at least.

23

aspects of competition.

24

have a basis for saying it reflects the critical ones.

25

That doesn't mean it has to reflect all
It's not going to.

You have to

Some fact based analysis by your experts has to
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1

lead to this conclusion, and he has to be prepared to

2

convince the trier of fact that he is right in thinking

3

about the industry and the model in this way.

4

The model also has to explain the recent past

5

at a fairly high level of generality, especially the

6

intensity of competition, as I like to think about it, as

7

reflected in price cost margins.

8

be explained by models, how the industry has responded to

9

shocks, the level of prices as compared to costs.

10

model should be able to explain these things, not

11

necessarily with exquisite precision.

12

why a model should explain day to day price movements.

13

We don't care about day to day price movements.

14

There is a lot that can

A

There is no reason

The ultimate test, another way of restating the

15

fifth requirement, is that every modeling choice should

16

be justified on some basis.

17

economic theory, for example, the assumption of profit

18

maximization, and needs no further justification.

19

is what economists do.

20

assume that, don't call an economist.

21

It could be dictated by

That

If you don't want somebody to

It can be supported by industry data, for

22

example, if the model is calibrated properly, that fits

23

the price and shares of industry, that kind of data I

24

have in mind.

25

ratios or demand elasticities.

Also, the data may speak to diversion
There are lots of
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1

different ways in which models could be supported or

2

refuted by data.

3

It should be consistent with stylized facts of

4

the industry.

5

important elements of competition?

6

How does competition work?

What are the

If you have a typical differentiated products

7

case and it involves a retail sector, how does the

8

manufacturing sector interact with the retail sector and

9

how does the retail sector behave?

10

These are the kinds of stylized facts that have

11

to be studied before you can properly model an industry,

12

and you should be prepared to explain how the facts

13

support the particular modeling choices.

14

Fourth, some modeling choices may turn out to

15

be unimportant.

16

different choice.

17

choices.

18

model doesn't really matter.

19

justification.

20

You may be able to try a particularly
There may be a major difference in

You may find out for that particular thing, the
That is a perfectly fine

Finally, particularly when you can't do any of

21

the above, it may be in addition to doing some of the

22

above, you can justify a choice by doing a sensitivity

23

analysis and showing that over the range of plausible

24

assumptions, you have picked one that if your plaintiff,

25

for example, leads to relatively small price increase
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projections.

2

There are some modeling choices in merger

3

simulation that you are not going to be able to justify,

4

and that's what you have to do.

5

A couple of illustrations.

This is, I think,

6

the easiest and best one of some kind of modeling choice

7

that you are never going to be able to justify based on

8

the facts of the data, and that is what is the assumed

9

functional form for the demand curve?

10

Here I have plotted between the competitive

11

prices over in the lower right and the monopoly prices in

12

the upper left, four demand curves that have been used in

13

merger simulation.

14

competitive price to the monopoly price, it involves a

15

vastly larger price increase for some demand curves than

16

others.

17

As you can easily see, going from the

Where you are going to see one of these or

18

perhaps some other functional form is when you do a

19

merger simulation, and it's going to affect in a very

20

substantial way the price increase predictions.

21

for the plaintiff, I would be using linear demand, which

22

produces small price increases, absent some strong

23

evidence I can't imagine ever having, that one of these

24

other functional forms fits better.

25

If I'm

A final illustration has to do with demand
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1

elasticities.

In differentiated products, merger

2

simulation is a way of translating the demand

3

elasticities into price increase predictions.

4

those predictions are sensitive to the demand

5

elasticities, and it should be obvious that we never know

6

exactly what those elasticities are.

Obviously,

7

Well, so you should consider what the price

8

increase predictions are for a range of elasticities.

9

Here is a very simple illustration of how that might work

10

for the WorldCom/Sprint merger, where a very strong

11

assumption about demand is made so that we can place

12

parameters on this model just based on two elasticities.

13

One is the aggregate elasticity demand for

14

residential long distance service, and the other is

15

WorldCom's firm level elasticity for its long distance

16

service.

17

considers a very wide range of plausible values.

18

For each of these elasticities, this plot

The academic literature is estimated in

19

elasticity demand for residential long distance of about

20

one, and this gives quite a wide range around one, from a

21

half to one and a half.

22

elasticity here is from 1.25 clear up to 4, which is a

23

huge range of elasticities.

24

truth lies somewhere in that interval.

25

The range for WorldCom demand

It's highly likely that the

What this plot shows is that for some
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1

combinations of parameters, a 4/10ths of a price increase

2

on up to 1.2 percent price increase for the average price

3

over the whole residential long distance, which of course

4

includes AT&T and all these other little guys which

5

collectively had, I think, around 70 percent a few years

6

ago, so WorldCom and Sprint were at least a relatively

7

small portion of the industry, significant, but

8

relatively small.

9

other residential long distance service companies that

So we are averaging out over these

10

are going to have vastly smaller price increases than the

11

merging firms.

12

That is why these numbers are so small.

If you down it to .4 percent, it may be very

13

easy for merger specific efficiencies to swamp that, and

14

for the net price increase to be negative.

15

percent, that's not really so likely, and that's probably

16

a price increase big enough that the agencies would worry

17

about it, and you might say very plausibly that WorldCom

18

and Sprint were closer substitutes than this model

19

assumes, if so, the price increases would be even bigger,

20

and the contrary is also correct.

21
22

MR. FROEB:

Thank you, Greg.

Up above one

Joe, do you want

equal time now or later?

23

MR. KATTAN:

24

MR. FROEB:

25

MR. LIPSKY:

I'll wait.
Tad?
Thanks, Luke.

It's a great honor
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1

to be on the same stage with such distinguished

2

practitioners of these various economic approaches to

3

antitrust, and I have to say in listening to the

4

unilateral effects theory, you would almost be grateful,

5

I suppose, that you have a merger before the Commission

6

and before the DOJ where the theory is going to be

7

innovation markets or potential competition where now

8

this is applicable and you can't do simulations because

9

you have no current output for both firms.

10

That might be

nice.

11

MR. WERDEN:

You need an option model.

12

MR. LIPSKY:

As I said before, I think we are

13

focused on the wrong ex-Frenchman.

14

study, and I've said elsewhere many times before, pretty

15

much what passes for antitrust economics right now was

16

all in the original core notebook back in 1838.

17

think unilateral effects were in there.

18

option of the theory of monopoly.

19

Bertrand was an IUV

I don't

Maybe it's an

I want to go at some specific issues that have

20

been alluded to but haven't been raised directly.

21

I can give a somewhat different focus.

22

Maybe

Who decides and how effective are those

23

economics in this process.

I'm going to back over the

24

first principles that I don't remember thinking about

25

since my first day in econometrics as an undergrad, and
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1

probably I should have been thinking about them a lot

2

more than I have, but I think it helps ground the

3

discussion and reveals my approach to some basic points

4

here.

5

First, there are facts, and some facts are

6

really facts, like how much and how long it takes to

7

build a factory.

8

mental constructs of mathematical models, oligopoly

9

models, what have you.

10
11

There are models which are basically

I have here sort of the classical

model for merger law.
If an industry is more concentrated, the output

12

will be lower and price higher than if it's less

13

concentrated, ceteris paribus.

14

statistical tests which are propositions that grow out of

15

the application of a specific econometric method used to

16

estimate the parameters of a specific model, and I have

17

no idea what I'm saying here.

18

based widget market doesn't exist except in my head, but

19

this is the kind of assertion you would find at the end

20

of the articles back in the 1960s and 1970s as to what

21

you actually needed to apply econometric methods to a

22

model in a particular industry.

23

Then there are

Obviously, the silicon-

I want to echo something I heard Joe say

24

earlier. Maybe I won't put the words in your mouth.

25
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makers and we are not all judges, we are essentially

2

lawyers.

3

have enough economics or econometrics to understand

4

really what is contained in an assertion like that, and

5

that's one of the problems I'm going to get to a little

6

later in the presentation.

7

There is a certain assumption that they don't

The value of a statistical test, the values of

8

the parameters and all those squares and all that neat

9

stuff that the economists roll around and try to persuade

10

you that what they have done is great or is viable at

11

least, let me give you a very concrete example based on

12

something we have heard today.

13

We had a description of a statistical outcome

14

for a model estimated in the context of the Booksellers

15

merger.

16

but I will tell you right now, if the combined market

17

shares of those two firms in the defined book market are

18

say in the 5, 10, or 15 percent range, I can guarantee

19

you I will find some problem with the econometric model

20

that was presented.

21

shares and you talk about entry and market conditions and

22

other sort of stylized facts about the way book

23

publishing works, I would be entirely prepared to accept

24

that those statistical results are valid, but the key

25

point is that the econometric exercise is useless if you

I happen not to know a thing about that merger,

If you get up to much higher market
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1

have a significant reason to doubt the validity of the

2

underlying model.

3

There is sort of the red letter error type

4

thing.

5

and you tell him what your model was and he comes back

6

half an hour later and says, oh, you screwed up, you

7

forgot to adjust for elasticity or you have too many

8

multiple linear variables or whatever it is.

9

That's where you give your data to Greg Werden

Even assuming that the econometrics is done

10

perfectly, it doesn't mean anything if you have a

11

significant doubt about the truth of the model.

12

I think this has had a fairly profound impact

13

in my professional lifetime in the area of merger

14

analysis, which is when I entered grad school, people I

15

think we're beginning to have doubts about this long

16

series of econometric studies showing a correlation

17

between concentration and prices or concentration and

18

profits, and looking back, I'm not sure which was the

19

more popular, based on your original structure conduct

20

performance paradigm.

21

Why is it that it was thought to apply

22

econometrics to these models 30 or 40 years ago, and now,

23

I think it would be fair to say that those types of

24

models have been fairly thoroughly discredited.

25

process that not only involves "better econometrics."
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I'm thinking particularly of Porter's 1972 Review of

2

Economic Statistics Paper, where he said, you can take

3

these regressions that are being used as evidence that

4

concentration and profits are positively correlated, and

5

notice that even though there is a claim for the validity

6

of that relationship, the statistical tests show that the

7

coefficients are small and the statistical confidence

8

intervals are rotten.

9

I've discovered one reason why that might be.

10

We divided the samples in two groups, one is sort of

11

convenience goods group, where it was sold in drug stores

12

and grocery stores, a small amount purchased at any given

13

time, very little consumer search behavior for the

14

characteristics of the product, often very subjective

15

characteristics of the product.

16

side.

You put that off to one

17

The particular model that had been applied

18

worked pretty well in that set of industries, but it

19

didn't work at all in a different set of industries,

20

which was things like cars or consumer durables, where

21

you do have significant consumer search behavior and a

22

lot of the other underlying variables represented by the

23

method of retailing which were thought to be important.

24
25

Time marches on.

It's not like you put it in

at one end of the lab and get it out at the other and
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1

have a high degree of confidence that it's right.

2

much more an art, as I think somebody else said.

3

It's

Economic model is critical to the entire

4

process of antitrust decision making because you have to

5

decide a specific case, and every litigant, as I put here

6

in the middle, every litigant tells a story, and every

7

story has a model.

8

which is very bad, and I agree with the earlier remarks

9

that the focus on the unilateral effects of the merger

Sometimes the model is unstated,

10

simulation approaches sometimes gets you a long ways by

11

making the assumptions that the underlying model is

12

explicit, always a good thing to do.

13

Then the way the economic model really comes to

14

the floor in indicia decision making -- it's one of the

15

interesting phenomena, I think, in recent antitrust

16

jurisprudence.

17

In Matsushita, for example, the narrow issue

18

decided by the Supreme Court was whether an expert report

19

about the possible existence of a predatory pricing

20

conspiracy could be admitted, with the majority saying

21

no, because it's crazy, essentially, and the minority led

22

by Justice White saying wait a minute, what is the

23

seventh amendment for?

24

What is this?

25

A jury trial?

Expert testimony?

Justice White wanted to pretend, for purposes
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of his very powerful decision and opinion in Matsushita,

2

that the validity of the expert's testimony was a fact.

3

I don't think that testimony was a fact.

4

something different.

5

about a model.

6

be applied to particular facts, but the fact that the

7

Matsushita majority said we are essentially entitled to

8

disregard what this expert says.

9

something of a turning point in anti-trust jurisprudence.

It was a model.

It was a story

It was a story about why a model should

State Oil vs. Khan.

10

It was

I think it was

There is a very explicit

11

example of saying reasoning about maximum vertical price

12

agreements was wrong and, therefore, the per se rule was

13

wrong.

14

Brooke Group is kind of interesting because the

15

oligopolistic disciplinary pricing model in Brooke Group,

16

the plaintiff's story was this is a big nasty oligopoly,

17

six firms.

18

like crazy, and the third largest firm decided to lower

19

the boom on the smallest firm, confident that the leaders

20

of the market, R.J. Reynolds with 38 percent of the

21

market, respectively, would stand by that Williamson

22

discipline licit, later owned by Brooke Group, and the

23

court, maybe because they were represented by Phil

24

Areeda, but the court said that could fly, it could be an

25

oligopolistic disciplinary pricing theory under the

The smallest firm really started to discount
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1

Robinson-Patman Act, and sometimes I wonder and at the

2

same time feel thankful for the fact that there aren't a

3

lot more cases.

4

an oligopolistic disciplinary pricing theory that is

5

being tried out in this Tyson's case, but it's amazing

6

that nobody else has tried such a theory.

7

Maybe the Packers and Stockyard Act has

The Supreme Court says you must be covered

8

under the Robinson-Patman Act.

What they said in that

9

case was that doesn't apply here.

This is why I put it

10

on my list and use it for this point, Brooke Group was

11

essentially the rejection of an expert report.

12

who said, I observed the factual pre-conditions for and

13

the theoretical apparatus for appreciating this

14

oligopolistic disciplinary pricing theory in this case,

15

and the court said no, that's crazy.

16

with the facts, not a crazy theory, inconsistent with the

17

facts.

18

An expert

It's inconsistent

A particular fact that the court was dealing

19

with was that the main underpinning for the oligopolistic

20

disciplinary pricing theory was that the cigarette

21

industry was an oligopoly, with high prices, high

22

profits, sticky prices, sticky shares, all those things

23

we associate with oligopoly.

24
25

Well, it just so happens that I was senior
executive for the plaintiff that testified it wasn't an
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oligopoly, prices weren't sticky, that profits weren't

2

abnormal, and I think the court had a hard time

3

swallowing the expert relying on a theory which was

4

essentially contradicted by the leaders of the plaintiff.

5

We have this weird situation where the judges

6

are deciding economic issues.

They are rejecting models.

7

They are rejecting expert testimony.

8

Quartet, the four cases that really form the Daubert

9

line, are in a sense an extension and may have even been

I think the Daubert

10

suggested by Matsushita and Brooke Group, chronologically

11

it works out, I suppose we will never know.

12

30 years from now when the papers are disclosed we will

13

find out, but judges are getting more and more

14

uncomfortable with economic theorizing.

15

Maybe 25 or

The problem that we have is, as has been

16

previously said in the panel, the lawyers control this

17

process.

18

the ones who are appointed by the politicians to hold the

19

positions at the agencies.

20

over the place.

21

The lawyers present the case.

The lawyers are

There are just lawyers all

Whatever economic content has been suffused

22

into anti-trust, I think there is a great deal of it, it

23

has to come through the lawyers and judges.

24

existing institution that filters out the quality of

25

economic testimony and compares the relative
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persuasiveness of different economic views of these

2

particular cases that is really designed in a way you

3

would want an institution designed, to get to the truth

4

of the matter.

5

We have an advocacy process run by lawyers.

We

6

don't have time to sit around for the process to work.

7

You have some guy who is bringing cases based on the

8

notion that concentrations and profits are strongly

9

correlated, we don't have time to sit around and discover

10

that is wrong.

11

You have a failure in the antitrust realm.

12

It's not like the Challenger disaster, where the market

13

blows up and everybody says whoa, something really went

14

wrong.

15

There are antitrust disasters.
I think the United Machinery case is an

16

antitrust disaster.

17

case founded, I think, are illegitimate theories of

18

violation, suing remedy.

19

but it took about 10 to 20 years to happen.

20

debate as to whether the machinery industry was really

21

one that was destined to remain in American business

22

anyway, given all the things happening in the world.

23

That company driven out of business,

United Machinery was destroyed,
You can

I have summarized Matsushita and Brooke Group.

24

I mentioned the Daubert Quartet.

I also want to focus

25

you on the sources -- judges articulate their
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dissatisfaction with the process by which economic

2

expertise is applied during antitrust cases.

3

in other cases, too.

4

They do it

Justice Breyer I don't think has ever mentioned

5

antitrust in his talking about this issue.

6

he gave a talk at AEI recently on this same thing, and

7

might have mentioned antitrust.

8

toxic torts and that kind of scientific evidence.

9

I understand

His focus is more on

He has basically proposed in a speech to the

10

AEA a few years ago, we really need to weed out the

11

cranks.

12

professional body weed out the people who know what they

13

are talking about and the people who don't.

We need to have the AEA or some responsible

14

I'm not so sure that's a great solution for

15

antitrust.

16

Association having a qualifications panel for antitrust

17

economists.

18

I can't imagine the American Economics

Judge Posner, in HFCS, a very intricate

19

exploration of the economic elements of that case that

20

were relevant to the judgment of whether there is

21

adequate evidence of conspiracy.

22

the district judge and said, look, when this goes back

23

down to explore this issue.

24

summary judgment in favor of the defendants, it would be

25

a really good idea to use Rule 706 of the Federal Rules

He pretty much beat on

Now that I have reversed the
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of Evidence and appoint some experts so you can figure

2

this out at least as well and maybe better than I did.

3

If you haven't read Posner's decisions in Asahi

4

Glass vs. Pentech, and there is sort of a cluster of

5

cases that are related, you really need to read these

6

decisions.

7

Richard Posner, sitting as a district judge,

8

can you imagine, and going through unbelievably complex

9

cases involving a patent settlement and is that illegal,

10

there's some infringement issues along with other stuff,

11

you can learn about disappearing polymorphs and other

12

chemical curiosities.

13

It's just wonderful.

The reason it is inserted in my remarks here is

14

that Posner makes some rather pointed remarks about some

15

theories that are now popular in the analysis of pioneer

16

generic patent litigation settlements.

17

itching to see lower courts be more rigorous and more

18

explicit about how they confront economic modeling.

19

He is obviously

Just to treat unilateral effects as essentially

20

a case study of what I've been talking about, the

21

fundamental inside unilateral effects is really a

22

no-brainer. Sure, A's customers could go to B.

23

merger, they won't be able to go to B.

24

do they have to climb to get out of a hole.

25

going to impose any kind of long run pricing and
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imposition on consumers?

2

performance?

Is that going to decrease

3

We have already heard a lot this morning and

4

I'm not going into the fact that the analyses by which

5

you can get at these phenomena quantitatively require a

6

whole bunch of assumptions.

7

I conclude with the issue of kind of baseline

8

credibility.

If we are going to continue to live in a

9

world in which the decision makers do not have the

10

expertise to decide whether a model or econometric study

11

offered is worth a darn, what is the point at which we

12

are going to allow econometric testimony to influence the

13

decisions in antitrust cases?

14

I think it's a problem.

Let me suggest, and

15

here I want to run straight at an issue that Joe raised,

16

which is it's the lawyers who decide, to me, the lawyers

17

shouldn't decide.

18

review everything that goes into an antitrust case, sort

19

of certify for the judge, not that the expert is a good

20

expert, but that he thinks the analysis is pretty

21

plausible, hasn't found any particular issue with it.

22

Maybe independent economists should

It's not easy to imagine institutions that

23

would effectively accomplish what I'm trying to drive at,

24

but think about that issue.

25

actually decide?

Should the economist

Should the judges, should the lawyers
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be bound by what the economists say?

2

David Scheffman, who has written and I think as

3

others have mentioned this morning, the judgment on these

4

economic issues is done simultaneously, you can't

5

separate them out.

6

Nabisco Brands case that was decided, where New York

7

challenged a merger that both Federal agencies had passed

8

on and found that Hippocrates was not fringed.

Read Fred Kahn's testimony in the

9

This is from the first sentence of the

10

Aphorisms, his little sayings about good medical

11

practice.

12

Do no harm.

13

Aphorisms.

14

Bill Baxter was a great fan of Hippocrates.
That wasn't the first sentence of the

The first sentence is "Life is short, and Art

15

long, the crisis fleeting, experience perilous, and

16

decision difficult."

17

That applies here, too.

These are some criticisms I have of typical

18

enforcement agency modeling.

Market definitions tend to

19

be narrow.

20

There tends to be, I think, heavy discounting of dynamic

21

effects, and it's wrong for obvious reasons.

22

necessarily does it consciously, but it tends to

23

encourage the bringing of enforcement actions where

24

otherwise somebody a little more relaxed on those

25

assumptions would not have any concern.

They tend to focus on isolated time periods.
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Also, there is a tendency to go to extremes.

2

We will often hear arguments in the front office that

3

make it sound as if the parties have been unable to agree

4

on anything in terms of the assumptions that are going

5

into their arguments, their story.

6

I've mentioned some of these alternatives,

7

reliance on neutral experts, Rule 706.

Do we need to

8

have a category of economists who work for the agencies

9

but don't really have a role in cases, or maybe they

10

should be outside consultants, people who theoretically

11

won't have any percentage in the outcome because they are

12

not going to be involved in either the prosecution or

13

defense of the case.

14

idea.

15

I think we should think about.

I don't think that's such a great

16

I just raise it because this is the kind of thing

Can we get more peer review, maybe can we get

17

more industrial organization professors to look at these

18

things?

19

I think a lot of them do.
Finally, my last desperate gambit, maybe a

20

Federal judicial center should be given a pot of money to

21

study all this stuff.

22

Just to remind you of why they liked the per se

23

theory, United States vs. Topco. I loved that footnote

24

that says if we were to consider the economic

25

justifications for this joint venture, it would send us
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into the wilds of economic theory, so welcome to the

2

wilds.

3

MR. FROEB:

Thank you, Tad.

Greg?

While we

4

are waiting for Greg, I want to ask Greg Werden a

5

question.

6

simulation, it's a seldom useful exercise, too costly,

7

too time consuming, and it's persuasive only when we are

8

using it to justify something we already know, like from

9

the totality of the facts, we know that the merger is not

Both Tad and Joe raised questions about merger

10

going to raise price, here's an economic model that says

11

that.

12

Do you have any reaction to that?

How

13

frequently it is used, how frequently it influences

14

decision making at the DOJ?

15

MR. WERDEN:

In the first place, I don't think

16

either of them were as negative on merger simulations as

17

you suggested they were, particularly not Tad.

18

MR. LIPSKY:

It's helpful to clarify.

I would

19

agree the outcome is seldom very persuasive.

20

determine the outcome and often is really not

21

sufficiently persuasive to have a major influence on the

22

judgment.

23

MR. WERDEN:

It doesn't

I think there are two kinds of

24

major influences.

One, at a very early stage, there

25

certainly have been cases where merger simulation helped
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decide not to proceed with an investigation.

2

and dirty merger simulation, confirming what some people

3

already suspect, it's pretty easy for this merger to not

4

raise price much, to lower price, next case.

5

Very quick

Also, there are a number of cases in which I

6

think sophisticated analysis was given a lot of weight in

7

the agency decision about challenging or not challenging

8

a merger.

9

MR. FROEB:

10

MR. LEONARD:

Greg, go ahead.
Thanks.

Luke, Greg and I were

11

part of a group of economists who got the ball rolling

12

with merger simulation 10 or 12 or 14 years ago, whatever

13

it was.

14

quickly.

15

that gains popularity very quickly is that a backlash

16

occurs subsequently, and I think that has happened a

17

little bit.

18

problems.

19

It quickly became pretty popular and it happened
I think what happens when you have something

We have been talking about some of the

I thought what I would do today is try to

20

address some of the questions that have been raised about

21

merger simulation.

22

Let me just start by saying, and this has been

23

mentioned so I'm going to go fast, basically, you have

24

the fact based inquiry, which are reviewing the

25

documents, reviewing the depositions, interviewing
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customers, so forth and so on.

2

simulation.

3

Then you have merger

They shouldn't be substitutes for each other.

4

They really should be complements.

5

something to the party.

6

They both add

Merger simulation has two pieces to it.

The

7

first is what I'd call guesstimating consumer demand

8

functions.

9

do that possibly by looking at documents, if the correct

10

You can do that with econometrics.

You can

ones are out there.

11

The second case is the model of firm behavior

12

you are going to use.

13

oligopoly models.

14

People have been talking about

That's what I mean there.

The two pieces together are what constitute

15

merger simulation.

16

mean to include both pieces.

17

When I talk about it, I'm going to

Let me first say what does merger simulation

18

add where you have the documents.

19

like it.

20

What does merger simulation add?

21

argue is it helps move merger analysis closer to what I

22

would call science.

23

Attorneys certainly

With economists, I would say they have value.
I guess what I would

What do I mean by "science?"

The most important thing is that the analysis

24

is based on a set of theories or a theory that is

25

testable.

That's really the essence of what science is
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about.

We come up with theories.

2

pass the test, we accept them.

3

them.

4

with a better theory.

5

is all about.

We test them.

If they

We keep trying to test

Eventually, they may be rejected, and we come up
That's what the scientific method

6

Second, and what has been mentioned earlier

7

today, the underlying assumptions of the analysis are

8

very clearly delineated.

9

of the analysis can be replicated by somebody else.

The third thing is the results

10

Finally, scientific analysis typically will

11

allow you to calculate the precision of your results.

12

think Tad mentioned that it is conditional on the

13

assumptions, and that is certainly true.

14

I

Why should merger simulation aspire to be a

15

science?

I guess the first thing I think as probably the

16

most important is it gets closer to objectivity and

17

further from subjectivity.

18

really about.

That is again what science is

19

Secondly, it provides some certainty.

20

know what the rules of the game are, and that's the whole

21

purpose for the merger guidelines, I think, to lay out

22

some rules and to say here is how the game is going to be

23

played, and then gives people an idea about how the

24

analysis will go and allows them just to know how things

25

are going to fly.
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Next is the sources of disagreement between the

2

parties, I think, are a lot more easily identified when

3

you have some scientific approaches on each side, a

4

larger definition, arguments that are based on documents.

5

There is a lot of subjectivity.

There is a lot of hidden

6

assumptions, a lot of judgment.

If you can instead

7

replace that with an analysis of elasticities, then you

8

are talking about hard numbers.

9

about how you get those elasticities.

There may be issues
Arguing about the

10

elasticities, I think, is better than arguing about some

11

vague ideas that come out of documents.

12

This is what I said before.

What we are going

13

to get is bad methods are going to be replaced by good

14

methods, and good methods are going to be replaced by

15

better methods.

16

process.

17

That is the essence of the scientific

Obviously, if you come out with a result that

18

is very uncertain, you are going to put a lot less weight

19

on it.

20

In large, merger simulation is in fact a

21

science or a scientific analysis.

It's based certainly

22

on well established economic theory.

23

of consumer demand that drives the demand equations.

24

have the econometric theory that is behind the estimation

25

procedures used to get at the demand elasticities.

We have the theory
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have the oligopoly theory, which as someone was pointing

2

out, is based on infringement from many, many years ago.

3

It has been around for a long time.

4

We tend to lay out the assumptions, the

5

underlying assumptions, very clearly, and this is a very

6

important point.

7

tested.

8

is very important.

It says assumptions can often be

I think that is another aspect of all this that

9

For instance, the demand model you choose can

10

be tested.

11

an AIDS model perhaps, under the right conditions.

12

We can distinguish between a logit model and

I can give another economist the data and I can

13

say here's what I did, and that person could hopefully

14

get the same results, replication.

15

There are going to be choices along the way and

16

we may disagree about those, but at least we know what

17

those choices are, and they are fully described.

18

Finally, you can get a standard error for a

19

predicted price change.

20

assumed demand models and assumed oligopoly models, but

21

hopefully again those have been subject to some testing

22

along the way.

23

Again, it is conditional on the

The so-called document approach, it is not

24

really a science, at least in the same sense.

25

all, usually not incredibly well linked to economic
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theory.

Lawyers have models in their minds.

2

think that's true, but they are not very well

3

articulated, and so the assumptions themselves aren't

4

laid out very well.

5

A lot of times, they don't even know what the assumptions

6

are.

7

I don't

The assumptions often aren't tested.

I think if you think about what is in these

8

documents, that really is one of the problems.

9

at these documents and we assume that the authors of them

10

are discussing things or analyzing things in the way that

11

is actually meaningful for the merger analysis we are

12

trying to perform.

13

always the case.

14

We look

I don't think that is necessarily

If you look at the Staples case, there was a

15

certain set of analyses done.

16

entirely different purpose.

17

necessary.

18

agreed with that and went forward and did an additional

19

analysis.

20

They were done for an
I think further analysis was

I think even the economists on the FTC side

Similarly, customer reviews are used a lot.

I

21

think there are some serious problems by sampling.

The

22

customers that care are the ones who come forward.

They

23

may also tend to be the marginal ones.

24

of that.

25

What do we make

Another problem with the documents is the
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results can't be replicated, at least in the same way

2

that a merger simulation can be, because you are going to

3

have two different people look at the documents and

4

review them and come up with very different conclusions.

5

Finally, in terms of some questions that have

6

been raised about merger simulation.

7

technique?

8

true of almost any scientific inquiry.

9

complete.

10

Is it a perfected

The answer to that is clearly no.

It's never final.

That is

It's never

Things are always refined.

It doesn't need to be finalized to be useful.

11

Whatever the current state is, it can be useful in

12

certain ways, even though it may be improved upon later.

13

I think it's a theory of evolution.

14

In Darwin's original formulation, he thought

15

that evolution occurred gradually over time.

16

looked at the fossil record, you would find one organism

17

that clearly evolved from an earlier one, but they were

18

very different, and it was talked about as being gaps in

19

the fossil record, we were missing the fossils for the

20

organisms in between.

21

When they

The punctuated equilibrium theory was developed

22

and basically what it said was wait a minute, evolution

23

isn't gradual.

24

no change for long periods of time in between.

25

explains the facts better, and it is perhaps a better

It happens in short bursts and there is
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theory than the original one.
If you go back to the 1930s and 1940s, it

3

doesn't mean Darwin's formulation was useless.

4

it formed a lot of scientific thought.

5

In fact,

The second question that comes up is does

6

merger simulation provide an answer.

No, it doesn't.

7

That's one of the consequences of the fact that in this

8

science, we have to go out and test the assumptions, and

9

we might find the assumptions aren't valid.

Then the

10

merger simulation is not going to be -- at least in that

11

format, is not going to work.

12

It would be impossible to capture all the

13

economic processes in a model that is going to work,

14

given we are not going to be able to do this merger

15

simulation in that case.

16

If you contrast that to the documents approach

17

where you can't always get an answer, you can get any

18

answer you want within the bounds of reason.

19

often get two answers, one for the defendant and one for

20

the plaintiff.

You can

21

I would argue that because it's a science, you

22

are not always going to get an answer, and that's a fact

23

of life, I think.

24
25

Does merger simulation involve choices?
it clearly does.

The good thing is the choices are
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clearly articulated, and you can get down to brass tacks

2

and have the experts on each side argue about what the

3

right choice is.

4

testing.

5

the arguments.

Often, the choices are subject to

Again, very important.

That's a way to resolve

6

If you contrast that to the documents approach

7

where the assumptions are often not expressly stated and

8

often can't be tested or certainly aren't tested, I think

9

there the choices are so hidden.

That makes it very

10

different.

11

among experts about what choices to make.

12

make merger simulation any less a science.

13

disputes have existed forever.

14

them.

15

And the fact that there might be disputes
It doesn't
Scientific

There are ways to reserve

Is merger simulation the only co-scientific

16

merger analysis, and I would say no to that.

17

there are other kinds of analyses that are co-scientific

18

that are helpful.

19

industry when one firm's plant blows up and isn't able to

20

supply the market any more, and see where customers turn

21

to and what other firms do in terms of prices.

22

Certainly,

We can look at what happens in the

You can also look at what happens when there is

23

a new product introduction.

There are obviously

24

complexities about these types of analyses as well, and

25

choices and everything else.

In certain cases, they are
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going to be more appropriate.
FTC vs. Staples is an example of that, where

3

the analyses were done based on looking at markets where

4

there were a different number of competitors or where the

5

number of competitors changed.

6

Should the merger simulation approach replace

7

the documents approach?

As I said at the outset,

8

absolutely not.

9

documents and it is going to give you very useful

A lot of times, you can look at the

10

qualitative information that allows you to fit the model

11

better and give you institutional details, and perhaps

12

even allow you to do some testing of the model, as I

13

said, is very important.

14

What I am going to turn to is some of the

15

problems that I think merger simulation faces.

16

is it may not appeal to attorneys.

17

little bit about that earlier.

18

really does require a fairly high level of economic

19

expertise, and I think attorneys, it may seem like a

20

black box to them.

21

The first

We have heard a

The first thing is it

They not feel as comfortable with it.

Secondly, I think when you end up in a battle

22

of experts like this for each side, talking about very

23

sophisticated choices, as we were talking about before,

24

you just end up in a situation where no one understands

25

what the heck they are talking about, and the two experts
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basically cancel each other out and the fact finder

2

doesn't pay any attention to it.

3

I think there is some of that.

What Tim was

4

talking about before, perhaps having an outside expert to

5

resolve some of those things would be helpful in that

6

regard.

7

There are some that feel merger simulation is

8

too new to be attempted in a courtroom.

I think it is

9

true that law tends to move more slowly than science.

10

an example, I was thinking about intellectual property

11

damages cases.

12

What happened is you basically had to show

13

there were no acceptable non-infringing substitutes to

14

get any lost profits at all.

15

reasonable royalty side of things.

16

don't get any damages, but you don't get any lost

17

profits.

18

As

Of course, there is this
It doesn't mean you

In terms of the share based approach, it kind

19

of made things better, but again, it is based on

20

assumptions that an economist would question, I think, or

21

would want to test at least.

22
23
24
25

I think simulation would really help in these
kinds of cases and hopefully will be used sometime soon.
Greg already talked about this stuff, so I'm
going to skip that.

I just want to say one thing about
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the usefulness of comparing predictions from merger

2

simulations to actual outcomes.

3

standard scientific practice to do that.

4

It is absolutely a

I have this paper with Jerry Hausman where we

5

try to do that a little bit, I think with mixed results,

6

but fairly positively.

7

Since every industry is really very different,

8

I'm not sure how much it would help to say in these five

9

industries, we have validated the merger simulation

10

approach.

11

us when we were applying it to the sixth one.

12

It's not clear to me how much that would help

Finally, I guess I'll just finish by saying as

13

I said before, this is a development process, as is all

14

science, and there are clearly areas where merger

15

simulation can be improved.

16

list is the old Darwin model.

17

beating today.

18

generally, it would be great to come up with a better

19

oligopoly model.

20

of merger simulation lies.

21
22
23

I think number one on the
Bertrand has taken a

It's absolutely true, just in economics

I think that is really where the future

Thanks.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
MR. FROEB:

Thank you, Greg.

I know we are

24

heavily weighted towards economists on this panel.

25

want to give the attorneys some time to rebut or say
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whatever you want.

2

MR. KATTAN:

I actually find myself in

3

agreement with most of the things that the economists

4

have said.

5

method.

6

are out there.

7

articulated, and we can beat up on them by saying, well,

8

I have a problem with that assumption or this assumption.

9

The models that are explicitly by lawyers are a

Certainly when they critique the legal

I think they have a valid point.

Their models

Their assumptions are clearly

10

lot more difficult to discern.

11

difference in the level of opacity, and therefore, in the

12

susceptibility of the model to questioning, and the deck

13

is stacked institutionally in favor of the lawyers,

14

largely because they control the process.

15

There is certainly a

To me, the issue is what do I do when I have a

16

set of choices, each of which is going to predict a price

17

increase no matter what, and I'm told basically take your

18

choice, which poison do you want.

19

I would ask Greg Leonard, how do you sell to a

20

client the idea that they really have to do this, you

21

know, however many thousands of dollars it is going to

22

cost them to pay you, to come with a model that will

23

predict the price increase, next to which you will have

24

yes, but if you count for efficiencies, you account for

25

this, you account for that, that price increase will be
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obviated or it's such a small price increase, that it

2

really shouldn't matter.

3

MR. LEONARD:

I think you have to go into it

4

realizing that the model is going to predict a price

5

increase, unless those costs and elasticities are zero,

6

which is unlikely in a lot of these cases.

7

one percent or two percent, it is just not enough to

8

worry about, especially because there are probably

9

offsetting effects.

10
11

If you get

If they are even small efficiencies,

that is going to wipe it out.
MR. KATTAN:

There is this language in the

12

merger guidelines, which I can't recite as well as I

13

should be able to, due to the fact that the five percent

14

test is not a tolerance level for price increases, and we

15

have certainly seen cases where the predicted price

16

increase was very, very small, and a challenge in fact

17

took place.

18

I don't take comfort in the prediction of an

19

one percent price increase and the argument that well,

20

you wouldn't need a lot of efficiencies to obviate.

21

worry about my ability in most cases to show any kind of

22

efficiency that is going to bring prices down.

23

show significant efficiencies that are driving the deal,

24

but as I said before, they are usually going to be more

25

in the overhead category.
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MR. LEONARD:

If you go back to the guidelines

2

and say well, that's sort of how we should do things.

3

you follow the guidelines strictly, next best substitute

4

or second, if it turns out it's the third one, you can

5

still have a price increase there, too.

6

economics of it and I don't know how you get around that.

7

I don't think following the guidelines versus merger

8

simulation saves you from that.

9

assumption in there, that we don't care about it if it's

10

the third on the list.

11

MR. FROEB:

12

MR. LIPSKY:

If

This is just the

Again, you are making an

I don't know if that's right.
Tad?
I think part of the problem -- I

13

think there are some respectable roles for simulation,

14

making explicit the hidden assumptions is a good one.

15

feel that a lot of these analyses, what triggered the

16

thought was the mention of the five percent.

17

the 1982 guidelines were written, one of the principal

18

reservations about using the five percent SSNIP test was

19

that it would suggest an unsustainable degree of

20

precision.

21

I

Back when

You know, this is going to become a standard

22

and the lawyers are going to seize on this, it's a very

23

specific number used in a very specific way, and sure

24

enough, that's exactly what happened, to the point that

25

you may recall that the major feature -- there was
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actually an 1984 set of guidelines issued by Paul

2

McGrath -- one of the major features of the 1984

3

guidelines was this big introductory statement that said,

4

now, wait a minute, you totally have the wrong idea on

5

this five percent test.

6

some markets could be 1.5.

7

the right question and the magnitudes we have no idea

8

about.

9

Some markets could be seven and
This is just meant to suggest

Similarly, I think, in the simulation area, if

10

you can be confident about the sign of the first

11

derivative for any of the major variables, whether it is

12

price, output or whatever, someone is going to triumph

13

from the fact that you can establish it from any modeling

14

device at all, that would be real progress.

15

I really liked the analogy to the dispute over

16

evolution.

17

equilibrium was popularized as a theory, there are some

18

modeling gradulists who describe punctuated equilibrium

19

in a manner intended to be pejorative as evolution by

20

jerks.

21

respond by calling the gradulists evolution by creeps,

22

which suggests something of the flavor of the debate over

23

unilateral effects theory in antitrust law.

24
25

We know that even after punctuated

Of course, there are punctuated equilibrium guys

The question I want to pose is this, and let me
say it very bluntly.

My view is that most of the
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1

shortcomings in the way that economics is applied to

2

antitrust decision making, it's not economics isn't

3

perfect, everybody knows all the stuff we have been

4

saying about you don't have the facts and the modeling is

5

crude, oligopoly assumptions, but just the question of

6

getting everything on the table in an efficient manner,

7

where the non-experts are in a position to judge exactly

8

what the limitations are on the analyses being presented.

9

I personally would like to see, as you could

10

tell from my presentation, I personally would like to see

11

economists somehow, and particularly neutral economists

12

as opposed to economists retained by parties, become more

13

directly involved in antitrust decision making.

14

Maybe an independent panel where the decisions

15

on the economic issues have to be in some sense credited

16

or respected by a court, or even incorporated in the

17

decision.

18

We have a bunch of economists on the platform

19

here who have had a lot of experience with use of

20

economics and antitrust agencies and antitrust cases

21

before courts.

22

like a good one.

I'd like to hear whether that idea sounds

23

MR. FROEB:

Greg?

24

MR. WERDEN:

No.

25

(Laughter.)
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1

MR. WERDEN:

There are a million obstacles that

2

stand in the way, not the least of which is you don't

3

have the time.

4

and you don't even have extra days in most of these

5

merger cases.

6

That would take extra months, I think,

It would be fairly expensive, but I'm sure you

7

would campaign for extra funds for the agencies to

8

support that.

9

I don't know that the decision makers who still

10

remain lawyers are going to care about the independent

11

guys.

12

I don't know that it would be given any weight.

13

I don't know that they care about the inside guys.

I can imagine doing something like that, much

14

more outside of the agency than inside.

15

hire these people as temporary employees, you could solve

16

the confidentiality problems, but then these guys would

17

never be able to write about these things and they may

18

not want to do that.

19

I suppose if you

Getting people to make the commitment to get up

20

to speed on these things is tough.

We find it hard even

21

when we are paying people $800 an hour to get them to put

22

the time commitment in.

23

volunteers for this sort of thing, and it creates

24

conflicts of interest.

25

be a lot of takers.

It's not going to be easy to get

I don't think there are going to
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1

Court appointed experts, I have somewhat more

2

sympathy for, but I don't think it has ever been done

3

successfully.

4

cases, but I think never successfully.

5

isn't so good.

6

There haven't been a lot in antitrust
The track record

I think that might make some sense,

7

particularly if what the court appointed expert was asked

8

to do is what Tad suggests, which is to tell the judge

9

does this theory make sense, is this in the mainstream,

10

what does this theory really depend on, is there some

11

fatal flaw in this that any neutral person would see,

12

that they are trying to paper over, and these two extreme

13

positions I'm getting from the two sides, which is

14

closest to the truth.

15

There are a lot of things that a court

16

appointed expert might be able to do successfully,

17

although if they are appointed the way Fred Kahn was

18

appointed, like an arbitrator, by striking people from a

19

list, you are going to get the least common denominator

20

expert, not the best expert.

21

to work too well.

22

MR. FROEB:

I don't think that is going

I want to turn from merger

23

simulation, which unfortunately or not, it seemed to suck

24

up all the debate on the panel.

25

issues associated with unilateral effects.

There are a lot of other
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1

toss them out to our EC visitor, to Valerie.

2

Is it possible to allege both unilateral and

3

coordinated effects in a merger case?

4

tried to do that?

5

MS. RABASSA:

6

MR. FROEB:

Have you ever

We have tried to do that.
We have 10 more minutes.

I want to

7

give each of the panelists two and a half minutes, and

8

I'm going to be strict here, to sum up kind of a big

9

picture type question.

What criticisms do you have of

10

the guidelines, the question of unilateral effects, and

11

what positive suggestions do you have for its

12

improvement.

13

Greg, do you want to start?

14

MR. WERDEN:

I guess my main conclusion would

15

be it would be silly to re-write the guidelines.

16

would come out worse.

17

projects are not good ideas.

18

probably do better than both of the agencies can do

19

together.

20

guidelines, and that advice has been taken on a number of

21

occasions.

22

They always do.

They

These committee

Any one person could

My main advice always is don't write

I don't think there is much in the way that I

23

don't like in the unilateral effects section of the

24

guidelines right now.

25

terms the theories.

It articulates in very general
That is what guidelines are supposed
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1

to do.

2

That is what guidelines don't do very well.

3

say anything about modeling.

4

It doesn't say very much about the evidence.
It doesn't

Joe was suggesting a tension between what

5

economists do in the guidelines.

I don't see it at all.

6

I don't think the people responsible for the 1992

7

guidelines would see it.

8

methodology.

9

that addresses the questions in the guidelines, the

Bring it on.

The guidelines do not specify
Whatever methodology you have

10

guidelines are happy with it.

11

are useful, because they are not a straight jacket for

12

merger analysis.

13

with that addresses those issues in the guidelines is

14

acceptable.

15

and it has to be sound methods.

16

That's why the guidelines

Any economic analysis anybody comes up

Of course, it has to pass certain screens
Bring it on.

The one thing I don't like in the guidelines I

17

guess, and that's only because it is misunderstood, is

18

the 35 percent.

There is no 35 percent safe harbor in

19

the guidelines.

Read the sentence as often as you want.

20

It is never going to say this is a safe harbor.

21

It is going to say something else that people

22

can take to be a safe harbor, but the economists who were

23

involved in crafting those sentences made sure it wasn't,

24

and since it just does more damage than it's worth, I

25

would just cross that out.
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1

MR. FROEB:

2

MR. KATTAN:

Joe?
I actually agree with much of what

3

Greg said, and in particular, I'm not sure that we could

4

do much better with the current guidelines, which do

5

address the issue at a level of generality that I think

6

is appropriate.

7

Jim Rill has voiced some of the similar

8

criticisms that I have, so I don't think it's necessarily

9

true that none of the people involved in the 1992

10

guidelines have concerns about modeling, but it's

11

absolutely correct that the guidelines say absolutely

12

nothing about modeling, and I'm not saying the simulation

13

approach isn't appropriate, but I think it is the case

14

that it necessarily asks a somewhat different question

15

than the guidelines do, whereas the guidelines focus on

16

the spacial separation based on qualitative attributes,

17

product attributes, marketing attributes.

18

simulations define differentiation by necessity based on

19

market share.

20

on market share.

Many of the

That is the significance of firms is based

21

The 35 percent issue, Greg is right that if you

22

read the language very closely, and read like safe harbor

23

language, on the other hand, has there been a case since

24

1992 where unilateral effects have been alleged under 35

25

percent?
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1
2

The reality may be different.

I think it is

the case that most people do view it as a safe harbor.

3

MR. FROEB:

4

MR. LEONARD:

Greg?
I guess I wouldn't want to stop

5

at the 35 percent, getting rid of that, and getting rid

6

of shares altogether with differentiated products, then

7

they really just are entirely meaningless.

8
9

I think the guidelines are trying to use some
terms that a lot of different people can understand, and

10

lawyers and the companies that are thinking about merging

11

and so forth.

12

percent, I probably wouldn't change anything either.

13

Aside from the share issue and the 35

MR. FROEB:

Valerie, I am going to open it to

14

you.

15

promulgated EC guidelines.

16

suggestions for change?

17
18

You can talk about our guidelines or the newly

MS. RABASSA:

Feel free.

Do you have any

Big picture?
After only two weeks, we have to

wait.

19

MR. FROEB:

20

MR. LIPSKY:

Tad?
I guess I don't have any problem

21

with the way the guidelines are written.

22

with simulation and types of analyses that are made in

23

support of unilateral effects approaches are lack of

24

realism in the underlying model of behavior and the

25

dynamic assumptions.
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1

This broader institutional problem, which I

2

think allows the first problem to survive, to continue,

3

which is that decision makers, because they are lawyers,

4

are essentially free to ignore what the economists are

5

telling them.

6

get to is again analyses that are closer to the truth,

7

and I think the way to do it is to make it less easy in

8

some way for decision makers to ignore what the

9

economists are telling them, but, also, I think there is

The solutions ultimately we are trying to

10

a degree of want of a better term, no insult intended,

11

the conversation between the contending economic theories

12

needs adult supervision, both within the agencies and

13

before courts.

14

We have touched on some of the institutions

15

that might be used to accomplish that.

16

the direction to look for, a discipline that will

17

facilitate scientific progress.

18

MR. FROEB:

19
20

I am going to give the last word to

Dave Scheffman, who is sitting here.
MR. SCHEFFMAN:

This is a very good panel, a

21

lot of good discussion.

22

simulation.

23

aren't so complicated.

24

equilibrium conditions and stuff.

25

That, I think, is

It did focus too much on

Very clearly, the simulation models really
It is sometimes A and B and some

What you don't think about is the A/B model
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1

doesn't necessarily mean there is going to be a price

2

increase.

3

lawyers is in industrial markets where the lawyers will

4

chase unilateral effects cases on seemingly just as good

5

as a basis, the economists will chase them off,

6

competition is much more complicated, you can't look at

7

it that way, but all of a sudden you say brand, and all

8

of a sudden you have a theory that works.

9

In fact, I think one of the problems with the

I keep saying the economists -- I don't think

10

it is true because most times economists and agencies are

11

doing both simulation and you have some other economists

12

actually getting into the details of competition, you

13

have to do that in either case.

14

useful, but I caution you and I keep saying this, A and B

15

analogy is very good and there is nothing wrong with the

16

guidelines.

17

rebuttable all the time in industrial products mergers.

18

Economists don't seem to forget that when they estimate

19

demand elasticities.

20

Simulation can be

It's a rebuttable presumption.

Let me give you one example.

It's

There are a lot

21

of problems with retail versus wholesale.

I have been

22

working with soft drinks for over 20 years, and I am not

23

convinced there is a substantial percentage of people who

24

are in between Coke and Pepsi when prices are near a

25

parity.

That is the demand curve is very flat.
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1

estimates a demand curve like that.

2

That is just one of many reasons why you think

3

about why this theory may not work.

4

curve may be very flat, may have kinks, whatever.

5

Actually, the demand

Those are the things we worry about in

6

industrial products mergers, because we ask the customers

7

and they say, well, I'm actually not worried although A

8

and B are my two premier qualified suppliers, because I

9

can get it somewhere else.

10
11

We say, well, that doesn't

work.
We need to think some more about the

12

fundamental theory in the guidelines.

13

wrong with that, but it's a rebuttable presumption.

14

need to think about as to whether it is right or not.

15
16

MR. FROEB:

There is nothing

On that note, I want to thank all

of the panelists and the audience.

17

(Applause.)

18

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the workshop

19

We

recessed for lunch.)

20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

A F T E R N O O N

2

S E S S I O N

COORDINATED EFFECTS

3

MR. KNIGHT:

Good afternoon and welcome to the

4

panel on coordinated effects.

Coordinated effects

5

analysis might be best summed up by the observation that

6

predictions are tough, especially about the future.

7

course, Section 7 of the Clayton Act calls for predictive

8

analysis, and the Agencies have invested great effort

9

over the years in an attempt to answer the often

Of

10

difficult question of whether a particular merger is

11

likely to enhance or diminish competition in the relevant

12

market.

13

Historically, much of that focus has been on

14

concentration.

15

as the threshold test for coordinated effects.

16

as the 1982 Merger Guidelines recognize, and recent

17

agency pronouncements confirm, a lot of the concentration

18

data provided a starting point for analyzing the

19

competitive impact of the merger.

20

Indeed, concentration continues to serve
However,

What comes next with regard to coordinated

21

effects analysis is the topic of this panel.

22

Guidelines consider two theories of competitive harm,

23

unilateral effects and coordinated interaction.

24
25

The Merger

During the 1990s and continuing through today,
much has been written and said about the coordinated
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1

effects theories and various approaches to assessing

2

coordinated effects of mergers.

3

Recently, both agencies have significantly

4

renewed their interest in the analysis of coordinated

5

effects.

6

This panel represents a continuation of that

7

effort.

Today, we are delighted to have a full list of

8

esteemed guests.

9

Deborah Majoras is with the law firm of Jones,

10

Day, Reavis & Pogue, where she practices in the area of

11

antitrust law, among others.

12

of last year, Debbie served as Deputy Assistant Attorney

13

General at the Department of Justice Antitrust Division.

14

During her tenure at the Justice Department, Debbie's

15

responsibilities spanned the civil, international and

16

foreign --

17

myriad of industries, from software to financial networks

18

to defense, health care, media and entertainment, to

19

industrial equipment.

20

From April 2001 to the end

she oversaw numerous matters involving a

In addition, she served as the chair of the

21

International Competition Networks Group and oversaw

22

policy initiatives such as the DOJ's review process

23

initiative, best practices project, the merger remedies

24

manual, and the day to day DOJ/FTC health care hearings.

25

She was often a frequent speaker on behalf of the DOJ.
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3

In her current practice, Debbie actively speaks
and writes on antitrust issues.
Dr. David Scheffman has recently rejoined LECG

4

as a director, after a second stint with the Federal

5

Trade Commission as Director of the Bureau of Economics.

6

He is also a professor in business strategy and marketing

7

at the Undergraduate School of Vanderbilt University,

8

where he was a chaired professor in the 1990s.

9

Dr. Scheffman is a noted scholar in the area of

10

antitrust economics, among others, and has written

11

several important articles and books.

12

In his most recent role as Director of the

13

Bureau of Economics, David was instrumental in

14

stimulating quantitative analysis in antitrust

15

investigations, promulgating best practices for

16

interaction between the Bureau of Economics and outside

17

parties, including economic and financial consultants.

18

Dr. Andrew Dick is with Charles River

19

Associates.

Prior to joining CRA, he was the Acting

20

Chief of the policy section at the Antitrust Division.

21

While at the Justice Department, he directed the agency's

22

re-evaluation of coordinated effects analysis for merger

23

investigations, and he prepared to serve as the

24

Division's testifying expert in coordinated effects

25

merger investigations.
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1

Andrew has worked on a wide range of merger and

2

non-merger projects on electronic networks, steel,

3

broadcast and media, computer software and services,

4

insurance and health care.

5

Dr. Steven Salop is a Professor of Economics at

6

Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C.,

7

where he teaches economics and economic reasoning and the

8

law.

9

focusing on microeconomics and regulation.

He is a consultant to Charles River Associates,
He has

10

written numerous articles on various areas of economics

11

and law, exclusionary conduct, joint ventures and tacit

12

coordination.

13

His research has focused, among other areas, on

14

various aspects of mergers and joint ventures, including

15

market definition, ownership interest, and efficiencies.

16

It also includes telecommunications, electronic commerce,

17

computer hardware and software, financial services and

18

consumer products.

19

Dr. Jonathan Baker is a Professor of Law at

20

American University's College of Law, where he teaches

21

courses in the areas of antitrust and economic

22

regulation.

23

of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade

24

Commission.

25

at the Council of Economic Advisors in the Executive

From 1995 to 1998, he served as the Director

From 1993 to 1995, he was a Senior Economist
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1

Office of the President.

2

Dr. Baker has served as Special Assistant to

3

Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the

4

Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and as

5

Assistant Professor at Dartmouth's Tuck School of

6

Business Administration, as well as Attorney Advisor to

7

an Acting Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.

8
9

Professor Baker is currently involved with the
American Bar Association's division for antitrust law,

10

and is a senior consultant with Charles River Associates.

11

Paul Yde is with Freshfields, a newly

12

established antitrust group in Washington, D.C. as of May

13

of 2002.

14

practice group.

15

Trade Commissioners and as a litigation attorney in the

16

FTC's Bureau of Competition.

17

He is the current chair of the antitrust
He has served as advisor to two Federal

In addition to being recognized as a leader in

18

antitrust law, he has been active in the leadership of

19

the antitrust division of the American Bar Association,

20

he's been a speaker and author on antitrust issues, and

21

he has sat on the editorial boards of the Antitrust Law

22

Journal and Antitrust Magazine.

23

As the moderator of the panel, I will attempt

24

to lead the discussion through a number of relevant

25

issues.

While my questions may actually be addressed to
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actual panelists, all panelists are encouraged to jump in

2

the discussion at any time and pose questions of their

3

own.

4

With that, let's go ahead and get started.

5

Perhaps as good a place as any to begin is the discussion

6

of the definition of coordinated effects.

7

mean? The Merger Guidelines focus on assessment of

8

whether a merger may lessen competition, and I want to

9

start by asking David Scheffman, is that an appropriate

10
11

What do we

definition?
MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thanks, Mike.

Sorry for the

12

long introduction.

13

abbreviated bio. I am going to try as always to be

14

provocative.

15

talk about all of this.

16

I should have given you an

I've given a handout.

I'm not going to

Let me step back to the beginning, to my

17

beginning in antitrust.

When I came to the Commission,

18

and Steve Salop was here, too, when I came to the

19

Commission, we were litigating the Cereals case, and both

20

of the antitrust agencies had very active enforcement

21

efforts against oligopolies.

22

If you think about what was in the Cereals

23

case, which I am not a big fan of, but it was a very

24

interesting case.

25

what the litigation was about in that case, and looking

If you look at how the Commission and
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at how we analyze mergers in concentrated industries now,

2

there is a total disconnect.

3

to talk about here.

4

That is partly what I want

I am going to jump to slide three, and partly

5

this has happened as a result of the focus on unilateral

6

effects.

7

We say that it's true formally that the models

8

that we use in unilateral effects are "oligopoly" models.

9

What I learned back in the dark old ages of economics, is

10

they are the most primitive oligopoly models.

11

models that do not include exactly what you think might

12

happen in industries that we typically review these days

13

for mergers.

14

assumption, which everyone realized must not make any

15

sense in a concentrated market, is that each competitor

16

assumes that its actions do not stimulate reactions by

17

the other competitors.

18

These are

Specifically, in Cournot and Bertrand, the

Economists have known for almost 100 years that

19

this assumption probably doesn't make sense as analysis

20

of real behavior in concentrated markets, but that is the

21

sort of analysis we have in unilateral effects including

22

in "oligopoly" models like Cournot and Bertrand.

23
24
25

In fact, game theory is much richer than
Cournot and Bertrand.
Some people have said unilateral effects is all
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you need because if you build coordinated interaction on

2

top of that, it is even worse, so if you have a case with

3

unilateral facts, then you have a coordinated interaction

4

case, too.

5

models.

6

markets is much more competitive behavior than what we

7

predicted by Cournot or Bertrand, because a lot of the

8

behavior is not about picking a price on a demand curve,

9

but trying to shift your demand curve at the expense of

10
11

That could be true under some particular

However, what we see in many concentrated

your rivals.
What happened in coordinated interaction, i.e.

12

oligopolistic interdependence?

13

a lot of coordinated effects cases, primarily because of

14

the level of concentration.

15

collusion cases.

16

arguing about whether or not collusion was possible in a

17

given industry and in a more casual manner, what the

18

merger might have to do with that.

19

In the 1980s, there were

They were, in fact,

The analysis was the checklist and

The most complete record of that is the case in

20

which the Bureau of Economics memoranda were actually

21

discovered by the other side, and you saw the big tension

22

between the lawyers and the economists about this.

23

What has happened since?

Coordinated

24

interaction has gotten some renewed emphasis with the new

25

Administration, although it really had never gone away.
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What is it based on?

2

If we go back to the 1982 Guidelines, the

3

theoretical foundation of the 1982 Guidelines was

4

Stigler's theory of oligopoly.

5

oligopoly was a brilliant paper, but it was a theory of

6

collusion.

7

the development of dynamic game theory.

8

of results in dynamic game theory.

9

any result.

Stigler's theory of

What occurred since the Stigler paper we have
There are a lot

You can get almost

So, it's not very helpful.

But, the focus

10

of dynamic game theory, particularly as to antitrust, is

11

on collusion games.

12

between collusion and perfect competition.

13

But there are a lot of "things" in

What I am suggesting is that we need to go back

14

to something like oligopolistic interdependence, not

15

tacit collusion.

16

fit the merger situation, although there are few

17

situations where it does fit.

18

Collusion theory doesn't usually really

What we should be analyzing is whether the

19

industry, or the oligopolistic coordination in this

20

particular concentrated market is likely to lead to

21

adverse effects as a result of the merger, not the tacit

22

collusion test, which is too strong a test.

23

I think what we don't know is what we mean by

24

non-unilateral cases.

What we tried to convey in the

25

Scheffman/ Coleman paper is the different categories of
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cases, types of cases.

2

situations where we have the oligopolistic coordination,

3

which seems to lead to what is the ideal competitive

4

circumstances that might be adversely impacted by a

5

merger.

6

One category which I would add is

These are the things we should be concentrating

7

on.

I think that is what the agencies actually do.

8

think that's what the attorneys actually focus on.

9

think in coordinated interaction cases, what the

I
I

10

attorneys are focusing on in most cases these days is

11

what is the actual nature of competition.

12

trying to prove, for example, in a unilateral effects

13

case, not that A and B are the closest substitutes, which

14

often these days is not the primary test, but that they

15

are particularly close competitors.

16

They are

In non-unilateral effects cases, they are

17

looking for evidence that the parties to the merger in

18

some sense are behaving "cooperatively."

19

This is the area that I think the economists

20

could have the most impact, in theoretical presumptions

21

of theories, which don't really explain very much of what

22

we are actually trying to analyze.

23

MR. KNIGHT:

Thank you.

Jon?

24

MR. BAKER:

25

Let me first respond by trying to put this in a

Thank you.
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1

little bit of perspective.

2

we debating what is coordinated and what is not?

3

issue is how do we make sure we are applying the correct

4

economic analysis?

5

What are the stakes?

Why are
The

I guess in listening to you talk, Dave, it

6

seems like you think coordinated and unilateral are dirty

7

words, and there is some third category that we don't

8

fully understand without a model, and that's where all

9

the cases are.

I'm not sure I fully understand that yet.

10

I'm going to have to go back to your paper to see what's

11

there.

12

I want to stick with what we do in the

13

Guidelines with coordinated and unilateral.

14

is a mistake to interpret the recent reinvigoration of

15

coordinated competitive effects analysis as somehow

16

reflecting questions as to the soundness of unilateral

17

effects analysis.

18

I think it

We want to focus on the technical issues in

19

coordinated effects analysis here; the outcomes you get

20

when the firms are following strategies that take into

21

account the past conduct of their rivals.

22

kind of outcomes that are represented as a result of

23

oligopoly supergames, and they can differ from

24

oligopolistic interactions, because punishment threats

25

can support less competitive outcomes, if the firms are
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1
2

able to identify and reach those outcomes.
That's why when we do coordinated effects

3

analysis, we are spending a lot of time thinking about

4

whether firms can reach a consensus on coordinated

5

effects outcomes.

6

There are a bunch of examples of in the

7

Guidelines, and when I was working on cases in the

8

Antitrust Division and working under the 1992 Merger

9

Guidelines and other cases at the FTC.

10

MR. SALOP: You all might be surprised but I am

11

actually in sympathy with what Dave says here, the way he

12

framed it today.

13

both old guys.

14

of the sort of models that we learned when we were in

15

graduate school, back before there were graduate schools.

16

You have to understand, Dave and I are
You have to put this back in the context

Basically, what Dave is talking about is what

17

used to be called conjectural variation models.

18

start off with a basic unilateral effects model and you

19

expand it by saying there is some conjectural variation,

20

that if firm one raises price, then firm two will react

21

by changing its price a particular way, and firm one will

22

anticipate that reaction of firm two.

23

complex sort of Nash-Bertrand equilibrium models.

24
25

You

They are more

I think we need to think about those models.
think as a modeling strategy, the unilateral effects
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1

model is closer to the sort of modeling we do and closer

2

to sort of the intuition we have when we are thinking in

3

terms of conjectural variations.

4

In addition, this notion of conjectural

5

variation, not stating it as such, but conjectural

6

variations are contained within the 1992 Merger

7

Guidelines in analysis of unilateral effects.

8

MR. KNIGHT:

9

MR. DICK:

Andrew?
I'd like to echo the point that Jon

10

was making.

11

interaction theory really is the notion of repeated

12

interaction.

13

critical phrase is that a coordinated effect arises from

14

strategies or actions that firms take that are only

15

profitable because of accommodation by rivals, or an

16

expected accommodation by rivals, and a mutual

17

accommodation arises most naturally when there is

18

repeated interaction amongst firms.

19

I think at the heart of coordinated

If you look in the Guidelines, I think the

Think of the three sort of tasks which Jon

20

briefly mentioned that are mentioned in the Guidelines

21

that would-be conspirators have to accomplish.

22

First, they have to reach some kind of

23

understanding or terms of coordination, talking about

24

actions they are going to take in the future that are

25

conditional upon an expectation that each firm is going
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1

to accommodate each other's activities.

2

a natural forward looking event there.

3

There is already

The second task that they have to successfully

4

accomplish is monitoring whether there has been

5

compliance with that agreed upon accommodation.

6

the notion is over time they are going to learn whether

7

they can trust one another.

8

is key.

9

Again,

Again, repeated interaction

The third task, of course, is in the event that

10

there is deviation from the agreement, they have to have

11

a way to punish.

12

are in the last period of competition, there is no scope

13

for punishment and everything unravels.

14

Again, that's forward looking.

If we

I would agree with Jon that there is a very

15

simple and elegant point made in the Guidelines, which is

16

that all the profitability of these coordinated

17

strategies is contingent upon accommodation, and

18

economics, and game theory in particular, has repeated

19

interaction as being essential to that.

20

MR. KNIGHT:

Let's move to the Guidelines for a

21

moment.

22

post-merger market, in particular, whether it is one that

23

is conducive to coordination -- conducive to reaching

24

terms, to monitoring and punishing.

25

They do focus the analyst on looking at the

They refer folks to what has been called the
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

141
1

Stigler-Posner checklist of factors, to look at that

2

post-merger market and try to determine if it's one that

3

is conducive to coordination.

4

availability of routine information concerning market

5

conditions, transactions, and competitiveness,

6

characteristics of buyers and sellers, characteristics of

7

typical transactions, and whether there has been previous

8

collusion.

9

Those factors include the

Let me start with you, Steve.

10

appropriate way to go about it?

11

MR. SALOP:

Is that still an

Every fact we get is one more

12

brick, one more brick in the understanding of the

13

dynamics.

14

have has really a lot of shortcomings.

15

types of shortcomings.

I think this sort of simple checklist that we
There are several

16

First of all, the screens in the checklist are

17

imperfect. For example, with respect to the HHI, we know

18

that there is often substantial competition despite high

19

HHIs.

20

successful price fixing in markets even that have safe

21

harbor HHIs.

22

The opposite is also true, there has been

Take list versus negotiated prices.

The

23

checklist said list prices and don't discount, where

24

there were competitive concerns.

25

fixing conspiracies in many industries are with

That's true.
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1
2

negotiated pricing.

Acidic acid, vitamins, and so on.

Even if the prices are individually negotiated,

3

as we learned from Mr. Wilson in the ADM movie and

4

Weissing movie, we know if you can monitor quality, then

5

you don't have to look at prices at all.

6

It's the same with many of the other elements

7

in the checklist.

Excess capacity.

While on the one

8

hand excess capacity can reduce the likelihood successful

9

coordination by giving firms a greater incentive to

10

cheat, but on the other hand, excess capacity increases

11

the likelihood of coordination by increasing the ability

12

of firms to punish.

13

Big buyers.

Big buyers can keep the market

14

competitive, but big buyers can also induce to sellers to

15

raise the costs.

16

Even efficiency benefits in a coordination

17

model, we think cost savings generally reduce the

18

likelihood of coordination by giving the firm who reduces

19

its costs a greater incentive to cheat.

20

hand, the cost savings increase the ability of the merged

21

firm to punish its rivals who defect from the agreement.

22

On the other

Even the Department of Justice in 2001

23

recognized that cost savings can increase cost similarity

24

across the firms and thereby increase the risk of

25

coordination.
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1

All these factors can go both ways.

There are

2

serious interaction effects.

3

that the longer the detection lag, the less likely the

4

coordination will succeed.

5

I think everyone agrees

I think everybody also tends to agree that

6

product homogeneity tends to facilitate coordination by

7

ensuring a rapid response to the event of cheating.

8
9
10

If long detection lags, then product
homogeneity increases the event of cheating because you
have more to gain.

11

I think the checklist is just too simple to be

12

relied on for more than just a guide, a basic guide to

13

thinking about the industry.

14

if the agencies made a decision and said, well, we have

15

five in this pile and three in this pile, so we are going

16

to bring the case, and it would be even worse if they

17

say, oh, I have at least one in this pile, therefore, the

18

policy maker might say I have discretion to come out in

19

either direction, so I don't need to worry about the

20

facts at all.

21
22
23

MR. KNIGHT:

I would certainly hate it

Debbie, are the checklist factors

useful?
MS. MAJORAS:

24

factors are very useful.

25

shared some views.

Yes, I think the checklist
I know that David Scheffman has

I'm going to defend the Guidelines a
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1

little bit on a couple of fronts, not entirely, but a

2

little bit here.

3

First of all, the checklist is a misnomer.

If

4

it's true that the agencies were doing what Steve Salop

5

just said, and sort of making a list on this side and

6

this side, and whoever has the most, that's the way it

7

comes out, then sure, I would agree that would not be a

8

particularly responsible analysis.

9

Starting with just what the Guidelines say,

10

maybe I'm reading it differently from everyone else, but

11

they say "depending upon the circumstances, the following

12

market factors among others may be relevant."

13

wiggle words do you need?

14

it, it's not a checklist of just very specific market

15

facts.

16

How many

And then when you go through

For example, it says you have to look at

17

marketing and pricing practices, characteristics of

18

buyers and sellers, characteristics of typical

19

transactions.

20

The number of firms that I have seen, and there

21

are those of us at DOJ who have worked very closely with

22

Andrew on working on some analysis on coordinated

23

effects, many of the things we are talking about that

24

need to be done in a rigorous analysis are within the

25

Guidelines.

In fact, if you look at what Joe Simon said
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1

about the cruise lines investigation and the analysis

2

that was done there, he says in his speeches, that was a

3

very straightforward application of the facts to the

4

Guidelines, Guidelines to the facts.

5

I don't mean to argue about semantics, but I

6

think we do have to be careful when people say throw out

7

the checklist.

8
9

The other thing that we need to remember any
time we talk about risks of common characteristics that

10

might be red flagged for an agency, red flagged for

11

counseling clients, is the following.

12

antitrust work and analysis that is done, very important

13

antitrust analysis, is done two times.

14

A lot of the

First of all, with counsel counseling their

15

clients well before the agencies have ever heard about

16

it, well before it has hit the press, when there hasn't

17

yet been time for a truly extensive market analysis. But

18

in fact, you have a client who wants to know is it even

19

worth my trying this thing.

20

That's the first place.

The second is within the first 30 days at the

21

agencies.

If the agencies can't have some factors that

22

we can agree on that are at least red flags, that if

23

those are not present, the agencies could then have some

24

comfort based on other factors, including market share

25

and concentration and entry and the rest, gee, this isn't
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1

one where we need to keep going, issue a second request

2

and go forward, then we may be in trouble because a lot

3

of work is done in that first 30 days.

4

system depends on a lot of work being done in the first

5

30 days.

6

MR. YDE:

I think the

Let me just add to that.

Debbie

7

stole most of my lines.

The question here is what our

8

objective is.

9

Guidelines, changing the way that we organize evidence,

If we are talking about revising the

10

to move away from the checklist and design something

11

else, that's one thing.

12

If we are talking about actually changing what

13

economic theory we actually rely on in applying the

14

Guidelines, that's another thing.

15

Let's go to the first part, which is what

16

Debbie was referring to.

I certainly have never read the

17

Guidelines as a checklist.

18

underlying economic theory, that I think everybody agrees

19

is the basis for the coordinated interaction section.

20

Then we look at the standards and the objectives that are

21

stated just in that section as well as in the overall

22

purposes of the Guidelines in trying to interpret what

23

the "checklist" says.

We look first at the

24

I think as long as we read the Guidelines first

25

of all with the objectives in mind and understanding what
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1

the underlying economic theory is, then you don't end up

2

with the Steve Salop range of factors that he suggested.

3

I guess there is a more fundamental question

4

which is what I think I didn't fully appreciate from what

5

Dave was saying when I first read his paper, which is the

6

suggestion that the theory of oligopoly, Stigler's theory

7

of oligopoly is not an appropriate theory for predicting

8

outcomes for mergers or for determining whether a merger

9

should be unlawful in predicting there is a substantial

10
11

lessening of

competition.

This goes to Jon's point.

That seems to me not

12

to be just a technical point.

13

about what kind of evidence is being used to predicting

14

anticompetitive effects, but if Dave is saying that we

15

shouldn't be using the likelihood or the possibility of

16

collusion or at least the theory of oligopoly as a means

17

of predicting whether a merger is anticompetitive, that I

18

think takes these Guidelines and throws them out and

19

starts over.

20

MR. KNIGHT:

21

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

There is a technical point

Is that what you are saying, Dave?
I'm glad you said that.

22

remember where the checklist came from.

23

somewhere else.

24

implementing it.

25

That was a brilliant paper.

Let's

It came from

Posner was just brilliant about
It came from the theory of oligopoly.
It was a set of conditions,
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1

really the 40,000 foot level of sort of very broad

2

industry characteristics, that you could maybe make some

3

pronouncements about in a very general model about

4

whether or not they were conducive or not conducive to

5

collusion.

6

Again, that paper is the theory of collusion.

7

Lots of people have said that.

8

theory of oligopoly.

9

It's not really the

It's the theory of collusion.

I agree with Debbie.

The agencies are much

10

more sophisticated in the use of this.

11

and I did said let's really get down on the ground in

12

thinking about a "checklist" sort of analysis.

13

Stigler would have actually applied his theory to an

14

actual industry and had all the evidence and facts we

15

have on a situation, he would have looked at the same

16

thing we do, which is look at all the factual details

17

rather than broad industry characteristics at the 40,000

18

foot level.

19

The paper Mary

If George

I think the checklist used in its broadest

20

sense, which is to look at the details of an industry and

21

how competition works or not, to see whether there is a

22

viable basis for coordination, is always very useful.

23

It's useful for what I'm proposing, which is worrying

24

about oligopolistic interaction.

25

The problem is that like a lot of such tests,
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1

it only has power in one direction.

Given certain facts,

2

it can reject the viability of any sort of coordinated

3

behavior.

4

we had a merger with something that sounded bad to some

5

people, which is yield management, so that there must be

6

a case here.

7

we got down in the facts and said, well, where is the

8

evidence of coordination?

9

sort of coordination in there, we would have had five

In cruises, which was an interesting example,

The only reason why there wasn't a case is

If we could have found any

10

votes against the cruises merger.

11

However, if we found "it," that still would not prove

12

that the merger was anti-competitive.

13

We couldn't find it.

The problem you get into these days in

14

coordinated interaction cases is the basis of the case?

15

The problem is increasingly, that the attorney not

16

surprisingly turns his focus to what is the competition

17

and to arguing that there is some oligopolistic

18

coordination, there are some things that look suspicious,

19

where if it's four to three, we have to block this

20

merger.

21

wrong, from an economic perspective, and we have to

22

provide more help on the economics side.

23

That is where the real gap is.

Sometimes they are right and sometimes they are

Economics does

24

not give us much to answer to that in this gray area

25

where maybe something can happen, the checklist passes in
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1

a sense.

There is some basis maybe that it would be

2

possible to coordinate on something.

3

collusion could never arise from a merger, but that's not

4

the primary problem, as I see it.

5

I'm not saying

In mergers, we are worried about whether it's

6

going to change the nature of competition not in a

7

collusive way, and not in the particular dynamics games

8

models we are talking about, which we never see.

9

about those models. Look at equilibriums where the

Think

10

collusive equilibrium is sustained because there are

11

punishment strategies and you see price wars and things

12

like that.

13

industries we see.

14

the industries that we see do we see that.

15

we see some "oligopolies."

16

You hardly ever see that in any real world
You see it in a few.

Hardly any of
Nonetheless,

That is where we have to develop more analysis.

17

This is where the attorneys run things, where the

18

economists have to have something more to say.

19

can't say per the checklist, it fails the checklist in

20

the large, so there is no basis at all for coordination,

21

look at the data.

22

coordination in some sense, that's where we have to get

23

more economic analysis into the decision making.

They

When you have what looks like

24

MR. KNIGHT:

25

MR. BAKER:

Jon Baker?
Let me first comment on what we see
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1

and then what the factors in the Guidelines say.

2

In terms of the empirical economic literature,

3

what we see is that in a lot of industries, firms behave

4

so that they are not acting competitively; we reject

5

competition.

6

find some sort of way of interacting that leads to

7

outcomes that are less than competitive.

8
9

There are a lot of studies that say firms

We also see in lots of these industries that
the firms are paying attention to strategies -- this is

10

the outcome of a dynamic oligopoly model of the sort that

11

coordinated effects analysis in the Guidelines is all

12

about.

13

It is perfectly plausible that the coordinated

14

interaction model is the sensible model for understanding

15

lots of oligopoly interaction without expressed

16

collusion.

17

interaction model.

18

behavior without expressed collusion.

19

That is why they developed this coordinated
They wanted to explain strategic

There are two issues in coordinated effects.

20

Whether the firms can solve their cartel problems,

21

whether they can reach consensus after the merger.

22

is what the factors that we call the checklist are all

23

about.

24
25

That

There is another question about how the merger
changes the outcome.

It's in the Guidelines, too, but
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1

it's not really analyzed the way the first question is,

2

whether after the merger, the firms can solve their

3

cartel problems.

4

In order to analyze that question, you are

5

looking at a lot of factors, in terms of dynamic

6

oligopoly interactions.

7

It's an innovative analysis of evidence that focuses on

8

the question of whether the firms can solve their cartel

9

problems, and whether they can reach consensus.

10

MR. SALOP:

I agree with Paul and Debbie.

I don't think any serious economist

11

would say that you would like to get rid of the

12

coordinated effects section of the Guidelines.

13

the issue is whether there should be an extra section put

14

in, which is called -- I don't know what to call it --

15

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

16

MR. SALOP:

I believe

Non-unilateral.

Dave, we will let you name the

17

section when you come back to being Bureau Director for

18

the third time.

19

If the idea is that we are anticipating rivals

20

will follow the price increase.

The firms may think

21

about it in just that way, without thinking about it in

22

terms of consensus and punishment.

23

that sort of anticipation, that sort of strategic

24

interaction into the context of consensus, deviation, you

25

are going to have trouble.

If you have to have
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1

You would like to have a section that takes

2

that into account.

3

and deviation flow out of collusion, it doesn't flow out

4

of the theory of oligopolistic interaction.

5

I think David is right.

MS. MAJORAS:

Consensus

Steve, you are not suggesting

6

that sort of situation has just been completely ignored

7

in merger analysis, are you, just that it's been sort

8

of --

9

MR. SALOP:

I don't think it has been ignored.

10

I gave you the example of the repositioning, and the

11

example of the shampoo merger, where there was a highly

12

concentrated industry, there was decent information on

13

price.

14

decent information.

15

interaction was the fear that if you did something to

16

"restrict" output, the other people would respond by

17

entering or creating repositioning.

18

price, you anticipate entry, in a pricing model.

19

within that, and you can handle it that way.

20

token, us old guys, we were doing unilateral before the

21

1992 Guidelines came out.

22

Although you could work it in, it's certainly true

23

detailing it in the 1992 Guidelines was a major

24

contribution.

25

more careful.

It wasn't perfectly transparent.

There was

What was motivating the competitive

If you raise the
It is

By the same

You talked about wiggle words.

When you actually write it down, you are
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1

I would say the typical non-unilateral effects

2

case is the case I'm talking about.

3

many lawyers' memos as I have, and they are not about

4

collusion analysis.

5

to be reduced somehow as a result of this.

6

on the right question.

7

conclusion because there is no anchor there.

8

where we need some more economics to help.

9

You have read as

They are about competition is going
It is focused

I don't always agree with the
That is

If we keep talking about dynamic collusion, we

10

are never going to bridge the gap.

11

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I don't agree.

I think the

12

analysis was all about whether we could find anything in

13

the data that would indicate that there was either a

14

basis or some existing sort of parallel or coordinated

15

behavior going on now.

16

now?

17

Is there evidence of oligopoly

In cruises, the obvious thing which was, well,

18

why don't we just wait longer.

Well, the data show that

19

was not a viable theory at all for lots of good reasons.

20

We looked for all sorts of patterns in the data.

21

there was anything to indicate even parallel pricing of

22

some kind, then they would have been dead. We couldn't

23

find it.

24

found it.

25

whether there was some evidence that indicates some sort

If

They would have been sued for sure if we had
It was not about collusion.
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1

of parallel conduct, and we couldn't find it.

2

MS. MAJORAS:

David, just to round that out.

I

3

agree with you.

4

imprecise, not that somehow there is something so missing

5

from it that the agencies haven't been able to use the

6

Guidelines' analysis.

7

It may be that the Guidelines are

We have done it in cases where we are looking

8

at past collusion.

9

different.

10

MR. YDE:

The analysis there was a little

The fact that the memos that are

11

coming forward and the analysis that is being presented

12

by the attorneys -- and I'm sure also by a lot of the

13

economists -- the fact that that analysis is not well

14

grounded in the theory of oligopoly and the collusion

15

theories that are stated, or at least described, in the

16

Guidelines, that doesn't necessarily commend that

17

analysis.

18

There should be some rigorous economic analysis

19

applied, and if it was the analysis in the Stigler

20

theory, that's going to be better than just sort of a

21

suggestion that we know it's anticompetitive because

22

there is going to be a reduction in competitors.

23

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Absolutely.

The Stigler theory

24

only has power to reject.

You can prove, as I think we

25

did in cruises and some of the other examples, that your
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1

theory can't possibly hold here, given all the

2

unsystematic noises in these industries.

3

The Stigler theory doesn't tell you when you

4

don't have -- a lot of industries actually look like

5

it -- it doesn't tell you in the situations that don't

6

look like hard core oligopolies but look actually more

7

oligopolistic in some of the outcomes, what you should

8

make the decision on.

9

concentrated and looks suspicious, so we have a case.

This is when the lawyers say it's

10

That is not a proper basis, but I am saying the

11

economists have to get into the game here, and the models

12

that we are using aren't the right tool.

13

It's partly going to be empirical analysis, but

14

we also need some theoretical development to shed better

15

light on whether we have a problem or not.

16
17
18

I think the DOJ folks have advanced the ball in
thinking about whether the merger -MR. YDE:

Is there any empirical analysis that

19

suggests that the use of the Guidelines or the Guidelines

20

as they have been used, the checklist, however you want

21

to describe it, that mistakes have been made or mistakes

22

are being made, or that the change in the approach that

23

you are describing will improve results?

24
25

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I'm saying that the approach

I'm suggesting is the approach that is used.
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1

that numbers of competitors makes a difference, you have

2

a case.

3

"Suspicious" oligopoly conduct, what the attorneys think

4

are suspicious oligopoly conduct, that is a situation

5

where the economists and the lawyers get into serious

6

arguments, and where we need some more economic and

7

theoretical analysis to do that.

You don't need a theory other than that.

8
9

Are there mistakes?
decisions?

In the enforcement

We know yes, because we see hardly any

10

consummated mergers that anyone is complaining about.

11

also know that the economists disagree, much less than

12

they used to, but they disagree on some significant

13

percentage of the cases.

14

right.

15

We

Probably sometimes they are

We don't usually get it wrong on industrial

16

mergers and with relatively small numbers of customers.

17

I'm happy to rely on the customer assessments like the

18

agencies do.

19

We get those right.

Branded products.

We have middlemen.

20

Supermarkets.

21

think we get it wrong enough of the time that we could do

22

a better job.

23
24
25

It's not clear we are getting it right.

MR. SALOP:

That is what we call good

lawyering.
MR. KNIGHT:

Andrew?

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

I

158
1

MR. DICK:

I'm not sure in listening to this

2

discussion for the last little while that there is really

3

as much disagreement among the people up here as maybe

4

meets the eye.

5

we don't want to throw out the checklist factors or

6

whatever we want to call them.

7

want to be very careful in how we use them.

8
9

I think almost everyone would agree that

At the same time, we also

As Steve pointed out in his opening remarks on
this topic, on this question, clearly the checklist

10

conditions are not necessary for coordination because we

11

can observe counter examples, nor are they sufficient

12

because we can observe industries where we can count up

13

on both hands the number of favorable or allegedly

14

favorable checklist conditions and yet there doesn't seem

15

to be any evidence of coordination.

16

They shouldn't be taken literally.

I have

17

always thought of them as not telling us something about

18

factual conclusions so much as sort of guide posts,

19

telling us what directions we should be looking for

20

evidence specific to an industry or specific to a market.

21

They are very handy sort of things to have in your back

22

pocket to say you know, here is where we should start

23

looking, and it is not to say this is the only place we

24

should look or if we can find and show these factors one

25

through ten, that we are done.
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1

The other point that I wanted to mention is

2

that one of the deficiencies of course of the checklist

3

factors is they can be pretty helpful in describing or

4

characterizing coordination or collusion pre-merger, but

5

they are not by themselves all that helpful in terms of

6

telling us about post-merger conditions for the simple

7

reason that many of these conditions can be changed

8

directly through firms' actions, through the actions they

9

take.

10

Sometimes they can be helpful in identifying

11

pre-merger constraints on coordination, but they may not

12

tell us how the merger will relax or change those

13

constraints.

14
15

MR. KNIGHT:

last word on this particular topic.

16
17
18

Jon Baker, we will give you the

MR. BAKER:

Steve may want to come back after

this.
I understand where we differ, Dave, and I think

19

it's instructive.

What I think I hear you saying is that

20

the circumstances of the coordinated effects category

21

applies narrowly, it's only on collusion of some sort,

22

and the circumstances of unilateral effects apply --

23

everything else, and I think you would say most of what

24

we do in merger analysis is some other category where we

25

don't have models and the Merger Guidelines don't give us
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guidance.

I just think that is wrong.

2

I find the Guidelines very helpful in

3

understanding competitive effects, including collusion

4

and competitive effects analysis, which I think is

5

important.

6

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

As Greg Warden has indicated

7

and articulated, the Guidelines by their nature are vague

8

enough to incorporate anything.

9

much a problem with the Guidelines.

10

I don't think it's so
They can be

misleading as to actually what the practice is.

11

I don't have anything against unilateral.

I

12

have a lot of problems with Bertrand, for lots of

13

reasons, and in a lot of circumstances.

14

problem with unilateral as a more general theory, as many

15

of us might use it.

16

I don't have any

I do have a problem in the gray area where we

17

don't think we have unilateral, but we think we might

18

have a case because of coordinated interaction, and the

19

dynamic super games are not the answer, they are not

20

going to give us an answer to whether we have a case or

21

not, but the problem is the attorneys don't use them

22

anyway.

23

case.

24

don't give us much help to answer those difficult issues

25

in the four to three merger where it is difficult and

They will go ahead and they will generate a
We need to have a better answer.
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1

it's clearly not unilateral.

2

MR. KNIGHT:

We are going to get to some of

3

those additional tools that we might use.

4

that, I want to take a slight detour to talk about

5

mavericks for a minute.

6

Before we do

The Guidelines' coordinated effects section

7

does indicate that a merger can contribute to coordinated

8

interaction by taking out a maverick firm.

9
10

Jon Baker, does that analysis make sense, and
if so, when should it be applied?

11
12

MR. BAKER:

It seems it should always be

applied.

13

When you think about the question of how does

14

the merger change the outcome, how is the constraint

15

being changed by the merger?

16

It makes it sound like it is some sort of special

17

analysis.

18

dynamic oligopoly theory, firms are going to differ in

19

all sorts of dimensions in these settings.

20

It is all about mavericks.

It comes right out of thinking about the

If a merger involves non-maverick firms, then

21

you need to analyze how the merger is affecting the

22

maverick.

23

MR. KNIGHT;

One of the criticisms that we have

24

heard at the agencies is that the investigating staffs

25

are all to quick to label the acquired firm as a
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maverick.

Is that fair?

2

MR. BAKER:

I don't know about the agencies

3

now.

When I was there, I wouldn't say that.

4

coordinated effects has occurred since I left.

5

there were some cases where we thought about whether a

6

firm was essentially a maverick.

7

Analysis of
I know

The real focus of the agencies' on coordinated

8

effects theories has been since I was gone.

9

criticism.

10

It's not a

You have to think of what it means to be a

11

maverick in order to figure out what that maverick is.

12

The concept isn't something that has some firm that is

13

observed as disruptive.

14

because a firm cuts price doesn't automatically make it a

15

maverick.

16

think otherwise.

17

These could be mavericks.

Just

Maybe there is a temptation for people to

You have to think about whether it has a

18

greater incentive to cheat or it has a greater ability to

19

punish.

20

There are a bunch of things you can do.
You can't always identify the maverick.

Even

21

if you can, you aren't always sure how the merger will

22

affect the maverick.

23

how coordination would be affected by the merger and why

24

the merger matters.

25

MR. KNIGHT:

But, that is a way to think about

Steve?
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MR. SALOP:

I like the maverick theory, this is

2

not meant to be critical but rather to just emphasize

3

several points.

4

First, I think "maverick" is an unfortunate

5

term, because maverick gives you the idea that there is

6

someone who is not going along with everyone else.

7

It is possible that the disruptive firm might

8

be the firm with the greatest incentive to cheat, and

9

that is what is found in the Guidelines for the most

10

part, but a disruptive firm could also alternatively be

11

the firm with the greatest -- the firm with 60 percent of

12

the market, any time anybody cuts price, he slams them.

13

That firm would be the maverick.

14

determines the equilibrium.

He's the one who

15

I think we shouldn't simply think about the

16

maverick as being the firm that is least likely to go

17

with the price increase.

18
19
20

We should also ask for an alternative to
mavericks.
MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I like the maverick, but

21

probably not for reasons you would appreciate.

22

always having arguments.

23

core economists who think this maverick stuff is b.s.

24
25

I'm

I have big arguments with hard

I, as a strategy professor, say firms choose
their competitive strategies.

Most of this is about
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1

shifting the demand curve one way or the other.

2

about shifting customers to you from your competitors to

3

gain new customers.

4

It's

That is what I think a maverick is.

I think shoehorning that into the collusion

5

thing is the problem.

6

industry will break out in collusion.

7

industry would be less competitive.

8

get misused.

9

meaning somehow that the merger is going to make a

10

difference.

11

It is not about whether the
It is that the
The maverick does

The lawyers confuse competition with

Those are not the same thing.

MR. KNIGHT:

Let me squeeze in two questions.

12

First of all, if coordination is not the theory, is not

13

the underlying theory, why do we need principles on what

14

is a maverick?

15

so we make sure the maverick theory is not abused?

16

And, how do you re-write the Guidelines

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I do think that you have to

17

have -- I think what isn't done well is developing the

18

factual basis.

19

firm that actually is making things more competitive.

20

think if you have a factual basis showing that's true and

21

that company is being acquired by someone else who

22

doesn't have that strategy, you have a strong start to a

23

case.

24
25

It really is a maverick, but this is the
I

The problem is often that what would seem to me
would come up is evidence that that company is competing
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1

like other folks, not evidence that they are making the

2

prices lower than they otherwise would be.

3

that factually, and there is some discussion in my paper

4

about that.

5

You can do

You can do that sort of analysis.

I think if you have proof factually that it is

6

true that the firm is actually making things more

7

competitive, then you have a good start for a case.

8

think very often, that is the part that is missing.

9

MR. YDE:

I

What is the policy implication of

10

saying in the Stigler oligopoly theory that everybody is

11

a maverick?

12

What is the policy implications for mergers?

MR. SALOP:

It should say you should stop this

13

snipe hunt.

14

you are looking for here is broader than just the low

15

price leader.

16

As I said before, I think the concept that

It could also be the powerful one.

In Jon's model, the maverick is the price

17

leader.

18

the firm with the low cost.

19

firm that prevents the price from going down.

20

much broader concept than simply the price leader.

21

you agree with that, Jon?

22

Jon mainly talked about that in his article as

MR. BAKER:

The leader could also be the
It's a
Do

I agree that one way you could have

23

a maverick is a firm could be indifferent between

24

cheating and colluding and therefore keep the price from

25

going higher.

Another way is indifferent to punishing
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more.

Did I say that backwards?

I think a maverick is

2

where he does not want to punish as much as he should.

3

I think in real world situations where firms

4

differ and the firms can't find ways to punish or to make

5

side payments, some firms are doing more of the work in

6

constraining coordination than others.

7

It seems a perfectly reasonable thing for me to

8

do to find out who the maverick is in order to understand

9

whether the merger --

10

MR. SALOP:

I would hate to see coordinated

11

effects analysis to be reduced to whether a firm is a

12

maverick.

13

MR. DICK:

There's a corel to this, too, in

14

terms to the response to the second question Paul asked,

15

which is there is always a firm on the cusp, there is

16

always a maverick, more than one maverick, and the

17

question is if the merger eliminates that maverick, who

18

is next in line, and if they are very similar, close in

19

terms of the constraint they place on coordination, then

20

the merger, even though it eliminates a maverick, would

21

not have a very significant effect.

22

look at the next guy and why he is going to replace the

23

guy that got knocked out.

24

MR. SALOP:

25

MR. DICK:

You always have to

Just like the next best substitute.
Right.
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MS. MAJORAS:

I just want to come back to

2

something David was alluding to, which is I was wondering

3

whether when I was at DOJ whether I saw the maverick sort

4

of being over-used in case recommendations under

5

coordinated effects.

6

I don't think so.

There is not a maverick

7

identified in every case recommendation.

8

were some and some of those cases were brought in the

9

last year.

10

Sure, there

I don't believe they were called a maverick.
For example, if you look in the UPM complaint,

11

the evidence showed that UPM had come into the United

12

States, had been quite aggressive, and expanded their

13

U.S. sales, and there were facts -- I should say I was

14

actually recused on that matter -- that were part of it.

15

There was also evidence that perhaps some coordination

16

had already begun, so that was an important factor as

17

well.

18

In another case that you may not have looked at

19

because it resulted in a consent decree, Alcan, believe

20

it or not, was identified as an aggressive new

21

competitor.

22

long time, but this particular product was new to the

23

United States, and there was some evidence there.

Alcan obviously has been in aluminum for a

24

Sure, we saw it some of the time.

25

cases in which there was evidence of past collusion in
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1
2

markets and I don't recall searching for a maverick.
To the extent that we are really in

3

investigations sometimes looking for one, I think the

4

reason for that comes back to something that you have

5

been saying here, David and others, which is if the

6

question you really need to answer is why does this

7

merger matter, not just what is the structure and what

8

are the market characteristics today, and what would they

9

be post-merger, but how is this exact merger going to

10
11

make an impact.

That is a very hard question to answer.

That is one of the reasons at DOJ we tried to

12

reinvigorate looking at the theories and looking at what

13

we have and looking at what we have left to do.

14

sense was we weren't doing a very good job of answering

15

that question.

16

The

When you have a maverick to point to, that's

very

17

specific -- this merger, this guy, is having this impact on

18

the market and presumably won't have that impact any more.

19
20
21

It's not surprising that we would fall back on
that, that the enforcement agencies would.
MR. YDE:

On the definition of a maverick and how

22

you can define a maverick, who is identified as a maverick,

23

in Northwest/Continental, where I was on the other side,

24

Northwest -- I'm sorry Jon I haven't read your paper yet, I

25

did read your deposition and your expert report -- Northwest
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was not a company that could have been so identified, at

2

least as far as I understand it, there wasn't any underlying

3

structural factors that suggested why they would be the

4

maverick.

5

that it may have been the case and it may be supportable in

6

some way, that they had a strategy that on a repeated basis

7

they historically had not gone along with the generalized

8

price increases that were proposed in the industry.

9

Nevertheless, it did appear, at least you argued

I guess this goes also to your analysis, David.

10

Is it ever sufficient that you just find there is a

11

historical record of maverickness?

12

have to identify some underlying structural factor, either

13

in its costs or excess capacity or whatever else broadly

14

defined, that suggests why after a merger its maverickness

15

being lost is important.

16

MR. BAKER:

I would think you would

I think you are much happier if you

17

can identify why.

18

had your facts right.

19

behavior had gone on for so long and so consistently that it

20

was hard not to reach the conclusion this really was a firm

21

that for reasons that weren't clear based on market

22

structure was constraining coordination.

23

In the Northwest example, you basically
It was hard to pinpoint it.

The

I would have been happier to have understood why.

24

It really takes a long history of years of multiple

25

incidences of doing that before I was willing to come up
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1

with the conclusion in that case.

2
3

MR. YDE:

Do you think it is important that you

can explain to the court --

4

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

As a business strategy professor,

5

I draw on more bases than what we use in simple economic

6

models.

7

It's going to be pretty obvious and you are going to have

8

natural experiments to be able to prove you had a situation

9

where the one firm never follows the price increases of the

It is going to be obvious that you have a maverick.

10

competitors and price changes are important, they show up on

11

the shelves.

12

that or you are going to have in some cases a relatively

13

small share of firms that go around and are used to voice

14

the bigger firms in industrial markets.

15

Then you are going to have a track record like

A real maverick, you are not going to have to hunt

16

for.

You have to prove it actually affects the prices.

17

They go around and knock on the doors and try to get

18

business.

19

prices?

20

That's fine.

Do they actually have an impact on

That's the critical point.
MR. KNIGHT:

We have talked on a number of

21

occasions here about the additional approaches and tools

22

that the agencies might begin to use to assess coordinated

23

effects.

24

the agencies to reinvigorate the analysis.

25

a little bit about what you see the agencies could be doing

Andrew Dick was sort of involved in the efforts at
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or are beginning to do in utilizing coordinated effects?

2

MR. DICK:

Sure.

I had the pleasure to work with

3

Debbie and Charles James and Michael Katz when I was in the

4

DOJ, as Debbie mentioned earlier, to try to reinvigorate

5

some of the coordinated effects thinking. It really started

6

with just trying to understand what we knew about

7

coordinated effects now and to identify what we didn't know,

8

which was equally important.

9

I think there is a sense that in the Division as

10

speeches by Charles and by Hugh and by Debbie have

11

articulated, which is there is sort of a focus on a two part

12

question.

13

coordination right now before the merger, and secondly, and

14

obviously the really critical question, which is how will

15

this or will this merger in fact relax in any significant

16

way some of those pre-merger constraints, some of the

17

binding constraints?

18

The first part is what is it that constrains

That is sort of the general question the Division

19

has used to frame some of this analysis.

20

now, where are those constraints found, where should we go

21

and look for them?

22

The question is

One of them we have just been talking about, that

23

is sort of the maverick firm, and more broadly, the

24

disappearance of a significant competitor, and significant

25

in what sense.

The maverick is one way of looking at it.
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Another way that people have looked at that, or have started

2

to look at it, is whether a firm might be pivotal in a sense

3

that the removal of that firm is going to significantly

4

change the incentives of say a subgroup of competitors to

5

engage in coordinated interaction, or the incentive and the

6

ability of firms, say the firms that aren't part of this

7

alleged cartel or group of conspirators, to take actions

8

that would tend to undermine coordination.

9

One can try to look at various indices such as

10

controlling excess capacity, as I think Debbie mentioned

11

briefly in the UPM case, in the complaint.

12

the factors that Debbie mentioned, there is also discussion

13

about the acquired firm representing a very large share of

14

the excess capacity in the industry.

15

the complaint emphasizes.

16

In addition to

That is something that

And then working that notion into whether, in

17

fact, the firm that was being acquired in that merger was

18

pivotal to the success or the likelihood of coordinated

19

interaction.

20

Another category of constraints is asymmetries

21

between competitors.

In our earlier remarks, we talked a

22

little bit about asymmetries.

23

Asymmetries in cost structure, in planning horizons, in

24

product positioning, geographic coverage, discount rates.

25

lot of the factors that come up in the checklist indeed, but

I think Jon mentioned that.
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1

here the question is not whether those factors are present

2

or not but could the merger in some significant way change

3

those factors, change those constraints, relax them, by

4

narrowing cost asymmetries.

5

allegations, for example, in the Primdor Masonite case that

6

the Division brought two or three years ago.

7

That was one of the

A third source of constraints could be narrowing

8

the opportunities for firms to deviate from coordination,

9

and under that category, I think people usually think about

10

the degree of transparency in the market, that firms observe

11

each other's strategies and can they observe each other's

12

payoffs, which is market shares and so forth.

13

Also, the pace of innovation.

Is this a market in

14

which new products are continually being introduced or cost

15

changes are continually occurring that may create

16

opportunities or lend themselves to opportunities for

17

mavericks to take advantage of openings to disrupt

18

coordination?

19

None of these concepts, I think, is particularly

20

new.

21

nonetheless very helpful, was to try to add a little more

22

rigor and put them in a more structured framework.

23

Probably what the Division did, which was, I think,

I had one slide that was sort of helpful to walk

24

through one example.

It relates to the point of how we

25

interpret historical evidence, which is something that has
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1

been talked about already today.

2
3

Let me just sort of walk through it in the
interest of time.

4

If we find the slide, we find it.

The question is, should history matter?

We have a

5

history of coordination, let's say, in this industry.

6

Should it matter, and if so, how?

7

In practice, the courts have placed substantial

8

weight in many cases on historical evidence.

In the grain

9

case, a history of price fixing was thought to be very

10

important.

11

coordination was thought to be important.

12

in the Heinz case that Jon worked on, and in Hospital Corp

13

of America, the notion there was cooperation, not

14

necessarily anticompetitive, but cooperation in general in

15

the past was thought to be possibly relevant to analyzing a

16

current transaction.

17

In Cardinal Health, the history of tacit
Price leadership

History has clearly shaped how courts have thought

18

about this and has clearly shaped how agencies have heard

19

evidence and influenced sort of where they have set the bar

20

for assessing merger effects going forward.

21

There is an empirical basis for thinking history

22

matters that is sort of grounded in some empirical evidence.

23

At its base, it's really driven by correlations, rather than

24

sound microeconomic theory.

25

In many cases, we talk about history as sort of a
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summary statistic for unobservable information, unobservable

2

data.

3

we observed they did.

4

hurdles of thinking maybe they could do it again and maybe

5

they could do it even better after the merger.

We don't know why firms were able to coordinate, but
That sort of gets us over the initial

6

Starting with that base, I think one of the things

7

that the new approach has taught us is that we need to first

8

undertake sort of a reality check.

9

The empirical evidence on whether history matters

10

is actually relatively mixed.

11

Jon has a very nice one in the Journal of Law and Economics

12

a number of years ago looking at the steel industry and

13

whether firms were able to learn more from coordination and

14

continue even after sort of the initial impetus for it was

15

removed.

16

There are case studies, and

On the other hand, there is lots of cross-

17

sectional evidence in studies of cartels and time series

18

evidence that indicates recidivism is relatively low or

19

rather infrequent, and when recidivism does occur, that

20

successful cartels seem to break up much more quickly than

21

the first set of cartels or the first incarnations.

22

That is a reality check and it calls a little bit

23

into question the basis for extrapolating to the future from

24

the past.

25

It also brings up the next point, the next sort of
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lesson of the Division's new learning, which is to say we

2

have to identify very clearly the micro foundations for why

3

history might matter.

4

As Debbie mentioned a few minutes ago, the

5

critical question is how will this merger effect competition

6

or effect coordination in this market.

7

looking at the historical evidence, we have to ask, will

8

history affect coordination after this specific proposed

9

merger?

10

In the context of

There are a number of good theoretically- grounded

11

reasons why history might have that effect.

12

help build understandings amongst firms.

13

the types of firms, their cost parameters, their discount

14

rates -- information that theory tells us is relevant to

15

whether coordination is sustainable.

16

History can

It can help reveal

History can teach firms how to coordinate.

That

17

is the example that Jon analyzed on his paper on the NRA

18

codes for steel.

19

accuracy of current and future monitoring; say that over

20

time firms learn more about that underlying demand

21

conditions and seeing they are relatively stable may help

22

them in the future in terms of monitoring and punishing.

23

History can also sometimes improve the

The final point that has to be added to this,

24

pointed out by the Division's new approach, is there has to

25

be a sensitivity check.

We always have to ask, has history
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1

changed significantly since we last looked?

2

significant entry?

3

Have power buyers emerged?

4

relaxed?

5

in the historical evidence have really led to important

6

changes, say in pricing behavior?

7

Has there been

Has the geographic market broadened?
Have capacity constraints been

Can we demonstrate whether in fact those changes

I just took this detour to talk about history as

8

one example, but I think the new approaches are intended to

9

build from the checklist approach and say is there something

10

there that might tell us about where we should look for

11

evidence, and sort of try to be realistic about it, apply

12

reality checks and sensitivity checks, and above all,

13

develop a good firm micro theoretical foundation for why

14

that factor matters.

15

MR. KNIGHT:

Following on that, Dave, you talked

16

earlier about that the economists may have more to

17

contribute, particularly in assessing current markets

18

pre-merger.

19

come about?

20

Can you talk to us about some ways that might

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I sort of alluded to that.

I've

21

talked about it in various ways already, which is, I think

22

you need to look beyond the checklist and then said that the

23

agencies clearly do that.

24

everyone that we do, the agencies do.

25

I think it should be clear to

Look at the details.

We are talking about mergers
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1

affecting price.

That is what we are usually concerned

2

with.

3

look at, price is determined between the seller and the

4

individual buyer.

5

any of the markets we look at are like that wheat market.

Where is price determined?

6

In most of the markets we

It's not like the wheat market and hardly

You need to look at actually the details of those

7

prices and the determination of those prices to get some

8

idea whether or not you think there is coordination

9

viability.

That is the main point of Mary's and my paper.

10

Looking at the detailed transactions level data, looking at

11

in detail what information firms have from one another.

12

Mary and I had a wonderful case once where we had

13

just terrible documents that our client was the price

14

leader, all the competitors thought it was the price leader.

15

It turned out that we looked at all the data and it was

16

pretty hard to see from the data that there was any

17

leadership going on.

18

hard to be a leader if you don't have any followers.

As I tried to tell our client, it's

19

What looked like from the documents a classic

20

oligopoly, that they were tracking what each other were

21

doing, looking at who they were gaining sales from and

22

losing sales to, and everything like that, and tracking that

23

by looking against the other company, there was no match in

24

the data.

25

try to do very carefully, and then we could check that

Looking at how they track capacity, which they
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against what the other companies actually did, that sort of

2

detailed analysis is clearly very relevant and it is spelled

3

out in detail in the paper.

4

To get into the details of whether you really have

5

any sort of coordination going on or you have a basis for

6

it, again, I think it's very good stuff, but it's only a one

7

way test.

8

of markets that you might think are oligopolies, but the

9

data you see, say in a chemical merger, it's hard to find

10

You can actually do that.

I've worked on a lot

real oligopolies these days showing up at the agencies.

11

When was the last merger case DOJ had that

12

generated a serious price fixing investigation?

13

many.

14

Not too

Antitrust attorneys are going to look at, talk to

15

people and look at, the documents and say there is no way

16

you are going to do this merger.

17

why that is not a very viable theory.

18

see it hardly, even where it does exist.

There is another reason
You are not going to

19

I think we need to be looking at something else

20

and where we play, given the pre-screening, which is does

21

the merger make a difference?

22

MS. MAJORAS:

23

MR. SALOP:

DOJ does have one now.
Two caveats, I think, are worth

24

pointing out.

The caveat is it has been pointed out these

25

tests are one-sided tests.

All they can do is reject the
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1
2

coordination model.

You can only win, you can't lose.

What we need is tests that can reject coordination

3

or we need other tests that can reject competition.

4

Otherwise, the tests are really problematic.

5

The issue of whether we are going to grandfather

6

existing coordination or whether, in fact, we are going to

7

hold existing coordination against the merger.

8

Guidelines don't resolve this issue fully.

9

The 1992

In my view, I don't think we should grandfather

10

pre-existing coordination, for the simple reason that absent

11

the merger coordination might break down if and when market

12

conditions change, but if you permit the merger, it could

13

entrench the coordination and prevent the breakdown in the

14

future if and when market conditions change.

15

The Merger Guidelines really do focus on the

16

incremental effects of the merger, and they never explicitly

17

say that they are worried about this entrenchment factor.

18

There is this one place, in Section 1.11, in

19

market definition, where the Guidelines say that the

20

agencies use prevailing prices, unless pre-merger

21

circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated

22

interaction, in which case, the agency would use a price

23

more reflective of the competitive price.

24
25

To the extent there is any coordinated interaction
or a chance of it, that means you should apply this, and
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

181
1

that means you can't do the SSNIP test based on the current

2

price, and it means critical loss, one more reason why you

3

should throw out simple critical loss analysis.

4

I don't know of any cases in which the agencies

5

have ever applied this proviso.

6

use a different price SSNIP test, but I've never seen one.

7

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

They say maybe they will

I guarantee you any industry in

8

which the staff has pretty convincing reason to believe that

9

prices look suspiciously high because of funny sort of

10

behavior, you are going to get a merger blocked.

11

MR. BAKER:

I have one point to add to Steve's

12

comment about the prevailing price, which I basically agree

13

with.

14

making recently, and especially the FTC, on gathering

15

empirical evidence on issues as to whether the merger is

16

really useful.

17
18
19

The emphasis that both of the agencies have been

There are interesting ideas about things that
might be tested and you can look at on tacit coordination.
The point I want to make about all these empirical

20

studies is that they are tied to specific theories of how

21

firms solve their cartel problems, just as what we used to

22

call the checklist factors.

23

the theory of how firms can -- the empirical studies have to

24

be conducted with what the theory is.

25

They have to be integrated into

Just as the checklist factors have to be analyzed
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1

with an eye towards what the theory of the case is, the

2

empirical studies have to be conducted with an eye towards

3

what the precise theory of the case is as well.

4

MR. KNIGHT:

Dave mentioned a case in which the

5

documents suggested one story and the analysis, empirical

6

analysis, suggested another.

7

instance?

8
9

MS. MAJORAS:

What do you do in that

It's hard to imagine a case where

all you would have would be some documents and then some of

10

the empirical analyses.

11

other factors, too.

12

that you have to take all those factors, you have to weigh

13

each piece of evidence, because obviously, that is the

14

ultimate analysis for the agencies.

15

to go into court and prove something.

16

You are going to have a lot of

I don't think there is any question

They are going to have

As you are going through and having to do a

17

balance of the various factors in the marketplace, you have

18

to weigh them and you have to weigh them against each other.

19

I don't think there is any way you can say in the abstract

20

that one is going to have more weight than the other, but I

21

will say this.

22

have had this experience, courts are going to put a lot of

23

weight on the actual, on pieces of paper, on what they see.

24

They will give credence to theory, for example, but they are

25

going to put a lot more weight on the pieces of paper, on

If you look at courts, I think most people
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historical facts.

2

We can say those damn lawyers, it's terrible that

3

we have to put up with them, but we are part of the process,

4

and that is what we ultimately have to do.

5

the end by what you have to do in court, and that's a good

6

discipline.

7

MR. YDE:

It's governed in

We don't want to divorce the documents

8

from the theory.

What you are doing essentially with

9

documents is taking admissions in documents and formulating

10

them in theory, what is consistent with those documents, and

11

particularly other evidence that may suggest that the

12

transaction is not anticompetitive.

13
14

I think you want to take those admissions and
formulate a theory that is consistent with those admissions.

15

MS. MAJORAS:

Yes, there's no question, and

16

besides that, you have to take those documents and you have

17

to analyze those in the context of all of the other

18

documents.

19

say this is evidence.

20

MR. KNIGHT:

You can't just pluck ones out of the file and

As these analyses move forward at

21

both agencies, how do you see this affecting the way in

22

which you counsel clients?

23

MR. YDE:

There are three different things we do.

24

I think Debbie would agree.

First, there is the counseling

25

on transactions, counseling up-front, making predictions
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about what is likely to happen on a transaction in front of

2

the agency, the course of review at the agency, and related

3

to that is the way that you negotiate the provisions in the

4

merger agreements.

5

The second is the representation before the

6

agencies, and the third is litigation.

I'll cut to the

7

chase on litigation.

8

on in the agencies that has any effect on the outcomes of

9

litigation.

There is almost nothing that is going

I'm sure the people in the agencies right now

10

would disagree with that, but if you look at the court's

11

decision in the UPM case, I think you recognize that the

12

courts aren't paying any attention to the theories that the

13

agencies -- at least the more rigorous descriptions of the

14

theories that the agencies -- are propounding.

15

On counseling, the most significant effect or the

16

most significant event in all of this for counseling a

17

client on mergers is when the leadership of both agencies

18

said we intend to reinvigorate coordinated effects analysis.

19

That was pretty much the beginning and the end.

20

Once you are told that the agencies intend to

21

focus on coordinated effects theories, you need now to take

22

that into account in the way that you are making a

23

prediction about the course of agency behavior and, also,

24

about the way you are going to negotiate the risk allocation

25

provisions, especially if you are looking at a transaction
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in which there is likely to be a small part of the overall

2

transaction that comprises the potential coordinated effect,

3

and you know you have to negotiate something to deal with

4

that in the agreement.

5

Andrew was just describing the rigorous approach

6

and Dave described the quantitative methodologies and

7

techniques that are being applied.

8

the way that we are going to advise a client?

9

so.

Does that really affect
I don't think

It's done at a pretty gross level, depending on the

10

things we have talked about before, a history of activity at

11

the agencies in the industry that you are dealing with,

12

especially with a company that you are taking in.

13

documents, if you have any bad admissions, whether it is

14

public and, of course, customer complaints.

15

Hot

On representation in front of the agencies, it is

16

a much different thing.

It affects substantially the

17

arguments you make, the representations you make.

18

I think you have to be affected by what David was

19

saying when he was the Bureau Director, what Jon was saying

20

when he was the Bureau Director, and what Andrew and Debbie

21

were saying when they were in the Department of Justice.

22

You have to know what impacts their analysis, what

23

they think is the most important way to formulate the --

24

what techniques they think are important.

25

When Joe Simons came into the agency, if you were
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not presenting a critical loss analysis on every case you

2

had before him, you were probably making a mistake.

3

same thing is true here.

4

that has been put together by the Department of Justice

5

actually should be generally distributed to the general

6

public.

7

would be helpful to everybody in predicting how the agency

8

is going to look at your deal and how you should present

9

your case.

10

The

I would just suggest the manual

I haven't seen it yet, but I would suggest that

It's to give guidance to the staff and management

11

about how the leadership wants the staff and management to

12

look at the case.

13

There is some feedback.

You want to do some of

14

the analyses upfront to see whatever it happens to be that

15

is being suggested by the agency as being influential.

16

want to do some of that upfront to see how it is going to

17

look when you go in.

18

It generally doesn't have a big impact on most of

19

the sort of gross level judgments you are making about

20

whether to proceed.

21
22
23
24
25

You

MR. BAKER:

Why bother to do it if it doesn't

matter for the outcome?
MS. MAJORAS:

He isn't saying it doesn't matter

for the outcome.
MR. YDE:

It is the question of whether you are
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going to proceed with the transaction or not.

2
3

MR. BAKER:

Isn't it expensive to do this in

advance?

4

MS. MAJORAS:

The client doesn't often give you

5

time to do two months worth of a pricing study to tell you

6

what to do.

7

they ought to give this one a shot.

8
9
10

They want to know tomorrow whether you think

MR. YDE:
much.

Like most things, you can generalize too

What I said was a gross generalization.
MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I want to clarify something Debbie

11

said, because I'm sure she didn't mean it.

12

other qualitative information are not necessarily "facts."

13

And fact-based analyses, often not econometric analysis, can

14

corroborate or disprove the "facts" appearing in documents

15

and depositions.

16

Documents and

In my last stint at the FTC, we had a difficult

17

case and the attorneys really had convincing evidence.

18

it was difficult to figure out what the market was.

19

market is customers that have these attributes, and it

20

seemed right.

21

economists analyzed got the customer lists of the companies.

22

The market wasn't anything like that.

23

That's what the documents said.

MS. MAJORAS:

But

The

However, the

I'm not saying that the analyses are

24

always going to come to documents.

25

asked a general question.

I thought I was being

You have to play them according
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to what you have in front of you.

2

times where I might actually disagree with you, where I

3

might think the documents, if it is registering what in fact

4

a company thinks one of its competitors is doing and reacts

5

accordingly and that turns out to be wrong once an economist

6

comes in and does a study, so what.

7

because of what it thought, it had imperfect information, so

8

that was actually relevant, even though it turned out to be

9

not the actual facts.

10

In addition, there are

That firm was behaving

One final thing, one thing that I think is

11

interesting in counseling clients in mergers, and talking

12

about coordinated effects versus unilateral effects, I think

13

I saw some of it in the dynamic on the other side of the

14

table when I was at DOJ, and that is it is almost

15

psychological.

16

It's very hard to get clients focused sometimes on

17

the right issues when you are talking to them about

18

coordinated effects, because they take it personally,

19

because they become very angry.

20

meetings sometimes on the other side, where we would spend

21

45 minutes with members of a firm explaining to us what

22

great people they are and how they are very honest people,

23

and they are never going to do bad things that would put

24

them in jail and that sort of thing.

25

You can actually see it in

I just mention that because it is sort of an
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interesting fact.

2

clients, it takes a long time to get the client to sort of

3

calm down, not just be sort of ticked off at the agency, and

4

not just want to keep protesting, but to understand we are

5

not just talking about explicit collusion.

6

about other forms of coordination.

7

It is true, I think, when you counsel

We are talking

It's not going to be helpful to go into the agency

8

and tell them you have learned your lesson, you are very

9

good now, this is never going to happen again.

If the

10

market hasn't changed substantially, that just is not going

11

to be persuasive.

12

They don't really understand this.

They want to

13

know why did you make me put in place all these wonderful

14

compliance programs and now it isn't going to do me any

15

good.

16

unilateral effects, nobody takes it personally if you

17

suggest they might act like they are the king of the hill.

18
19
20

On the other hand, when we are talking about

It is always an interesting factor, I think, when
you are counseling.
MR. SALOP:

I disagree with Dave that simple

21

correlations are going to carry the day in court.

That is

22

what econometrics is all about.

23

minded correlation and then the other side shows that it

24

didn't control for that factor, and when you put the

25

controls in, it turns the result around.

One side puts in a simple-
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The lesson is that U.S. Tobacco didn't put any

2

econometric response to the shoddy study that was done.

3

they had, they could have blamed the damages away in a

4

district court.

5

I think we see time and time again that people do

6

super correlations, then the other side does some

7

sophisticated econometrics, perhaps just explained as

8

further variables, and they blow away the initial data.

9

If

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I said you won't find a

10

correlation or a regression in there at all.

11

simple facts.

12

see what you think.

13

Economists can do more than that.

14

than that, which you sometimes need to do, then you need to

15

be sophisticated about it, of course.

16

Yes, here's the prices.

It is just

Take a look at them,

I'm not saying that is the only thing.
If you do something other

I was just responding that sometimes economists

17

can do something and they sometimes forget this, let's just

18

develop the basic facts here and see whether what the

19

lawyers are saying is true, and sometimes it is not because

20

often the business people don't have it right.

21

often where there is a big margin of opportunity.

22

not to say you can do any sort of modeling and correlation,

23

you better do it right.

24
25

MR. KNIGHT:

That is
That is

In the minutes that we have left, I

want to give each of our panelists a chance to answer this
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question and then to make any final points they wish to

2

make.

3

It has been suggested that perhaps the bar should

4

be raised on coordinated effects analysis, to bring it in

5

line with Sherman Act standards.

6
7

Does anyone see that developing, and if so, any
time soon?

8
9

Again, make any final comments you may have.
MR. YDE:

Because we have a short amount of time,

I am going to preface this by saying I think you have to

10

read the paper and then you will understand my comments, but

11

I think he has it exactly backwards.

12

I think effective coordination is not the standard

13

for drawing inferences in Section 1 cases, and effective

14

coordination is a standard in determining whether a merger

15

is likely to be anticompetitive or likely to violate Section

16

7.

17

I just disagree with the underlying premise and I

18

think it is exactly backwards.

19

MR. DICK:

I think the standard is applied

20

appropriately or where it is applied is appropriate.

21

have to prove that a merger will substantially lessen

22

competition.

23

likelihood that it will do that.

24

competition standard.

25

You

You have to establish there is a reasonable
Also, the lessening of

I think Jon was the one who quoted some of the
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language from the Guidelines about the merger making

2

coordination more perfect, more complete, and more durable.

3

It doesn't say it is absolutely perfect or absolutely

4

complete or durable in all respects.

5

implication.

6

MS. MAJORAS:

It's a directional

I agree with Andrew.

I think it is

7

more important that the various pieces that we use in

8

Section 7 analysis have some consistency as to the standard

9

that is used, as opposed to find consistency between a

10

Section 1 analysis and a coordinated effects analysis.

11

Just taking off on what Andrew just said, if you

12

contrast that with Section 1, when you are looking for an

13

agreement, one of the major differences is there, you are

14

looking backward.

15

are doing is looking at circumstantial evidence usually, if

16

it has gotten this far, to decide whether in fact an

17

agreement has occurred.

18

It has happened or it has not.

What you

Somebody knows the answer to that question, and

19

the purpose of the proceeding is to present evidence to find

20

this out.

21

When we are in Section 7 analysis, it is

22

completely forward looking, as Andrew says.

That is a

23

difference.

24

of our colleagues happy, truthfully, it would take it out of

25

kilter with the rest of Section 7, and in fact apply a

If you raise the bar, while it would make a lot
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standard that I don't think was intended by Congress.

2

I agree it is an interesting paper and there are

3

times when you are working through a Section 1 problem and

4

you switch to a Section 7 one and that contrast becomes

5

quite clear and seems a little odd, but when you really step

6

back and look at it, it makes sense within the context of

7

the statutory framework.

8
9

MR. SALOP:

I agree.

A closing remark, what I

want to say in closing is that I think it is very important

10

that we economists not oversell what we are doing in

11

coordinated effects.

12

100 years, it's a mainstream economic model.

13

true that dead Chicagoans are held in higher esteem than

14

dead Frenchmen, but maybe not.

15

The unilateral effects model goes back
It might be

I think to some extent economists weren't cautious

16

enough in explaining limitations of unilateral effects to

17

the lawyers and policy makers to begin with, and the lawyers

18

understand it as, we believe you can predict the price

19

effect to three decimal points, and we were saying you don't

20

need lawyers, you can just run the regressions, and the

21

documents, depositions and so on don't matter.

22

I think with respect to coordinated effects, as we

23

make it more sophisticated, as we build coordinated effects

24

models and have empirical tests and so on, we need to make

25

it clear to policy makers that these are just little pieces
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adding to the proof.

2

we do now.

3

This is not an attempt to replace what

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I've done both Section 1 and

4

Section 7 cases.

It's pretty obvious we have Section 1

5

standards for merger cases.

6

"collusion," but that is not really what we are doing at the

7

agencies.

8

competition, SLC, that the market is going to become less

9

competitive.

I think we use the word

We are looking at substantial lessening of

Sometimes the way you say it, it is collusion,

10

you need to think as an economist, it is perfectly valid --

11

how we distinguish tacit coordination is that the unilateral

12

incentives are different.

13

consistent with equilibrium.

14

Unilateral incentives are quite

I think this collusion thing is a red herring.

15

really are just looking at is there a reason to believe

16

there is going to be less competition than there otherwise

17

would be.

18

it has anything to do with collusion.

19

price down lower than it ever was or would be.

20

that they are going to start colluding after.

21

is a red herring.

22

fancy economics.

23
24
25

We

If you have a bona fide maverick, I don't think
They are dragging the
It's not
I think that

It is not what we actually do.

It isn't

MR. KNIGHT:

Jon Baker, again, you get the last

MR. BAKER:

I think what we need to do is find a

word.
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case where we have in front of us a set of facts and where

2

we

3

panel, that is what I will propose, the next time around.

4

can characterize it as coordinated or not.

At the next

I wonder whether merger analysis today would

5

differ if it were conducted entirely under Section 1.

6

agree there was a difference when Section 7 was promulgated.

7

A lot has changed.

8

Clayton Act are converging.

9

different from Section 1 analysis at the end of the day.

10
11
12

It seems to me the Sherman Act and

MR. KNIGHT:

And is Section 7 analysis very

On that note, I want to thank all of

our panelists for a tremendous job.

Thank you all.

(Applause.)

13
14

UNCOMMITTED ENTRY
MR. GEBHARD:

Let me begin by welcoming everybody

15

who has been hardy enough to stick around for this last

16

session of the day.

17

Hopefully, you won't be disappointed.

My name is Ted Gebhard.

I am an attorney in the

18

Policy Office in the Bureau of Competition here at the

19

Federal Trade Commission.

20

I

As the program indicates, the topic of this

21

session is uncommitted entry, a topic that is found at

22

Section 1.3 of the Guidelines.

23

As many of you know, the term "uncommitted entry,"

24

not the concept but the term, first appeared formally in the

25

Guidelines in the 1992 revisions.

The concept of short run
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supply substitution, however, is hardly new to antitrust

2

analysis.

3

history.

4

It has indeed a very long and distinguished

Indeed, in the 1982 Guidelines the authors, in

5

attempting to provide a more rigorous algorithm for defining

6

markets and identifying market participants, spoke

7

specifically to the concept of supply substitution.

8
9

The 1992 Guidelines advanced this notion still
further and, in particular, articulated in a far more

10

precise manner the means by which the agencies will evaluate

11

entry in their merger analysis.

12

As I noted, the term "uncommitted entry" appeared

13

first in 1992 and, simultaneously, the term "committed

14

entry" appeared in the 1992 Guidelines.

15

Classifying entry into these particular categories of

16

committed and uncommitted suggests, at that time at any

17

rate, that it was thought that such a distinction would

18

improve the analytical framework of merger analysis, and

19

also hopefully the practical usefulness of the Guidelines.

20

We now have 12 years of hindsight and experience

21

by which to assess the efficacy of those revisions, and that

22

revision in particular. Among other things, we might ask

23

today, is whether classifying entry into these categories of

24

committed and uncommitted, and indeed, placing them at

25

somewhat in disparate parts of the Guidelines' overall
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analytical framework has, in fact, helped or hindered the

2

usefulness of the Guidelines.

3

More fundamentally, given actual experience over

4

the past 12 years, we might ask whether it makes sense to

5

continue to try to draw this distinction.

6

From an economic standpoint, is it an artificial

7

distinction?

Does it have a theoretical and/or practical

8

basis that is worth sustaining and maintaining for the

9

future?

How often is uncommitted entry a key factor in

10

merger analysis and in what industries and markets might we

11

most expect the concept of uncommitted entry to play a

12

significant role in merger analysis?

13

To address these and other issues related to the

14

concept of uncommitted entry, I am pleased to say that we

15

have a very distinguished panel of commentators.

16

Let me just take a couple of minutes briefly to

17

introduce you to the panelists.

To my far left is Doug

18

Melamed, who is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering,

19

where he co-chair that law firm's antitrust practice group,

20

and as most of you know, in between stints in private

21

practice, Doug served as the principal Deputy Assistant

22

Attorney General at the Justice Department in the Antitrust

23

Division in the late 1990s, and culminated his tenure of

24

duty there as Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of

25

the Antitrust Division.
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Sitting next to Doug is Dr. Timothy Daniel, who is

2

an economist with NERA, here in Washington, D.C.

3

Tim also has a distinguished prior career in government

4

service, having served as an Assistant Director for

5

Antitrust here in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal

6

Trade Commission.

7

To my near right is Mark Whitener.

Like Doug,

Mark is

8

currently antitrust counsel for the General Electric

9

Company, where he has been since 1997.

Like the others, he

10

also has prior government experience, for several years

11

serving as the Deputy Director in the Bureau of Competition

12

here at the Federal Trade Commission.

13

currently an associate editor of the ABA's Antitrust

14

Section's Antitrust Magazine.

15

Mark is also

Last, but certainly not least, Dr. Rick

16

Warren-Boulton, a principal with MiCRA, an economist

17

consulting firm here in Washington.

18

likewise, he spent time with the government having served as

19

the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis

20

at the Antitrust Division for several years in the 1980s.

21
22

During his career,

With those brief introductions, let me ask Doug to
begin with some remarks on uncommitted entry.

23

MR. MELAMED:

24

Obviously, issues of supply response and entry are

25

Thanks, Ted.

an important part of merger analysis, and indeed, lots of
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aspects of antitrust analysis.

2

today is not that broad one, but rather the narrower one of

3

the usefulness and desirability of breaking that topic into

4

two separate categories or dividing the universe of

5

potential entrants into two categories, so-called committed

6

and uncommitted entrants.

7

I take it that the topic

Under the Guidelines, which do make such a

8

distinction, uncommitted entrants are defined as firms that

9

are not presently selling in the market, but would enter

10

within one year in response to a price increase and could

11

enter without incurring significant costs.

12

Once found to be an uncommitted entrant, the firm

13

is included in the relevant market, and that, of course, has

14

implications for HHI and other calculations.

15

entrants that are not uncommitted entrants are taken into

16

account, as Ted said, much later in the analysis as

17

described in the Guidelines.

18

Potential

In my view, the distinction does not enhance

19

merger analysis.

20

First, let me touch upon some of the reasons that are easier

21

to state.

22

It makes no sense for a number of reasons.

There are practical problems with this kind of

23

distinction.

It creates an additional issue in merger

24

analysis that some people may actually spend time on, and

25

that is worrying about what category does this potential
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supply response fall into.

This is not an area that is

2

likely to have or in my experience has had much pay off,

3

because there are almost always some costs, especially if

4

opportunity costs are taken into account.

5

another way of saying that the fact that the firm is not

6

presently selling in the market says something.

7

understand it, there have been very few cases where

8

uncommitted entry has figured into the analysis.

I guess this is

As I

9

Secondly, even where an uncommitted entrant is

10

identified, in reading the Guidelines, you can determine

11

that you haven't streamlined or shortened the analysis in

12

any way by making the identification.

13

The Guidelines are explicit about a proposition

14

that seems clearly correct.

15

entrant can't be deemed to be completely in the market.

16

That is to say that not all of its capacity should be deemed

17

to be in the market.

18

that capacity that is "committed or profitably employed

19

outside the market," that it would not enter in response to

20

a SSNIP, and thus should not be included in the market.

21

That is, even an uncommitted

The Guidelines state, for example,

Even if you identify an uncommitted entrant, you

22

then have to ask the question, how much of this entrant's

23

capacity should be in the market.

24

have to make the very same inquiry you would make about it

25

if it were a committed entrant.

And for that, you would

You have to ask, based on
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the particular facts, what is the likelihood of the timing

2

and the magnitude of entry one might predict from this

3

entrant.

4

Not surprisingly, our experience doesn't suggest

5

there is any way this category streamlines the analysis, nor

6

does it affect the substantive analysis of the merger.

7

might affect the substantive analysis if HHI calculations

8

were to be an end-all or even a hugely important part of

9

merger analysis.

It

But we all know that HHIs are at best a

10

starting point.

11

The recent data released by the agencies suggest they are

12

kind of like starting point, they don't tell you an awful

13

lot about what is going to happen.

14

The uncommitted entry exercise is only apparently

15

to enable refinement of the calculations of the initial HHIs

16

and, it seems to me, that is not going to have much effect

17

on the outcome of the merger analysis.

18

In addition to those practical considerations, I

19

think there are theoretical problems with the

20

uncommitted/committed entry dichotomy.

21

always in my view a problem when you create categories and

22

force lawyers and economists to focus on the categories and

23

argue about whether something does or does not belong in a

24

category.

25

analogy, rather than substantive analysis about what's the

First, there is

You then begin to get a lot of reasoning by
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competitive effects of the merger.

2

of undue formalism here by creating two categories from what

3

are really simply different places on a continuum.

4

At best, you have a kind

Second, there is a real problem with calculation

5

of shares.

If an uncommitted entrant is identified, you

6

have to figure out what does that mean.

7

one widget or many widgets next year?

8

judgment as to how much output should be put in the market.

9

Since the uncommitted entrant has no historic sales, the

Is it going to sell
You have to make a

10

only way you could possibly do that is by determining how

11

much of his capacity should go into the market.

12

We know from the Guidelines and sound analysis

13

that it is often the case that there are superior measures

14

to use for calculating market shares, such as dollar sales

15

and unit sales.

16

a market in which the Guidelines would ordinarily suggest

17

that the better way to calculate shares is by unit or dollar

18

sales, you either are going to have apples and oranges in

19

your calculation of market share, or you are going to be

20

requiring all shares to be calculated on the basis of

21

capacity, which will otherwise be regarded as the absolute

22

way of calculating shares.

23

If you try to put an uncommitted entry into

The most important problem I have with the

24

distinction between uncommitted and committed entry is a

25

theoretical one.

It doesn't, it seems to me, correlate very
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well with its purported purpose.

2

to figure out what is in the market.

3

of figuring out what is in the market is to be able to say

4

with more or less precision and accuracy what is the nature

5

of the competition in the market.

6

constraints on the competitive conduct in the pre-merger

7

period.

8
9

I take it the purpose is
I take it the purpose

What are the real

The reason you do that is to determine whether
this market is susceptible to anticompetitive restrictions.

10

If it was wheat farmers, we would probably think not.

11

identify whether the merger seems to be eliminating what was

12

under the status quo ante an important constraint on

13

anticompetitive behavior by, for example, merging with a

14

maverick or merging with a company with a large market

15

share.

16

Or to

The uncommitted/committed entry distinction does

17

not tell you very precisely anything about the status quo

18

ante.

19

there are no sunk costs.

20

condition for exerting a present competitive restraint.

21

Entry that takes a great deal of sunk costs could under some

22

circumstances induce enormous competitive constraints in the

23

market.

24

One industry, for example, is motion picture exhibition,

25

where a new state-of-the-art entrant in theaters could

The critical definition of "uncommitted entry" is
Sunk costs are not an essential
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overnight render obsolete the incumbents, because of a brand

2

loyalty in theater exhibition.

3

absence of sunk costs doesn't guarantee that there will be

4

an effect on present competition, because if limit pricing

5

is not required because incumbents could instantaneously

6

respond to anticipated new entry and retain their market

7

shares, then you are not going to have any present effect

8

from anyone who is characterized as an uncommitted entry.

9
10
11

By the same token, the

For those practical and theoretical reasons, I
don't think the distinction makes any sense.
I think if we are going to have a distinction, I

12

would suggest we go back to some old fashioned nomenclature.

13

I would suggest that we ought to ask ourselves in assessing

14

the status quo: In addition to the firms in the market, are

15

there firms not in the market who are exerting a perceived

16

potential entry effect?

17

the state of competition in the market more competitive than

18

the status quo ante.

19

Then you might be actually making

The second category, the committed entrants, those

20

who exert no present perceived entry or will predict actual

21

entries, and you analyze their impact on the merger, in the

22

competitive effects stage when asking the question, if there

23

were anticompetitive effects from this merger, would the

24

entry ameliorate them.

25

If you look at it in terms of a wings effect
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rather than uncommitted entry notion, you might want to make

2

some rough judgments.

3

think is likely to enter?

4

likely entry?

5

process calculation.

6

How much of his capacity do people
What do they perceive to be his

And you could calculate some HHIs in the

I don't know that it would become the HHI

7

calculation, but it would be a datapoint that might give you

8

some way of quantifying the magnitude of perceived potential

9

entry effect.

10
11

Beyond that, I would dispense with the kind of
dichotomy that the present Guidelines have.

12

MR. GEBHARD:

13

MR. DANIEL:

Thank you, Doug.
Good afternoon.

Tim?
I think my comments

14

are going to be largely complementary to Doug's.

15

to make a few additional points as we go.

16

Doug did, I will have a practical suggestion for a possible

17

alternative to the current application of uncommitted entry

18

concept in the merger review process.

19

I'd like

At the end, like

I don't think there is any disagreement among this

20

crowd that the Merger Guidelines provide a pretty logical

21

approach to the merger review, defining the market according

22

to consumer behavior, identifying participants in that

23

market, and then computing the shares and concentration

24

levels from the transaction, and then if you didn't clear

25

the concentration screen that triggers a more complete
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analysis, you go into the competitive effects and the entry

2

and the efficiencies.

3

There is no disagreement that uncommitted entry as

4

defined in the Guidelines and as defined by Ted at the

5

outset of this session deserve a place at the table, and

6

needs to be considered certainly as part of the merger

7

review, and as a possible additive to an anticompetitive

8

effect.

9

The question is where uncommitted entry should be

10

analyzed.

11

economists are all pretty much on the same page with regard

12

to that.

13

analysis, but certainly you do need to do it.

14

can be done in a confusing way and it can be done in an

15

efficient way, where it is done at the stage of identifying

16

market participants for purposes of calculating market

17

shares for those participants and the HHIs that follow.

18

Ultimately, it really doesn't matter.

I think

You don't want to get hung up on where you do the

Why do I say that?

The analysis

For many of the same reasons

19

that Doug just articulated, as laid out in the Guidelines.

20

It is relatively complicated.

21

identify, as Doug would say, a firm that might be waiting in

22

the wings or as a firm that might have capacity and serve a

23

particular market.

24
25

It's not enough just to

I think to do the analysis correctly, you need to
assess the profitability of that uncommitted entrant's
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beginning sales in the market of concern.

2

the Guidelines point out, you need to consider the extent of

3

the uncommitted entrant's costs.

4

any cases where a firm that's not currently selling in a

5

market that decided to move into that market without

6

incurring any sunk costs, so the sunk costs are truly zero.

7

You have to consider the extent to which that firm would

8

incur those costs and the agencies have historically, and

9

rightfully so, been very concerned about trying to quantify

10

To do that, as

I don't think there are

those and assess those.

11

In a differentiated products market, you need to

12

assess whether or not the uncommitted entrant would capture

13

sales.

14

enough to consumers to make that entry matter to the

15

competitive equilibrium.

16

in my view.

17

In other words, would its product be attractive

It's not a simple analysis at all,

Lastly, what economists like to do is assess the

18

profitability of entry to compare the margins that might be

19

earned by this uncommitted entrant going forward against the

20

sunk costs of entry and the ongoing costs of operations, and

21

see whether or not that uncommitted entry makes sense.

22

my view, in those cases where the calculations of shares and

23

the calculations of HHIs and the calculations of deltas from

24

a merger are intended to be in an initial screen

25

-- is it time for us to go forward or not –- these kinds of
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calculations are sort of outside that process and could be

2

an inefficient way to conduct the merger review.

3

This morning when I was here, I think it was Joe

4

Kattan who said something like entry analysis is the

5

analysis of last resort to a defendant, where they really

6

don't have any arguments to bring to the table.

7

quite as pessimistic as Joe about where to put that analysis

8

into the mix.

9

happening all the time, and I think that analysis can shed a

I'm not

I think in many markets, entry and exit are

10

ray of light on a merger review's process.

11

that I think that analysis needs to be done carefully.

12

needs to be done in a detailed manner, it can't be done

13

terribly quickly.

14

one of profitability, the kind of stuff economists like to

15

do.

16

My point here is
It

But in the end, I think the analysis is

You would look at the sunk costs of entry.

You

17

would look at the likely market share or sales that the

18

entrant could command on the marketplace, and then you would

19

see whether or not those profits are enough to clear the

20

sunk costs or upfront costs hurdle for that entry.

21

Doing that analysis requires getting the detailed

22

information from the firms in the marketplace, That

23

information would pertain to any firm that is not currently

24

selling in the marketplace, whether it be two, three, or six

25

months to the time that firm could sell so that it would
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fall into the uncommitted entry box, or whether it be six,

2

12 or 19 months out and maybe be in the committed entry box.

3

It really doesn't change the importance of the analysis or

4

the nature of the analysis.

5
6

I don't think that distinction makes the merger
process move more smoothly.

7

To bring home the point, the Guidelines does the

8

analysis right in my view or directed us to do the analysis

9

right, but that analysis is complex.

As I said, economists

10

like to do this stuff.

11

not to do.

12

supposed to do it at a different point in the merger review

13

process.

14

This is not stuff that we propose

Certainly, I am not saying that at all.

We are

The first point speaks to the need to check and

15

see whether this uncommitted entrant will actually be able

16

to make sales in the marketplace.

17

technical capability to achieve such an uncommitted supply

18

response but likely would not, because of difficulties in

19

achieving product acceptance or distribution or production

20

would render such a response unprofitable, that firm will

21

not be considered to be a market participant.

22

If a firm has the

I think the recent FTC investigation of the ice

23

cream case -- where the issue, as I understood it as an

24

outsider, was whether a new entrant, a new firm, could get

25

distribution of its ice cream products out to consumers -For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301)870-8025

210
1

proved to be a very lengthy undertaking, a very complicated

2

analysis in which the costs of distribution and the ability

3

to set up the distribution network were at the center of

4

that investigation.

5

Again, the kind of work economists love to do, but

6

it seemed to me to belong in the entry analysis as opposed

7

to the upfront analysis of assigning market shares and

8

computing HHIs.

9

On the second quote, it is to the opportunity

10

costs point that Doug mentioned, which is that in assessing

11

whether or not a firm is an uncommitted entrant under the

12

Guidelines, one would look toward the end of that quote,

13

whether the firm's capacity is elsewhere committed or

14

elsewhere so profitably employed that such capacity likely

15

would not be available to respond to an increase in price in

16

the market.

17

Again, this is an analysis that absolutely has to

18

be done, if you are proposing that a particular firm is a

19

potential entrant into a marketplace.

20

it is doing now and if that capacity is otherwise being

21

employed to serve another market, either another product

22

market or another geographic market.

23

ask whether or not the profits in those markets would be so

24

high as to make entry into this particular market less

25

profitable and therefore not likely.

You have to ask what

You absolutely need to
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1
2

the analysis to do in the entry section of a merger review.
Let me leave you with just a very modest

3

recommendation, based on these views.

4

uncommitted entry analysis, as currently described in the

5

Guidelines, in other words, for what purposes of figuring

6

out who is in the market, who the market participants are,

7

what their shares are, could still be used, but in some

8

fairly limited circumstances.

9

I think on the

Both of these conditions hold first if capacity is

10

the proper measure for calculating shares.

11

a homogeneous products market or in a market where consumers

12

make relatively large purchase decisions and therefore

13

capacity is only the right way to think about the ability to

14

serve these customers.

15

Capacity is the proper measure, as Doug mentioned.

16

This could be in

Secondly, the capacity for an uncommitted entrant

17

is capacity that is controlled by a firm that is already

18

selling in the market at issue.

19

about glass containers generally and the specific market at

20

issue would be glass containers used for pickle relish, and

21

that is a defensible antitrust market on the demand side and

22

you are asking who is in that market from a market

23

participant perspective.

24

supplying that market with jars for spaghetti sauce and

25

gravy food and other products might also have capacity for

Suppose we are talking

Those firms that are currently
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1

providing jars for pickle relish.

2

easily be swung for the supply and sale into the pickle

3

relish market, then I think it is absolutely appropriate to

4

consider that capacity in the jars for pickle relish market

5

at the outset of the analysis.

6

If that capacity could

You would want to make sure that swinging that

7

capacity into a different end use segment would make sense.

8

That capacity is relatively easy to identify and I think the

9

calculations one would have to do would be relatively less

10

involved than turning to another firm that produces only

11

glass jars for wine, and then argue that firm could, with a

12

five percent price increase, be profitably selling into the

13

pickle relish market.

14

certainly want to entertain that as a hypothesis to test,

15

but to my eyes, that would belong in the entry analysis.

That may well be true.

You would

16

Let me just close with one important caveat, which

17

is that the remarks I make today in terms of laying out what

18

I think is an efficient way and an appropriate way to

19

implement uncommitted entry under the Guidelines analysis by

20

no means should hamper any arguments on what I am going to

21

take to a court.

22

There, you might very well include more than just

23

the limited supply response that I articulate here, for

24

purposes of calculating market shares, for purposes of

25

identifying market participants, because in the merger
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1

review process, it is much more a back and forth between the

2

private parties and the government officials and the

3

investigative staff.

4

lay out your best case at the outset, and if your best case

5

involves including those wine producers who you really think

6

can swing their capacity quickly into the direction of

7

pickle relish containers, that is exactly what you ought to

8

do, along with other supply responses that could be

9

available.

10

In a court, you really need to sort of

MR. GEBHARD:

Thank you, Tim.

By my reckoning,

11

the vote is now two to nothing in favor of the distinction

12

between committed and uncommitted entry being largely

13

artificial, with the possible exception of limited

14

circumstances that Tim mentioned at the end of his remarks.

15

I am wondering if there is anyone who will defend

16

this beast.

17

MR. WHITENER:

Sure, why not.

Let me find my

18

weapons here.

19

something to go on, if they want to keep this section in the

20

Guidelines, which I happen to think is a pretty good idea.

21

I guess it falls to me to give the agencies

Let me begin by saying I didn't particularly seek

22

this work.

I didn't have a particular ax to grind on the

23

section.

24

think this is where Rick probably comes out, too, that it's

25

not a part of the analysis that gets used an awful lot, at

I tend to agree with the other panelists, and I
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1

least not in the rigorous sense that it is laid out in the

2

Guidelines.

3

The question as I see it as a general matter of

4

Guidelines writing is if you have a good economic and

5

analytical framework, even if the analysis is a reasonable

6

approximation of what the agencies actually do, at least in

7

some cases, then you have a basis to pretty much leave it

8

alone.

9

questions is yes, and therefore the answer to the ultimate

10
11

I think in this case the answer to both of those

question is yes.
There are a number of other aspects of the

12

Guidelines that I would probably have at before I would

13

touch this one.

14

unilateral effects plenty and will over the course of this

15

very helpful workshop.

16

get into this enormously confusing mixing and matching of

17

market shares and market thresholds in an analysis

18

fundamentally not about shares and not about thresholds.

19

Let me see what I can do to present a fair and

20
21

I'm sure others have talked about

A very sensible framework until you

balanced other side of this discussion.
Many people sitting in this room in some capacity

22

have had some role, in drafting the Guidelines.

Obviously,

23

all of us try to work with them.

24

principle, which is don't mess it up.

25

have a framework that is economically sound, you should look

I think there is a first
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1

very closely at whether to start tinkering with it.

2

Actual enforcement does not go back to the sort of

3

stylized Guidelines analysis.

4

to look at the HHI presumptions and see whether they really

5

are out of sync with what the agencies actually do.

6

Arguably now is a good time

Efficiencies were addressed in the 1990s to try to

7

expand our cursory analysis at the time.

8

not addressed in the current Guidelines, such as vertical

9

mergers, the third rail of antitrust.

10

There are issues

Some day, perhaps we

will see another attempt at that.

11

Another thing is just as a practical matter, when

12

you start down through the language, you create

13

law.

14

there is going to be a round of enforcement actions, and

15

only over a period of years can anyone even claim to

16

understand what the new Guidelines actually mean.

17

new common

You create new verbiage that has to be interpreted or

I suspect as we sit here today and yesterday we

18

have a lot of people who disagree about the Guidelines'

19

language that was written over 10 years ago means.

20

just a general and cautionary rule on re-opening the

21

Guidelines can of worms.

22

That is

Finally, as a general introductory matter, if the

23

worse thing you can say about Guidelines is we don't use

24

them very much, I'm not sure that is a basis to re-open or

25

modify that part of the Guidelines.

Let them sit there
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dormant until some day somebody says, hey, I have a case

2

where swing capacity or repositioning or imports matter, and

3

I think it's helpful upfront to do some bit of assigning

4

them at least a presence in the market or imagine them being

5

in the market and see what that does for my competitive

6

effects analysis.

7

The sort of threshold question is is this part of

8

the Guidelines analytically and economically sound.

9

the answer is yes.

10

yet.

I think

I haven't heard disagreement with that

We may still.

11

Doug and Tim raised some good points.

12

that is very interesting is whether when you look at entry

13

and exit costs.

14

really are a cost of entry, in essence, or they affect the

15

entry decision.

16

One thing

We take account of the fact that exit costs

That is an interesting fact.

It has been pointed out that it may be that really

17

the pure uncommitted entry may have very little effect on

18

current pricing, because the incumbents may also be hit and

19

run pricers.

20

if the guy comes in, I will price accordingly, and if he

21

exits, I will price accordingly.

22

They may not limit price because they figure

There are some interesting things to ask.

It's

23

certainly not every case where entry might be quick, that

24

you are going to necessarily assign that firm a presence and

25

a share as if they were current market participants, for the
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reason that Doug states.

2

constraining effect that a current market participant has.

3

They may not have the current

Is it economically sound?

I think so.

I think

4

the critiques that we have heard so far focus on how often

5

is it applied.

6

uncommitted entry very often or ever a particularly useful

7

distinction to make.

8

is artificial.

9

Is the distinction between committed and

Are we engaging in market drawing that

I think there are some legitimate questions and it

10

might be interesting to look at exit costs and ask whether

11

hit and run entry is really what we are after in terms of

12

the price constraining effect.

13

out of the mainstream of the fundamental Guidelines'

14

economics, so I think they pass that first test.

15

My sense is these are not

Are they ever useful as a practical matter?

16

Again, I agree with the sentiment that they are not useful

17

really very often.

18

mergers have not very often sat down and created a market

19

participant and share table based in large part in

20

anticipated supply responses that have not actually been

21

demonstrated in the market.

22

Most of us who have done a lot of

There are a number of reasons why they simply

23

don't come into play very much.

I don't want to spend a lot

24

of time on this.

25

really looking for who are the participants, how many are

In coordinated interaction cases we are
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there, what is the rough idea of their shares and their

2

significance.

3

As Doug points out, the shares are just a starting

4

point, so why go and do all this sometimes complicated

5

analysis to bring into that market those who have perhaps

6

the potential to come in quickly.

7

That is a fair point.

8

in the Guidelines.

9

shares, at least a number of firms.

The coordinated effects analysis is

It does look as a starting point at
While I agree you are

10

not often going to come up with a very meaningful share

11

calculation for that supply response, that uncommitted

12

entry, you are at least going to sometimes get a sense of

13

how many credible players there are likely to serve

14

customers in the near future.

15

In a case where you have only two or three

16

incumbents after the merger indicating perhaps, assuming

17

entry barriers and all the other conditions, a very serious

18

issue, and you have three or four pretty approximate supply

19

responders, I don't know why you wouldn't say, that based on

20

kind of a quick analysis under the uncommitted entry

21

section, that you really have five, six, seven significant

22

players likely post-merger, in the event prices were to

23

justify a supply response, so you don't have a problem.

24
25

It might be a quick screen.

Giving those

approximate supply responders their due, it may not be the
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basis for a problem.

2

and I will come back to this, I think you will turn it into

3

sort of an undifferentiated well to do what.

4

have a problem under the coordinated theory with five, six,

5

seven pretty comparably sized or decent sized firms, I don't

6

think we have to look much further.

7

If you defer them to entry analysis,

If we wouldn't

Winding down point, again, fair enough.

8

are drawn throughout the Guidelines.

9

drawing in this case is particularly severe.

The lines

I don't think the line
I think the

10

introduction of some costs in to the analysis in the early

11

1990s was a very appropriate analytically correct useful

12

addition to the Guidelines.

13

sunk costs?

14

defining that, and talking about recovery of those costs.

15

You are not going to get out of line drawing if

What is significant in terms of

At least the Guidelines take a crack at

16

you throw everything into entry.

17

years now, and indeed, I think you have somewhat less

18

guidance about what is sufficient entry under Section 3 than

19

you do under this section on how to evaluate the potential

20

presence of a firm as a current market participant.

21

You are talking about two

Having said that this section is analytically

22

pretty correct and perhaps not useful very much, if it so

23

rarely is going to come into play, and is taking up space in

24

the document, you can make a case for saying let's keep the

25

document short and confined to those situations that really
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come up in the real world.

2

I think there are some examples, but not too many

3

reported decisions that I think of really turned on an

4

uncommitted entry analysis.

5

litigated case and looked at the entire marketplace and

6

competitive effects, one hopes, the role of those other

7

players has been fully evaluated.

8

after a fully investigated and litigated case what category

9

you put them into.

By the time you have a full

It almost doesn't matter

10

We are talking here about enforcement decisions

11

and an analysis that lawyers can do going in and that the

12

agencies do in making the decisions that they make on a

13

weekly and monthly basis on which cases to bring and why.

14

In that context, there are some situations where I have seen

15

this analysis come into play.

16

One example is imports.

Again, Doug and Tim would

17

probably agree that there are often going to be some costs

18

in virtually any kind of entry or repositioning.

19

obviously right.

20

They often will be some sunk costs.

21

product repositioning, that's probably the most evident,

22

creating brand or creating new feature sets in the

23

technology driven marketplace can be quite difficult in some

24

cases.

25

That is

It doesn't mean they are significant.
When we think about

If you think of it in terms of imports, products
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coming in from outside the geographic market, I think it is

2

a little easier to think of this as an useful analysis.

3

Importers may have relatively few costs of providing supply.

4

On the other hand, they may have significant costs and it

5

may not apply.

6

product.

7

the expertise.

8
9

In some instances, they may already have the

They have essentially the feature sets.

They have

Transportation costs may not be significant.

Why do we need this analysis to look at that?

It

may be it's just as well in many cases to say let's look at

10

them as entrants and we will come to the same conclusion.

11

Again, I go back to the examples.

12

or you are considering a narrower geographic market.

13

U.S. market. You think there is some basis for that, so you

14

have to take it credibly as an agency and ask yourself if

15

there is a problem in that market, and you only have a very

16

small number of local producers after the merger.

17

have the ability to approximate which firms with roughly

18

what kind of supply capability, measured as capacity or

19

likely sales, can be selling in that market in a reasonable

20

amount of time, why not at least count them in the sort of

21

estimation of current participants, and you might come to a

22

judgment that this is not a three to two deal, this is a

23

nine to eight deal, and therefore, we don't have to ask a

24

whole lot more.

25

Suppose you have decided

You could go back and look at imports
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historically.

2

happened in the past and let's look at shares over a 10-year

3

period, and on that basis, they are in the market.

4

that is just another way of doing what I just described.

5

You could say, well, let's look at what has

I think

The other example, and this is probably my main

6

point, another example of when this analysis can be useful,

7

probably less often than in the case of the imports or swing

8

production of a homogeneous product, but I put this in to

9

make a slightly different point.

10

The Guidelines do ask in unilateral effects cases, well, we

11

have found there is closeness, competitive proximity between

12

the merging firms for some group of customers.

13

to look at the supply responses.

14

else who is adjacent to that differentiated segment could

15

readily reposition and come in, and that defeats the premise

16

of the unilateral effect.

17

Now we have

If essentially somebody

The point here is that number one, the Guidelines

18

relate that back to the uncommitted or committed entry

19

analysis, depending on the nature of sunk costs.

20

Guidelines today interlink unilateral effects and committed

21

and uncommitted entry in a way that I think makes perfectly

22

good sense.

23

The

The other point is my sense is there is a tendency

24

with the availability of transactional data to really

25

sometimes be enamoured of that competitive proximity, to
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find that proximity based on data, and to be very interested

2

in looking at a potentially unilateral effects case based on

3

kind of static bidding data.

4

issue here, and really skip over or perhaps not give enough

5

credence to the repositioning point.

6

Then to say maybe we have an

Go back to Joe Kattan's point.

If entry is the

7

last resort, and I think, in fact, there is a lot of truth

8

in that, the last thing I think we should do is kind of

9

commit to uncommitted entry fringes the entry analysis,

10

because under unilateral effects maybe in many of these

11

cases will go away, even though the two merging firms are

12

close in some feature set or some regard, because there are

13

several other players today that have not chosen to sell in

14

that niche but could fairly readily do so.

15

We ought to look at them as supply responders and

16

not push them off as timely, likely, and sufficient entry.

17

To think of them as entrants is really straining the logic,

18

I think, at that point.

19

Don't mess with Guidelines if they are kind of

20

reasonably analytically correct and if they are sometimes

21

useful.

22

and I think they are sometimes useful.

I think they are reasonably analytically correct,

23

Thank you.

24

MR. GEBHARD:

25

Thank you, Mark.

tells us we have about a two to one vote.
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1

podium over to Rick Warren-Boulton.

2

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:

I'd like to do this standing

3

up.

When we are criticizing the Guidelines, I want to see

4

if Werden is anywhere within range.

5

you are standing, if you are going to criticize them.

6

It is easier to duck if

Since it's two to one, I'm going to change my

7

conclusion.

8

the beast, perhaps for all the wrong reasons.

9

I like the underdog, and maybe try to defend

Going last means I am not supposed to repeat.

10

That's very difficult given that everybody else has done all

11

the good stuff.

12

saying if it's worth publishing once, it's worth publishing

13

two or three times.

14

probably worth saying it two or three times.

15

I have a friend that explains this by

If it's worth saying once, it's

I only have three points.

My rule is never have

16

three of anything because nobody can remember more than

17

three of anything.

18

I can't.

The first point I'd like to make is the true

19

uncommitted entrant, not necessarily the uncommitted entrant

20

of the Guidelines, but the true uncommitted entrant is like

21

an unicorn.

22

It's hard to confirm.

23

one.

It's often sighted.

Everybody else seems to have seen

It's really hard to bag.

24
25

It's a thing of beauty.

It's very difficult to get entry without some sunk
costs.

The second and third points, I think, are more
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interesting.

2

entrant, that's not likely to have much effect on the

3

analysis of a merger.

4

not a particularly tasty thing.

5

Even if you find the illusive uncommitted

Even if you bagged the unicorn, it's

The contrast, of course, is with the committed

6

entrant.

The committed entrant is a real find, because when

7

you have a committed entrant, it is three to two, and now it

8

is two to two.

9

long time to think of that.

We call this a two-two.

10

SPEAKER:

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:

Sorry.

Took me a

I can't wait for the third point.

If you find yourself one good

13

committed entrant, it is worth a very large number of

14

uncommitted entrants.

15

The third point is that finding a committed

16

entrant is going to have a significant effect on the

17

analysis.

18

with here is the standard in the Guidelines for committed

19

entry is just too high.

20

"real."

21

with a great deal of uncertainty, even a very low

22

probability, even a highly unlikely probability of inducing

23

committed entry, can restrain prices and prevent what would

24

otherwise be a price increase after the merger.

25

is that the entry doesn't have to be particularly likely if

The real problem that I see that we are dealing

I don't want to use the word

The point that I am going to make is in a world
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it's sufficiently dangerous.

2

Let's start with hunting the illusive unicorn.

I

3

thank Tim Daniel for the unicorn analogy.

4

it, and I could be wrong, the defining characteristic of a

5

true uncommitted entrant is that even though it doesn't

6

actually make the product, sell the product at the moment,

7

its mere existence or presence out there, in the words of

8

the Guidelines, likely will influence the market pre-merger

9

and would influence it post-merger.

10

As I understand

There are two ways that you might identify such a

11

creature.

12

characteristics that would imply this would be the case.

13

Then of course, although it is a little unfair, you could

14

actually look at the evidence and ask if it does behave that

15

way.

16

First, you can look for structural

Let's look at the two of them.

The first is the

17

one that lawyers love because you don't need any math to do

18

it, so what we are going to do is we are going to look for

19

evidence that the presence of the uncommitted entrant

20

actually effects prices currently, and therefore would also

21

affect them afterwards.

22

In theory, what the Guidelines do, because the

23

Guidelines are highly structural in this sense, is we say

24

that it should affect the current pricing decisions, if that

25

potential entrant, let's call it a potential entrant for the
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moment because we don't know whether it's a committed or

2

uncommitted entrant, if it could cover any sunk costs before

3

the price raising of the incumbents after the merger and

4

could lower its price back down again.

5

in the old days, before high tech hit, hit and run entry.

6

What we used to call

You can argue that those situations are going to

7

be unlikely and in fact, I think we all would.

My favorite

8

example of why it is unlikely came in Staples, where one

9

Staples manager said, well, it's perfectly true that if

10

Office Depot came in and entered its local market, he would

11

really have to drop his prices by a very large amount, but

12

his best strategy was to make hay while the sun shined.

13

What he was saying is obviously the Office Depot

14

manager only cared about what his Staples' prices were going

15

to be after the Office Depot firm entered.

16

Depot firm did enter, the Staples guy would have plenty of

17

time to change all his prices.

18

minutes.

19

entered wouldn't give any indication of how he was going to

20

price afterwards, therefore, higher prices pre-entry doesn't

21

of course induce any higher likelihood of entry.

22

as well price as high as you like because that is not going

23

to affect the probability of entry.

They could do that in 15

What the Staples' guy charged before Office Depot

24
25

If the Office

You might

I think that is overwhelmingly the usual
situation.

It's not always.

It's possible sunk costs are
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low enough and adjustment of incumbents is slow enough so

2

that you can get something that you might call hit-and-run-

3

after-a-little-while.

4

could constrain current prices.

5

That could be profitable and that

The most likely candidates for that are in bidding

6

markets.

7

may be able to make sure he has enough business at an agreed

8

price to allow him to recover his sunk costs even before he

9

has to incur any of those costs.

10
11

The nice thing about bidding markets is an entrant

In that situation, he is

truly an uncommitted entrant.
Those are not the only situations.

There are

12

situations in which a potential entrant could enter into

13

long term contracts with customers in the market.

14

are probably a good example.

15

difficult for small firms to enter into the airlines markets

16

because of the price response of the incumbents.

17

natural idea of the best way to do it is, that before you

18

enter, you go and you try to contract with customers.

19

Contract with large companies like General Motors who

20

promise to buy tickets on your airline if you enter, you can

21

contract with representatives of groups of customers.

22

they will say is we will contract with you at prices that

23

are below current prices but above post-entry prices.

24

will make sure you will survive.

25

happens is the customers can make a committed entrant into

Airlines

We all know it has been very

The

What

We

In those situations what
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1

an uncommitted entrant and encourage entry.

2

I think the 1992 Guidelines, everyone agrees on

3

this, makes a contribution by focusing attention on sunk

4

costs, and I think that was presumably the purpose, but what

5

it doesn't do very well is it doesn't answer the other half

6

of the question.

7

large the sunk costs, but the second half of the question is

8

how long is it going to take the incumbent to react.

9

The first half of the question is how

The thing that is really arbitrary in the sense of

10

the Guidelines is this one year to recover.

11

going to ask this kind of question, what you should do is

12

you should ask how much are the sunk costs, how long would

13

it take to recover those sunk costs, and then compare that

14

with how long it is going to take the incumbent to adjust

15

his prices.

16

If you are

In other words, if it takes much less than one

17

year for an incumbent to adjust his prices, and in most

18

cases that is true, you can identify a whole bunch of people

19

as uncommitted entrants in the sense that you think they are

20

going to constrain current prices, when in fact they are

21

not.

22

What else could you look at?

You could look at

23

actual evidence of competitive effects.

When you start

24

walking down this road, the unicorn begins to look pretty

25

illusive.

Think of the kinds of empirical tests that you
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would want to run to see if a firm was an uncommitted

2

entrant.

3

Remember, the goal is does he currently constrain

4

prices, even though he is not actually producing the

5

products.

6

are lower in markets where there are uncommitted entrants.

7

You want to find evidence that those margins fell when an

8

uncommitted entrant "entered as an uncommitted entrant," in

9

other words, wasn't actually producing in the market.

10

You want to find evidence that prices or margins

I know it sounds kind of funny.

Let's imagine we

11

have an airline that starts flying between New York and L.A.

12

and between New York and San Francisco.

13

is what does this do to prices between San Francisco and

14

L.A.

15

between New York and San Francisco.

16

uncommitted entrant between San Francisco and New York, once

17

you are flying -- I'm sorry -- San Francisco and L.A., once

18

you are flying back and forth between San Francisco and New

19

York and New York and L.A.

Do they fall?

20

What we want to ask

Do they fall as much as the prices fell
You are clearly now an

A more interesting question is do you find

21

evidence of prices increased when the uncommitted entrant

22

entered the market, that is exited from being an uncommitted

23

entrant.

24

prices didn't fall when the uncommitted entrant began

25

actually producing the product.

One of my favorites is do you find evidence that

Shouldn't that be the case
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1

if he's a true uncommitted entrant.

2

When you look at prices and margins, do you find

3

that HHIs that you have been calculating with assigning

4

shares of uncommitted entrants predict better than models

5

that don't assign shares of uncommitted entrants.

6

Even if you go through those exercises, you say,

7

okay, I found myself an uncommitted entrant, what you are

8

stuck with is the question of how large a share should you

9

give to an uncommitted entrant.

I think the answer is the

10

only way you would give as large a share to an uncommitted

11

entrant as you would to a current producer would be once

12

again if you believed the actual entry of the uncommitted

13

entrant wouldn't have any effect on the prices.

14
15

That's a pretty tough test, which is why Tim
called this the unicorn story.

16

That was my first sort of argument.

Then it gets

17

shorter.

The second is parties try extremely hard to

18

characterize an entrant as uncommitted.

19

partners, Steve Solvenance, pointed out if you find an

20

uncommitted entrant, it isn't going to have much effect on a

21

merger, but as I said before, if you can find a nice

22

committed entrant, that's worth a whole bunch of uncommitted

23

entrants.

Why?

One of my

24

Essentially what you are saying with uncommitted

25

entry is you have to find a large enough number of them so
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that you are going from a small number to that small number

2

minus 1, to from a large number to another large number.

3

That is not going to happen all that often.

4

I think Tim also commented, and I think correctly,

5

that what that means is uncommitted entry is likely to play

6

a larger role or be more useful in a Section 2 case than in

7

a merger case.

8
9

Finally, does all that mean that uncommitted entry
is just a concept, and well, it's not likely to do much

10

harm, it's not likely to do much good, so we might as well

11

leave it in the Guidelines.

12

I think the problem with uncommitted entry is it

13

really focuses attention away from committed entry.

14

Smith in an article that came out right after the 1992

15

Guidelines made that point, that the really scary thing

16

about raising prices after a merger is it might induce entry

17

by someone who cannot easily exit.

18

committed entrant, somebody you are going to be stuck with a

19

long time and you can't get rid of.

20

Steve

In other words, by a

The contrast with hit and run entry is that if

21

those hit and run entrants have no sunk costs, they are no

22

threat to incumbents.

23

uncommitted entrant, you can always go back to the status

24

quo.

25

If you make a mistake with an

If there is a lot of uncertainty with respect to
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the price that will induce entry, then if you run that

2

experiment and you get committed entry, there is a very high

3

price to pay.

4

Sort of like nuclear war here, the threat of entry

5

can really be an effective deterrent to a price increase,

6

even if that price increase would only slightly increase the

7

probability of entry.

8
9

The odd thing is it is perfectly possible in a
world of uncertainty, which I think is the world we live in,

10

committed entrant influences current prices more than a

11

uncommitted entrant.

12

If the Merger Guidelines makes a contribution here

13

or if the concept makes sense, I would like to say it is

14

because what you want to do is you want to make sure it is

15

only an uncommitted entrant.

16

uncommitted and the committed entrants, and I think the

17

lesson we should learn from this is not that it is the

18

uncommitted entrants that are really very important, but it

19

is the committed ones.

20

Where it separates out the

The nice thing about the Guidelines procedure is

21

it lets you separate out the wheat from the chaff to get to

22

the guys who are really going to affect prices if entry

23

occurs, and those are the committed entrants.

24

Thanks.

25

MR. GEBHARD:

Thank you, Rick.
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1

are cast, and by my reckoning, it is about 2.5 to 1.5.

2

(Laughter.)

3

MR. GEBHARD:

4

I have just a couple of questions I

would like to throw out to the panel at large.

5

My sense is that much if not all of the discussion

6

that we have had this afternoon -- behind that discussion is

7

that we are worried about kind of an unilateral effects

8

analysis or story behind a proposed merger.

9

about whether the post-merger entity might be able to

10
11

We are worried

exercise market power unilaterally.
I am wondering if the concept of uncommitted entry

12

introduces any particular complexities, any additional

13

complexities, or any peculiar complexities, that need to be

14

accounted for if we are talking about coordinated

15

interaction type stories, particularly one, a coordinated

16

interaction story that is not necessarily a collusion story.

17

What I had in mind here is if the uncommitted

18

entrant by definition is not already producing the product,

19

is not benefitting from any anticompetitive pricing that

20

might be coming about from the existing coordinated

21

interaction, if the merger is expected to perhaps increase

22

the degree of coordinated interaction and increase the

23

anticompetitive pricing.

24
25

What is the role of uncommitted entrants, and
let's suppose we have a factual situation in which we can
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1

identify at least potentially uncommitted entrants, how

2

should that enter the analysis?

3

particular complications?

4

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:

Does that add any

Are you asking if an

5

uncommitted entrant could be more important than the current

6

entrant?

7

I think that is what you are implying.
In that case, it would be yes, unless it was a pay

8

off.

9

than even just having one more firm actually in the market.

10

Having an uncommitted entrant would be more likely

MR. GEBHARD:

I take it then that doesn't add any

11

particular complications, as opposed to telling an

12

unilateral effects story.

13

MR. MELAMED:

To the extent that the notion of

14

uncommitted entry had utility, I don't think there is a huge

15

difference between its utility in a coordinated effects and

16

its utility in a unilateral effects case.

17

If there is a waiting-in-the-wing's effect, which

18

is what I think might be useful in that kind of situation,

19

it certainly could constrain any anticompetitive behavior,

20

supercompetitive pricing theory.

21

In addition to that, one could imagine an

22

uncommitted entrant is actually colluding, if you have

23

multiple markets and the collusion takes the form of market

24

allocation.

25

MR. WHITENER:

It's a very good question, an
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1

interesting question.

Unilateral effects, where I think the

2

importance is the greatest, the reason why Joe Kattan made

3

the comment this morning, low entry is I think the real

4

unicorn here, especially if we are talking about

5

differentiated products, which is where unilateral effects

6

usually arises.

7

almost always in some adjacent product area.

8

question of repositioning, not a question of building a new

9

plant or coming up with new technology or investing 10 years

The folks who are potential suppliers are

10

in intellectual property.

11

in some cases in those instances.

12

It is a

I think it is certainly relevant

To your question, Ted, it seems to me that

13

identifying these in the wings or potential supply

14

responders in a case where the potential theory is

15

coordinated interaction, it could very well be they are

16

particularly significant.

17

maverick.

18

They may be the ultimate

How does the market participant trying to evaluate

19

the payoffs from coordination evaluate the supply

20

responders?

21

timeliness, likelihood, degree of a potential uncommitted

22

entrant as the panelists here are saying the agencies would

23

have.

24
25

They may have as much difficulty evaluating the

It seems to me it is an interesting question, and
it may be, I haven't thought about this a lot, that if you
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1

had a number of those folks in the wings with the

2

capabilities to come in quickly, that may be a very

3

destabilizing factor for a coordination case.

4

need to look at that in as early in the analysis as you can.

5
6

MR. DANIEL:
that.

You would

I would concur with Mark's view on

I think I would also concur with his entry point.

7

Committed entry to me really is the profitability

8

of the extension of that product line or extension of that

9

geographic region of the product.

10

With regard to coordination, I think any analysis

11

is going to learn early on, do we have a set of potential

12

suppliers here that are going to be destabilizing after the

13

transaction, if they are not selling now.

14

I haven't found much support for the argument

15

since I have been outside the FTC, that these are really

16

critical suppliers over the course of five years or for a

17

period of time, and had never sold the product in the

18

market, even though they may sell it elsewhere or something

19

similar.

20

I would take Mark's point from before, that if you

21

are looking at imports, you are really not going to get much

22

traction unless there are imports flowing into the market in

23

some point, in the recent past.

24

nearby that has never stopped at a U.S. shore, even in the

25

last five years, it doesn't get me very far.

To say there is a boat
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1

hesitant to move forward very aggressively.

2

about what it would take for him to begin doing what he

3

hasn't been doing before, which is serving U.S. customers.

4

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:

I would think

One thing which I think is

5

worth noting, when people are looking for who is most likely

6

to be the entrant, and somebody who is making it somewhere

7

else, something like that, I think in many of the really

8

interesting cases, it's not somebody who is making the same

9

thing or making something similar, or making something in a

10

different area.

11

asked who was the most likely and the most threatening

12

entrant to Microsoft's desktop operating system, the answer

13

is Intel.

14

complementary product, that firm is not worried about price

15

reduction that happens after it enters because that firm can

16

pick it up.

17

pick it up by increasing the price of the chip.

18

It's a vertically related firm.

If you

The answer is if you have a monopoly in a

If the price of MS DOS had fallen, Intel could

There are these sort of really interesting

19

situations in which vertically related firms can and are

20

immune from the usual problem with entry, which is

21

post-entry price reductions.

22
23

MR. DANIEL:

Moving to the third rail now, Rick.

Vertical mergers.

24

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:

25

MR. GEBHARD:

Yes, long overdue.

Rick may have already addressed this
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1

question, at least in part, by noting that committed entry

2

is more important in terms of weight than uncommitted entry,

3

if you can make that distinction, and if you know of the

4

existence of a likely and timely committed entrant on the

5

horizon.

Implicit in the concept of sunk costs is the cost

6

of exit.

When we think of entry, often our instincts are

7

initially to think of costs of getting in.

8

neglect of costs of getting out.

9

worried in our merger analysis of costs of exit when we are

By definition, are we not

10

thinking in terms of committed entry.

11

"committed."

12

Perhaps to the

Hence, the name

In light of the fact that if both are on the

13

horizon and we are relatively confident about a committed

14

entry story and an uncommitted entry story, and the rule is

15

to assign greater weight to the likelihood of committed

16

entry where cost of exit is if not unimportant at least less

17

important, than in the concept of uncommitted entry, is that

18

a basis for maintaining at least some distinction in the

19

Guidelines?

20

maintaining some distinction in the Guidelines?

21

Does that provide an analytical basis for

MR. MELAMED:

I don't think so.

Why create two

22

separate categories?

Rick says while an committed entry can

23

be a bigger threat because you can't get rid of them.

24

could have a wings effect.

25

post-entry, post-merger ameliorating effect.

That

That could have a huge
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1

understand that, you have to get beyond the categories and

2

you have to really ask how likely is this entry and how

3

likely is it perceived to be, how likely will it happen, and

4

over what time.

5

The category doesn't help the analysis.

6

to look at all the factors in the Guidelines, of which sunk

7

costs is one, and make an assessment.

8
9

You have

I don't see why you go through the categorizing
exercise.

I think you ought to just ask the question, is

10

there somebody that is not in the market now that might

11

ameliorate things and if so, how and to what extent.

12

MR. WHITENER:

As part of the probably 1.5 votes

13

for keeping the test, I guess I would not point to the

14

difference in treatment of exit costs as the reason to keep

15

the analysis.

16

between the analyses.

17

costs, they are likely to be low sunk costs of exit.

18

going to be legitimate to look at that type of player as

19

having a high elasticity of supply, someone you have to look

20

at as folks that potentially exert a constraint in the

21

marketplace.

22

I do think it is a relevant difference
I think the fact that even low entry
It is

I think probably what happens when we sort of

23

envision -- everybody has their own factor, sort of their

24

own way of thinking about mergers.

25

discussion, we tend to think about supply responders, in

I think in a lot of this
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heavy industry.

I am making widgets but I could make

2

gidgets.

3

think about low sunk costs of entry.

4

perhaps quite significant costs.

That concept doesn't make a lot of sense often to
There are going to be

5

That is why I think the other examples that I

6

pointed to are probably more often where this is really

7

relevant, and imports is a good example to Tim's point.

8

is not a good commentary on merger analysis if we are

9

automatically assuming that because the ships are sailing

10

It

past the ports, we are not going to count them.

11

We are supposed to do a dynamic analysis.

We are

12

supposed to posit a change, either a price increase or the

13

entry analysis now talks about a supply increase or

14

decrease.

15

go into port.

16

There is an inducement for that ship to turn and

If it is really that easy to turn and go to port,

17

analytically, we shouldn't care if it has never done that,

18

because before the merger, we have a nice competitive market

19

and afterwards we don't, it really ought to be what is the

20

actual dynamic effect, and if that is relatively easy, then

21

it seems to me we have a role for giving those folks some

22

degree of some presence in the marketplace, in our initial

23

cut of who the players are and what the analysis looks like.

24
25

MR. WHITENER:

If there are price fluctuations

that seem to be the type that should draw the response and
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1

it hasn't occurred, I agree.

2

be the case.

3

competitive market where the equilibrium does not give them

4

any reason to turn and go to port, and a merger arguably

5

changes that, then I guess it would be relevant to me

6

whether it's pretty easy to make a left turn and go hook up

7

to the dock and start unloading.

8
9

If you had a fairly stable seemingly

MR. WARREN-BOULTON:
to that.

Maybe that is often going to

My concern is how we respond

Even in this discussion, it's quite clear that

10

everybody is saying the merger is somehow less likely to

11

have a price impact if it never turned and went into the

12

port, if it really truly was an uncommitted entrant.

13

never turned and went into the port, there are some sunk

14

costs of entering and going into the port.

15

incumbents raise their prices, this guy is going to turn

16

into the port, and once he gets into the port, you are not

17

going to be able to get rid of him.

18

be less of a problem if the guy never turns to go into the

19

port than if you see him routinely coming into port, and yet

20

the presupposition in every merger I have ever dealt with is

21

my God, do everything you can to see if you can characterize

22

that the guy is an uncommitted entrant.

23

MR. WHITENER:

If it

If the

The merger is likely to

It is the interpretation that I

24

think I find really problematic, and I'm not sure quite how

25

that happened, except maybe it came earlier in the
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Guidelines, and like all procedures, you spend all your time

2

worrying about what comes first.

3

MR. MELAMED:

Analysis aside, if you are arguing

4

the world is going to hell but don't worry, there is going

5

to be a savior, you are in big trouble, and you want to

6

avoid being in that situation.

7
8

MR. GEBHARD:

I see we have exhausted our time.

In fact, we have gone over for a few minutes.

9

Let me just close by noting that for a topic that

10

initially many people thought was not particularly the

11

sexiest on the workshop agenda, I think we have had very

12

interesting discussion, and some interesting comments this

13

afternoon.

14

For that, I want to thank each of the panelists

15

and thank the audience who stuck around for the late, late

16

part of the day.

17

Thank you very much.

18

(Applause.)

19

(Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the

20

workshop was concluded.)

21

-

-

-

-

22
23
24
25
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